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1 Introduction 
The history of a science has been described in terms of transitions between paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). 
A paradigm is a set of rules, standards and practices shared by groups of scientists, representing the 
continuation of a research tradition. For example, nanotechnology has been regarded as a 
revolutionary technology that is bringing about a paradigm shift in industrial research. Within a 
particular scientific discipline there are typically periods of stability, or normal science, punctuated by 
periods of crisis, leading to a revolution and a new normal science. During a stable period, puzzle-
solving activities take place in response to a mismatch between the paradigm and reality. The puzzles 
that cannot be solved are seen as anomalies of a paradigm, which produce disorder or crisis, and 
which encourage the willingness to try new approaches.  The existence of unsolvable puzzles, such as 
how to overcome the limits of Moore’s Law and to benefit from nanotechnology, serves as an 
incentive to develop a new paradigm.  
In this book, we argue that the emergence and development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) represents a 
paradigm shift in science. While all prior paradigms have been based on an entirely human 
civilization, AI will create a human-machine civilization. It is likely that during this century the 
accelerating growth of computer power will result in machine intelligence exceeding human 
intelligence in capability. AI will outperform the biological portion of humanity. It is even possible 
that reverse engineering of our software (our minds) and upgrading our hardware (our bodies) may 
indefinitely extend human life before the dawn of the 22
nd
 century.  Humankind will coexist and may 
ultimately merge with its computational technology. The intelligent beings that would emerge would 
represent the next stage in evolution. In a few decades, the average human brain may host billions of 
blood-cell-sized computers that will effectively multiply our biological intelligence a billion fold. This 
vast inter-neuronal network of computers would allow humans to think at electronic speeds, store 
worlds of information, and disseminate that information to each other or to all humans instantly.  
This book is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of the Singularity, a stage in 
development in which technological progress and economic growth increase at a near-infinite rate. 
Section 3 describes what artificial intelligence is and how it has been applied. Section 4 considers 
artificial happiness and the likelihood that artificial intelligence might increase human happiness. 
Section 5 discusses some prominent related concepts and issues. Section 6 describes the use of 
artificial agents in economic modeling, and section 7 considers some ways in which economic 
analysis can offer some hints about what the advent of artificial intelligence might bring. Chapter 8 
presents some thoughts about the current state of AI and its future prospects. 
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2 Technological Progress: Logistic Growth or Singularity? 
Human history has always been characterized by technological advances. One view about the 
trajectory of technological progress is that it follows a series of logistic processes. According to this 
view, technological progress develops in three stages: slow growth at first, followed by rapid growth 
and finally a leveling off, as illustrated by S-shaped curves. Cowan (2011) argues that human 
civilization is currently on a flat portion of this curve. The advent of artificial intelligence has the 
promise to alter this pattern.  Futurist Ray Kurzweil (2005) asserts that a serious assessment of the 
history of technology shows that technological change is exponential. In his view the power of future 
technology is generally underestimated because it is based on a linear extrapolation. For a brief period 
of time exponential trends appear to be linear, particularly in the early stage of progress. According to 
Kurzweil, smarter computers and their integration with human brains will lead to a time when change 
is so fast and significant that the progress-curve becomes nearly vertical, and technology appears to be 
improving at infinite speed. This situation has been termed the Singularity.   
The Singularity is a time of Transhumanism, at which there will be no clear distinction between 
humans and machines or between physical and virtual reality. Based on recent progress in the fields of 
neurobiology and nanotechnology, Kurzweil predicts significant steps in the fight against disease and 
aging, as well as in the augmentation of the human mind. In his opinion, in the future the line between 
biology and technology will blur and eventually become irrelevant. Humanity would be aided by the 
interaction with technology and potential pitfalls mitigated by smart technological solutions. Most 
Singularitarians believe that the Singularity will take place in this century, likely even within several 
decades. Kurzweil mentions 2045, but other futurists use a more conservative timeframe: 2140. 
The most likely cause of the Singularity will be the creation of some form of rapidly self-enhancing 
greater-than-human intelligence. Human intellectual skills have developed thus far through evolution. 
Our brains today are relatively fixed in design and capacity. Biological human thinking is limited to 
1016 calculations per second per human brain. Currently we cannot increase our own brainpower 
within our lifetimes; in fact we gradually lose neurons as we age. All thought is taking place on 
neurons with a limiting speed of 200 operations per second with a top speed of the electrochemical 
signals of 150 meters per second along the fastest neurons.  
By comparison, the speed of light is 300,000,000 meter per second, two million times greater. Speeds 
in modern computer chips are currently at around 2GHz, a ten million fold difference over humans 
and increasing exponentially. Within a few decades computers will have computational power and 
intelligence vastly greater than the human brain, and non-biological intelligence will be one billion 
times more powerful than all human intelligence today. The Singularity would result from many 
intertwined technological revolutions, including in Genetics, Nanotechnology and Robotics (GNR). 
At this moment the early stages of the G-revolution appear to be occurring. The genetic revolution is 
currently focused on correcting obvious biological flaws. The precise biochemical pathways that 
underlie both disease and aging processes are being discovered. Scientists are on the verge of being 
able to control how genes express themselves. This revolution has the promise to greatly increase 
human longevity, as humans move away from their biological bodies toward a software-based 
existence.  
The N-revolution may eventually enable a redesign and rebuilding of human bodies and brains, and 
indeed the world, molecule by molecule from the bottom up, going beyond the limitations of biology. 
However, as revolutionary as nanotechnology will be, artificial intelligence will have far more 
profound consequences, since nanotechnology is powerful but not necessarily intelligent. The most 
powerful revolution is the robotic or R-revolution: human-level robots with their artificial computer 
thinking ability will far exceed human capabilities. This is already well underway, as we discuss in 




2.1 Empirical Evidence in favor of the Singularity 
Maddison (2008) and Jones (2009) present evidence that per-capita GDP and population growth have 
been accelerating. Jones, referring to Nordhaus (1969), who links accelerating growth to ideas in his 
famous “price of light” calculation, postulates that new ideas are at the heart of accelerating 
population and productivity growth. More people lead to more ideas and more ideas made it possible 
for the world to support more people. Since population is a power function of the number of ideas, 
population growth accelerates similarly over time. Hence, both ideas and population would become 
infinite in a finite period of time if there were no resource constraints. However, since it is 
biologically impossible for the population growth rate to become infinite, fertility and population 
growth would eventually level out. 
Although demographic projections predict that the number of humans on earth will reach a maximum 
in this century, which might lead to a slowing of growth in technology, many factors may offset such 
a slowdown. More intense integration and communication among people allows individuals to share 
ideas and this factor may continue to grow long after total population begins to decline. Moreover, 
rising levels of human capital per capita will make the average individual better at discovering and 
sharing ideas. This effect may be increased if new institutions change incentives.  
Market signals point to acceleration in the rate of innovation in recent decades. There is a trend 
toward shorter corporate longevity. In the 1950s the average turnover in the S&P 500, measured by 
additions and deletions to the index, was about 3-4% per annum, suggesting an average life, as a 
component of the index, of about 25-35 years. The current annual turnover in the S&P 500 is about 7-
8%, corresponding to an average company life just 12-14 years. The weighting of technology 
companies in the stock market is four times greater than it was a decade ago at 28% versus 7% 
(Mauboussin and Schay, 2000). 
Furthermore, individual company share price volatility is increasing (Campbell et al., 2001). While 
the market’s overall volatility is currently well within historical bounds, the volatility of individual 
stocks has been increasing sharply since the early 1960s, revealing greater turnover in individual 
company prospects.  
The global economy is moving from physical to knowledge assets. This increases the stakes of 
success and failure. Evidence of this transition is provided by the sharp increase in Tobin’s q ratio, the 
ratio between market price and balance sheet asset value. One calculation shows that the q ratio rose 
from about 0.5 in 1980 to 2.5 in 2000 (Mauboussin and Schay, 2000). In many knowledge sectors 
firms compete in winner-take-all or winner-take-most markets in which the strong get stronger and 
the weak get weaker. Examples of winners include Microsoft (PC operating systems), Google (online 
search engines) and eBay (consumer online auctions). Shareholder returns for the top firms are 
increasing, while the declines for the losers are getting steeper.  
2.2 Living Forever: Methuselarity  
A great deal of human effort goes into avoiding and delaying death. Aubrey de Grey (2008) has 
suggested that a succession of advances in age reduction will surpass a critical threshold, which he 
terms Methuselarity. Methuselarity is the bio-gerontological counterpart of the Singularity. 
Methuselarity is the point at which people can expect to live, without age-related physiological and 
cognitive decline, from a low-three-digit to an infinite number of years. Aging will be subject to 
comprehensive postponement by regenerative medicine which partially or completely restores a 
damaged biological structure to its pre-damaged state. When rejuvenation therapies, the restoration of 
a lower biological age, are sufficient to deplete the damage through aging more rapidly than it is 
accumulating, Methuselarity, ”longevity escape velocity” or LEV will have been reached  
According to de Grey, the transition to Methuselarity will take no longer than a few years to arrive. 
Although he predicts a progressive, smooth, modest, relatively slow and unbroken decline in the rate 
at which new anti-aging therapies will be developed once LEV is first achieved, only quite modest 
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rates of progress will be sufficient to greatly postpone aging. Ultra-powerful computers would assist 
in attaining these innovations. De Grey predicts that the first thousand-year-old human is probably 
less than 20 years younger than the first 150-year-old. The first million-year-old and billion-year-old 
are probably less than a year younger than the first thousand-year-old.  
The Avatar Roadmap to Human Immortality 
Russian media magnate Dmitry Itskov is heading "Avatar," an extraordinarily ambitious and far-
reaching multidisciplinary research project that aims to achieve immortality in humans within the next 
three decades (Borghino, 2012). He plans to do it by housing human brains in progressively more 
disembodied vehicles, first transplanting them into robots and then, by the year 2045, reverse-
engineering the human brain and effectively "downloading" human consciousness onto a computer 
chip. 
Speculating on seemingly unachievable goals like this one is subject to a cognitive trap, the belief that 
improbable technological advances automatically become more likely simply by looking further away 
in the future. Itskov’s project seems to suffer from this trap. The principle of the late professor in 
astronomy Carl Sagan, which states that "extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence," 
seems to apply here. However, with the rate of technological change continuing to accelerate, the 
Avatar’s goals may be within reach, but not necessarily within the project's aggressive timeline. 
The first of the proposed steps, to be completed before 2020, would be to create a robotic copy of a 
human body, an android "avatar", controlled entirely by a brain-computer interface. The system would 
at first be of interest to physically handicapped people, but might also enable people to work in 
hazardous environments or perform dangerous rescue operations. 
DARPA, the American Defense Department Advanced Research Projects Agency, has allotted US$7 
million of next year's budget to the development of interfaces enabling a soldier to guide a semi-
autonomous machine and allow it to act as the soldier's surrogate.  
The second step would be the creation of an autonomous life support Avatar system in which a human 
brain is transplanted at the end of one’s life by 2025. Immobile patients with an intact brain would be 
able to regain the ability to move via their new synthetic bodies. A varied range of bio-electronic 
devices might become available, creating superimpositions of electronic and biological systems. 
Not a great deal of research is going into this at the moment. The closest match is the research of Dr. 
Robert J. White who, back in the 70s, performed several head transplants in monkey (Borghino). They 
lasted only just a few days because the surgery included severing the spine at the neck, so that the 
subjects were all paralyzed from the neck down. The animals were euthanized after being studied. 
The third step is to occur in the periods from 2030 – 2035. Itskov aims to reverse-engineer the human 
brain and find a means of "downloading" human personality and consciousness into a synthetic 
version. This would allow the creation of a human-like artificial intelligence and the achievement of 
cybernetic immortality for humans.  
Although there is much interest among neuroscientists in better understanding the inner workings of 
the brain, no current research project is yet considering transferring human consciousness into a 
silicon chip. A robotic arm that can execute the electrical signals of single neurons is certainly a step 
in that direction. 
For the fourth and final step, to occur by the year 2045, Itskov expects to see "substance-independent 
minds" uploaded not only onto a computer chip, but also into bodies of different compositions. A 
holographic body could walk through walls or move at the speed of light, while a body made of 
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nanorobots would be able to take on a number of different forms at will. By that time humanity will 
have made a fully managed evolutionary transition and become a new species. 
Itskov is absolutely serious about his project and has invested plenty of his own money, hiring 30 
scientists to achieve his goal. The initiative has also received the support and blessing of the Dalai 
Lama.  
2.3 Obstacles to Reaching the Singularity 
A number of factors, that may impede the advent of the Singularity, has been proposed. First, as 
Benjamin Jones (2005) has argued, there is a”Knowledge Burden”, or information overload, even 
when irrelevant information is filtered away. The burden acts as a brake to accelerating technological 
and economic progress. The knowledge burden is increasing, and has negative consequences for 
economic growth.   
The reason is that with an accumulating stock of knowledge due to technological progress, the 
expanding time costs of education is delaying the onset of active careers in innovation. By standing on 
the shoulders of giants, one can see farther, but first one has to climb up their backs. The greater the 
existing stock of knowledge, the harder this climb becomes. Innovators can compensate by seeking 
narrower expertise (this is the so-called “the death of the Renaissance Man” effect, i.e. the decline of 
the multi-talented person), but this may reduce their individual capacity to innovate and force 
innovators to work in teams.  
Empirical evidence that Jones presents, shows that over the course of the 20
th
 century, the mean age at 
which great inventors and Nobel Prize winners produced their great innovations increased by 6 years. 
The age at first innovation is trending upwards by 0.6 years per decade. There is a 6% increase in 
specialization every ten years and research team size is increasing at the steep rate of 17% per decade. 
The decrease observed in patents per American R&D worker of about 50% since 1975 is 
accompanied by a rise in team size over that period. 
Second, knowledge and skills are unevenly distributed and their exponential growth also leads to 
exponential growth of differences. Although there is diffusion of information between those who have 
lots of knowledge and those who do not, this transfer becomes less and less effective as the 
differences widen on the approach to Singularity.  
This may already be happening in the scientific community. An article in the August 1995 issue of 
Scientific American ("Lost Science in the Third World") discusses how third world scientific journals 
have become essentially invisible to the mainstream, first world scientific community due citation 
services and reviewer prejudices. Because of economic constraints, the third world cannot afford 
many important scientific journals, and the Internet is slow to spread and expensive. This gap is self-
reinforcing, and there is a risk that accelerating progress would make it impossible to close.  
The possibility that the Singularity occurs for a very limited subset of humanity (a "spike" as opposed 
to a "swell") cannot be ruled out. This would create a tremendous knowledge and ability gap with 
unpredictable social, political and economic effects. In the past we have often seen that the have-nots 
rebel against the elite due to real or imagined grievances, but this time the elite has a real chance of 
being so advanced that revolt is impossible. Moreover, the more quickly a small group advances, the 
more likely it is that their attitudes and vision of the world will be strengthened, filtering away 
information that does not fit their attitudes, leading to groupthink. It may also trigger political tension 
between the technological haves and have-nots, which could lead to costly conflicts. 
Third, there is the matter of human resistance to change. Even if a new technology is very useful, 
there is often a long delay before it becomes widely used, often simply because it is not perceived as 
necessary or as valuable as it actually is. It took over 140 years (!) for the fax machine to become 
common and several decades for computers and television to develop to the point where they became 
extensively usable. Sometimes, more inefficient systems remain  ”locked in” even when better 
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alternatives are present (for example, practically all English speakers use QWERTY-keyboards 
instead of the faster and less tiring DVORAK-keyboards) as technologies become more entrenched 
and where shifting to new systems appears more difficult than continuing with the old. Furthermore, 
to move to a wholly new technology, an entirely new infrastructure has to be built. This can be slow 
and expensive. Complicating the matter, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, elites often have 
an interest in limiting the spread of new technology that limits their power. This has served to keep 
much of the world poor historically. 
Fourth, the motivation to innovate may be deceasing since, as technological progress increasingly 
satisfies current human needs, individuals become less concerned with technological development. 
They may turn more toward personal growth, unique experiences, and other activities. While such 
activities may be creative, they are less obviously innovations in a technological sense.   
Fifth, there are challenges of coordination. Singularitarians often claim that a few key technologies 
need to be developed, and then everything will start snowballing. Overlooked is the huge 
interdependence of technological systems. It is not enough to have the technological ability in one 
area. Other areas have to be sufficiently developed to lead to major breakthroughs.  
Sixth, physical limitations to the Singularity exist. The speed of light prevents the exchange of 
information quickly over long distances. To communicate faster we have to move closer. There are 
also limits on information density. The Bekenstein Bound states that in computer science there is a 
maximum information-processing rate for a physical system that has finite size or energy. The speed 
of molecular or sub-atomic switches also places limitations on possible processing units and 
memories. Even very advanced civilizations will be subject to the laws of physics.  
Seventh, technology forecasters assume that past trends will simply continue indefinitely. However, 
technology is not (yet) a self-generating force progressing by its own internal dynamics.  All known 
natural growth paths follow a logistic function, which can be approximated by an exponential only in 
its early stages. Even Kurzweil admits that his exponential growth curves will eventually turn into S-
curves, though this would happen a very long time in the future.  
Eighth, there are economic incentives to slow down innovation. The first mass produced nanobots are 
unlikely to be self-produced, if only because the original designer and manufacturer of self-
reproducing machines would be destroying its own future market. This self-reproducibility will be a 
major obstacle to investment. Furthermore, the risk associated with investment on a large scale will 
not be undertaken until the products and processes are thoroughly tested and the applications are well-
established. Extrapolating technology forecasts depend on questionable sustained trends in enabling 
technologies and continued declining costs. Moreover, old technologies may resist displacement by 
new technologies because of the large prior investment in the infrastructure supporting them. 
Ninth, it is unclear that there will always be demand for new technology: Kurzweil has based his 
entire structure of expectations on Say’s Law which states that the supply of a new product creates its 
own demand.   Say’s law has been discredited within the economics profession by periods of low 
demand, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the troughs of later business cycles.   
Tenth, not all aspects of intelligence are subject to potential increases in productivity. Kurzweil 
considers what the brain does as a computational exercise. In his opinion, since machines do 
computations very well, it will become possible to imitate what the brain does with machines. 
Kurzweil predicts that the computational capacity needed to emulate human intelligence will be 
available in less than two decades.  However, the problem is that productivity increases are less 
obviously applicable to the other functions of the brain: the emotional, the memorial, the problem 
solving, the creative and so on. Indeed, most of the energy a human neuron consumes is devoted to 




3. Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence represents the most plausible path to reaching the Singularity. Charles Darwin 
(1859) has shown how a complex and adaptive system can arise from an evolutionary process of 
natural selection acting on random variation without the assistance of an intelligent designer. 
However, since ancient times humanity has been intrigued by the ability to design intelligent 
machines. Today, with the advent of the computer and 50 years of research into Artificial Intelligence 
programming techniques, the dream of creating smart machines is becoming a reality. At this moment 
in history human biological evolution is on the verge of being superseded by technological progress. 
Researchers are creating systems which can mimic human thought, understand speech, beat the best 
human chessplayer, and countless other feats never before thought possible. Militaries are applying AI 
logic to their hi-tech systems, and in the near future Artificial Intelligence will noticeably impact our 
lives.  
One of the goals of Artificial Intelligence is to replicate human intelligence in machines or computers.  
Although until now intelligence has been considered irrelevant to cosmological events and processes, 
proponents of AI argue that it is more powerful than all other forces in the universe. It may be only a 
matter of a few centuries before intelligence can manipulate matter and energy and create the universe 
it wants.  
Human intelligence, according to mainstream thinking in psychology, is not a single ability or 
cognitive process, but rather an array of separate components: learning, reasoning, problem-solving, 
perception, and language comprehension. Intelligence is the ability to adapt one's behavior to fit new 
circumstances.  Some researchers in AI take a narrower view, and consider human intelligence as only 
the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world. This consists of the ability to solve 
problems, think quickly, act with purpose, think rationally and associate effectively with the 
environment.  
Intelligence demands a number of irreducible features and capabilities. It requires senses to obtain 
features from the world and a coherent means for storing the knowledge thereby obtained. Systems of 
artificial intelligence must be able to process temporal data as patterns in time and store them in a way 
that facilitates concept formation and generalization. Such knowledge also needs to be automatically 
adjusted and updated on an ongoing basis, and new knowledge must be appropriately related to 
existing data. AI systems must be capable of acquiring knowledge on their own. They need to control 
what input data is processed – where to obtain data, in how much detail, and in what format. Since 
reality presents more data than is relevant, general intelligence must cope with an overabundance of 
data, and select the input data used for analysis and learning. It is also important to obtain multiple 
views of reality. Much of its learning must be autonomous, without teachers, through self-directed 
learning and adaptation. A general AI system must be able to dynamically and adaptively interact 
with the environment.  
Many researchers do not believe that general artificial intelligence is possible and they concentrate 
their efforts on domain-specific AI projects for commercial or academic purposes with more 
immediate results. Nevertheless, General AI promises to make an important contribution toward 
developing software and robotic systems that are more usable, intelligent, and human-friendly. 
Probably the closest work that aims to achieve general rather than niche intelligence is the Novamente 
project under the direction of Ben Goertzel (2007).  
3.1 Definition of Artificial Intelligence 
Definitions of artificial intelligence fall into two main categories. On the one hand there are systems 
that think and act like humans. These are machines with minds performing activities such as decision-
making, problem solving and learning, which require intelligence. These kinds of definitions measure 
success in terms of fidelity to human performance. On the other hand there are systems that measure 
success against an ideal concept of intelligence, in which a system is intelligent if it takes the best 
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possible action given what it knows. These systems use computational models that make it possible to 
perceive, to reason and to act.  
Although there is no consensus definition of intelligence, there is wide agreement among AI 
researchers that intelligence is required to do the following things: reason, use strategy, solve puzzles, 
make judgments under uncertainty; represent knowledge, including commonsense knowledge; plan; 
learn; communicate in natural language; and integrate the use of all of these skills towards common 
goals. Other important capabilities to be included in the concept of AI are the ability to sense and the 
ability to act (for example to move and manipulate objects) in the outside world. This includes an 
ability to detect and respond to hazards. Some sources consider "salience", the capacity for 
recognizing importance and to evaluate novelty, as an important feature. Some interdisciplinary 
approaches to intelligence also emphasize the need to consider imagination (taken as the ability to 
form mental images and concepts that were not programmed in) and autonomy. Computer based 
systems that exhibit some of these capabilities (e.g. computational creativity, decision support 
systems, robots, evolutionary computational ability, intelligent agents) do exist, but not yet at a human 
level. Other aspects of the human mind that are relevant to the concept of AI are the following. 
Consciousness is to ability to have subjective experience and thought. Self-awareness is the capacity 
to be aware of oneself as a separate individual, especially to be aware of one's own thoughts. 
Sentience is the ability to "feel" perceptions or emotions subjectively). Sapience is the capacity for 
wisdom. When a machine can persuasively argue on its own that it has feelings that need to be 
respected it can be postulated that a machine has consciousness. Although an AI system might be able 
to bootstrap itself to higher and higher levels of intelligence by thinking about AI, the level of AI at 
which this process can begin exceeds the current level.   
The term Artificial Intelligence was coined in 1956 by John McCarthy, an American computer and 
cognitive scientist, who organized the first international conference on AI at Dartmouth, New 
Hampshire. He defined AI as the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, which 
exhibit reasoning, knowledge, planning, learning, communication, perception and the ability to move 
and manipulate objects.  
Wikipedia defines Artificial Intelligence as the intelligence of machines and the branch of computer 
science that aims to create it. A modern, widely-used definition describes the field as the study and 
design of intelligent agents where an intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and 
takes actions that maximize his chances of success.  
Artificial Intelligence can also be defined as the science of making computers do things that require 
intelligence when done by humans. Computers are considered to be the right kind of machine to be 
made intelligent. Computers may be programmed to simulate intelligence. Computer programs have 
plenty of speed and memory. However, their abilities are limited to those intellectual mechanisms that 
program designers understand well enough to code into programs.  
In this manuscript, the term Artificial Intelligence is used in a very broad sense. It includes, but is not 
limited to, machine learning, pattern recognition, cognitive architectures, logical models, robot brain 
architectures, vision, sensor informatics and knowledge engineering.  
3.1.1 Turing Test 
Alan Turing, in a seminal paper entitled Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950), reduced the 
problem of defining intelligence to a simple question about conversation. In order to verify a 
machine’s capability to demonstrate intelligence, Turing developed a test. Turing asked the question 
“Can a Machine Think?”  Turing’s suggestion was that, if the responses from a computer were 
indistinguishable from those of a human, the computer could be said to be thinking and should be 
classified as intelligent. Turing concluded: If a machine acts as intelligently as a human being, then it 
is as intelligent as a human being. 
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The Turing Test involves a machine in one room and a person in another, each responding by teletype 
to remarks made by a human judge in a third room for some fixed period of time. The judge engages 
in a natural language conversation with the human and the machine and each of them try to appear 
human; if the judge cannot reliably tell which is which, then the machine is said to pass the test. 
Hence, being intelligent is defined as passing the Turing Test. 
The Turing test has been criticized because it is anthropomorphic in the sense that it attributes human 
characteristics to non-human animals or non-living things. But there is no reason why intelligent 
machines should closely resemble humans. Another disadvantage of the Turing test is that it does not 
test for particular human features such as the ability to be insulted or the temptation to lie. Moreover, 
a computer might score high when the questioner poses questions which require answers in terms of 
“Yes” or “No”. But a computer may not be expected to perform like a human being to questions of a 
broad-based, conversational nature, especially in the case of emotionally charged or socially sensitive 
issues. In some cases, like a search engine, a computer may perform much better and faster than a 
human so that the questioner can easily tell which is which. 
Turing’s Test has been confronted with nine common objections. These encompass all of the major 
criticism against AI. Turing countered that none of these negate the validity of his test. 
1) Theological Objection: Thinking is a function of man’s immortal soul and therefore a machine 
cannot think. Turing’s answer was that God could have granted a computer a soul if He so wished. 
2) Heads in the Sand Objection: The consequences of machine thinking are too terrible. Hopefully 
they cannot do so. Turing’s answer was that this confuses what should not be with what can or cannot 
be.  
3) Mathematical Objection: There are limits to what questions a computer system can answer. Turing 
suggested that humans are too often wrong themselves and are pleased at the fallibility of a machine. 
4) Argument from Consciousness: Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto 
could a machine equal a brain. Turing answered by saying that we have no way of knowing whether 
any being other than ourselves experiences consciousness or emotions. 
5) Arguments from various disabilities. These arguments all have the form “a computer will never do 
X”. 
 A machine cannot make mistakes. Turing noted it is easy to program a machine to appear to 
make a mistake. 
 A machine cannot be self-aware. Turing asserted that a program which can report on its 
internal states and processes can certainly be written. 
 A machine cannot have much diversity of behavior. Turing answered that with enough storage 
capacity, a computer can behave in an astronomical number of different ways. 
 
6) Lady Ada Lovelace’s Objection
1
: Computers are incapable of originality because they are incapable 
of independent learning. Turing’s response was that computers can still surprise humans, especially in 
cases where the consequences of different facts are not immediately recognizable. 
7) Argument from continuity in the nervous system:  According to modern neurological research the 
brain is not digital. The exact timing and probability of pulses have analog components. Turing’s 
                                                          
1 Augusta Ada King, Countess of Lovelace (1815 – 1852) is sometimes considered the World's First Computer 
Programmer.
 
She was the only legitimate child of the poet Lord Byron. She foresaw the capability of computers 




answer was that given enough computing power any analog system can be simulated to a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. 
8) Argument from the informality of behavior: Any system governed by laws (such as machines) will 
be predictable and hence is not truly intelligent. Turing’s answer was that this confuses laws of 
behavior with general rules of conduct. On a broad enough scale, machine behavior can become very 
difficult to predict. 
9) Extra-Sensory Perception such as telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis might 
not hold for machines. Turing’s answer was that conditions can be created in which this would not 
affect the test and so this argument may be disregarded. 
Turing was optimistic that computers would soon be able to exhibit apparently intelligent behavior, 
answering questions posed in English and carrying on conversations. However, as of 2008, no 
computer has passed the Turing Test. Trying to pass the Turing Test is not an active focus of much 
mainstream academic or commercial activity. AI researchers have devoted little attention to passing 
the Turing test, since there are easier ways to test their programs, such as by giving them a task 
directly, rather than through the roundabout method of first posing a question in a chat room 
populated with machines and people. Indeed, Turing never intended his test to be used as a real, day-
to-day measure of the intelligence of AI programs. He wanted to provide a clear and understandable 
example to help discussion of the philosophy of AI.  
The Turing test is commonly cited in discussions of artificial intelligence as a proposed criterion for 
machine consciousness; it has provoked a great deal of philosophical debate. For example, Dennett 
and Hofstadter (1981) argue that anything capable of passing the Turing test is necessarily conscious, 
while Chalmers (1995) argues that a philosophical zombie could pass the test, yet fail to be conscious.  
Even if the Turing Test is a good operational definition of intelligence, it may not indicate that a 
machine has consciousness, or that it has intentionality. Perhaps intelligence and consciousness are 
such that neither one necessarily implies the other. This issue is taken up in section 5.8. 
An obvious difficulty with the test is its reliance on the decision by a human judge. The human judge 
may be unfairly chauvinist in rejecting genuinely intelligent machines or he may be overly liberal in 
accepting cleverly-engineered mindless machines. 
There is an ongoing $10,000 bet between Mitch Kapor, the founder of Lotus Development 
Corporation and the designer of Lotus 1-2-3, and Ray Kurzweil about whether a computer will pass a 
Turing test by 2029. Kurzweil has predicted that Turing-test-capable computers would be 
manufactured around 2029. The Loebner Prize is the first formal Turing test. Hugh Loebner has 
pledged a Grand Prize of $100,000 and a Gold Medal for the first computer whose responses were 
indistinguishable from a human’s, as evaluated in a competition in which a judge asks questions to 
humans and computer competitors. In 1991, when the first Loebner prize competition was run, The 
Economist reported that the winning entry incorporated deliberate errors to fool the judges into 
believing that it was human. This technique has remained a part of the subsequent Loebner prize 
competitions, and has come to be known as Artificial Stupidity.  
Since 2001, another annual competition, started by Chatter Box Challenge (CBC), awards prizes 
annually to the most humanlike chatterbot, a computer program whose aim is to fool the user into 
thinking that the program's output has been produced by a human.  
3.1.2 Chinese Room Argument 
The Chinese Room argument, devised by John Searle, an American philosopher, (1980), is an 
argument against the notion that a compuer capabe of passing the Turing test would necessarily be 
able to think. His argument proceeds as follows. Suppose the Turing test is conducted in Chinese 
rather than English, and suppose a computer program successfully passes it. Does the system that is 
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executing the program understand Chinese? Searle’s argument centers on a thought experiment, in 
which someone who knows only English sits alone in a room full of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data 
base), together with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program). People outside 
the room send in other Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in 
Chinese. By following the instructions of the program the man in the room is able to pass out Chinese 
symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output). From the outside, it will appear that 
the Chinese room contains a fully intelligent person who speaks Chinese. But there is no one (or 
anything) in the room that understands Chinese. The instruction book is certainly not aware. Hence, 
Searle concludes that the Chinese room, or any other physical symbol system, cannot have a mind and 
that no understanding is created by running a program. The program enables the person in the room to 
pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese, but actually he does not understand a word of 
Chinese. 
3.1.3 Ned Block’s Blockhead Argument 
A second argument against the Turing Test as a standard for intelligence is Ned Block’s (an American 
Philosopher) Blockhead argument. Block (1981) argues that a non-intelligent system can actually be 
made to pass the Turing Test. Like Searle, Block argues that there is only a finite set of grammatically 
and syntactically correct responses to any input from a human judge. Although the number of such 
responses is huge, it is still theoretically possible to program a computer with each of these potential 
responses. Such a machine can converse with a human on any topic, if it already has all the possible 
replies pre-programmed in. Hence, the machine would be able to pass the Turing test despite the fact 
that it fails to possess any actual intelligence. 
Behaviorists argue that if something acts conscious in every way, it necessarily is conscious, because 
they define consciousness in terms of behavioral capacity. Block argues that two systems may be 
alike in many behavioral properties, yet there could be a difference in the internal information 
processing that mediates their stimuli and responses. One system could not be intelligent at all, while 
the other is fully intelligent.   
3.2 Scope and Approaches to Artificial Intelligence                                                      
AI research is highly technical and specialized, and sharply divided into branches that often fail to 
communicate with each other. Subfields have grown up around particular academic institutions, the 
work of individual researchers, the solution of specific problems, longstanding opinions about how AI 
should be done, and the application of specific tools. General Artificial Intelligence (AGI), or "strong 
AI", combining all these skills and exceeding human abilities, is still among the field's long term 
goals. However, at the present time, there is no established unifying theory that guides AI research. 
Researchers disagree about many issues. 
A basic question is whether a machine can display general intelligence. How does one know whether 
a machine is really thinking as a person thinks or is just acting like it is thinking? Many AI 
researchers take the position that is summarized in the statement of the Dartmouth Conferences of 
1956, which is widely considered as the birth of AI:                                                                                                     
“Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can be so precisely described that a 
machine can be made to simulate it.”                  
This issue can ultimately be resolved in one of two ways. On the one hand, it may be shown that there 
is some practical limit to the abilities of computers or that there is some special quality of the 
biological human mind, which is necessary for thinking, that cannot be duplicated by a machine. On 
the other hand, it may be shown that such an AI system is possible.  If the human nervous system 
obeys the laws of physics and chemistry, then it should be feasible to reproduce the behavior of the 
nervous system with some physical device.  
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In 1963, Alan Newell and Herbert Simon argued that the essence of both human and machine 
intelligence is symbol manipulation. They claimed that a symbol system is necessary and sufficient 
for intelligence and for machines to be intelligent. They wrote: “A physical symbol system has the 
necessary and sufficient means of general intelligent action.”   
This position has been criticized by American philosopher Hubert Dreyfus (1992), who argued that 
human intelligence and expertise depend primarily on unconscious intuitions, rather than conscious 
symbol manipulation. He claims that these unconscious skills would never be captured in formal 
rules. Nevertheless, progress has been made towards discovering the rules that govern unconscious 
reasoning. Neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, and so on are often directed at simulating 
unconscious reasoning and learning. AI research has generally moved away from symbol 
manipulation and toward new models that are intended to capture more of human unconscious 
reasoning.  
The question of whether a machine can have a mind, consciousness, and mental states, revolves 
around a requirement proposed by Searle for strong AI:  “A physical symbol system, a machine, can 
have a mind and mental states and is actually thinking.” This position may be distinguished from 
what he called weak AI: “A physical symbol system can act as if it were intelligent.”  
Strong AI would require a machine to exhibit consciousness and emotions. Consciousness is self-
awareness, possessed by a machine that is the subject of its own thought. Viewed in this way a 
program can be written for a machine that can report on its own internal states, such as a debugger. A 
related issue is whether a machine can process qualia, a term used in philosophy to describe 
subjective conscious experiences. Qualia are purely subjective sensory qualities like "the redness of 
red" that accompany our perception. If two people see the same thing, they may have a different 
experience. If qualia exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red, would be unable to describe 
the experience of this perception, in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color would 
be able to know everything there is to know about that experience.  
What is mysterious and fascinating about consciousness is not so much what it is but how it arises: 
how does a lump of fatty tissue and electricity in a human body give rise to the familiar experience of 
perceiving, meaning or thinking? This is the hard problem of consciousness: explaining the 
relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience. How can physical 
processes be accompanied by experience?  
Emotions are another highly controversial topic, and are related to consciousness. The question of 
whether a machine can actually feel emotion, or whether it merely acts as if feeling an emotion, is the 
philosophical issue of consciousness of machines in another form.  
AI is often defined as a field of computer science that explores complex computational models of 
problem solving by human beings. Computational modeling requires a mathematical and logically 
formal representation of a problem. Representation is defined as substitution, standing for something 
else, and it acts as an intermediary between the subject and the objects it observes. Representations 
serve as a causal connection, as a mediating entity between stimuli and responses. They make 
thinking possible. Examples of representations are linguistic symbols, mathematical symbols, visual 
patterns, images, categories, beliefs, propositional attitudes, schemata, and networks. 
Certain mental states such as pain, fears or depression may not be representational and may not be 
suitable for a computational treatment. Many AI researchers are computationalists, who believe that 
the brain is nothing more than a computer, and that consciousness and intelligence are the result of 
physical processes in the brain. The proponents of this computational theory of mind claim that the 
relationship between mind and brain is similar, if not identical, to the relationship between a running 
computer program and the computer it is running on. According to this view human intelligence is 
nothing more than a form of calculation. This has the implication that artificial intelligence is 
possible. Continuing progress in the development of faster, more capable computers would cause the 
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computer to equal and then to surpass humans in intelligence. However, this ignores the difficult 
philosophical question of whether a computer program, running on a digital machine that shuffles the 
binary digits of zero and one, can duplicate the ability of neurons to create minds, with mental states 
such as understanding or perceiving, as well as the experience of consciousness. 
Moravec’s paradox refers to the striking fact that high-level reasoning requires very little 
computation, while low-level sensorimotor skills require enormous computational resources. Hans 
Moravec (1988), an Austrian futurist, known for his work on robotics and AI, observed that "it is 
comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult level performance on intelligence tests or playing 
checkers or chess, and it is difficult or impossible to give them the skills of a one-year-old when it 
comes to perception and mobility." The mental abilities of a four-year-old – recognizing a face, lifting 
a pencil, walking across a room, answering a question – are some of the hardest engineering problems 
to be solved.  
In this respect, linguist Steven Pinker writes “As the next generations of intelligent devices appear, it 
will be the stock market analysts and petrochemical engineers who are in danger of being replaced by 
machines. The gardeners, receptionists, and cooks are secure in their jobs for decades to come.” Skills 
that appear effortless may be difficult to reverse-engineer, but skills that require much effort and study 
may not necessarily be difficult to engineer at all (Marvin Minsky, 1988). Indeed, perhaps the most 
difficult human skills to reverse engineer are those that are unconscious. 
From the very beginning, development of automated methods for AI planning has been part and 
parcel of AI research. Intelligent systems must be able to plan, that is, to to determine appropriate 
actions for their perceived situation. They then must execute them, and monitor the results. Intelligent 
agents must be able to set goals and achieve them. Algorithmically, a planning problem has, as an 
input, a set of possible courses of action, a predictive model for the underlying dynamics, and a 
performance measure for evaluating the courses of action. The output or solution is one or more 
courses of action that satisfies the specified requirements for performance. A planning problem thus 
involves deciding ‘‘what’’ actions to do, and ‘‘when’’ to do them.  
In classical planning problems, where the environment is static and deterministic, the planner has 
complete information about the current state of the world. More recently, substantial attention is being 
paid to planning in environments that are stochastic, dynamic, and only partially observable, which do 
not satisfy classical planning assumptions. The problem of representing, understanding, and 
controlling the behavior of agents (or other systems) in the context of incomplete or incorrect 
information has demonstrated its feasibility in the field of plausible reasoning. Multi-agent planning 
uses the cooperation and competition of many agents to achieve a given goal.  
Rapid AI development is occuring in speech recognition. Computerized speech has already arrived 
and is commercially available. Cell phones enhance the use and appeal of the mobile Internet by 
allowing users to call up any Web page from a mobile device just by speaking its address. Voice 
recognition also has security applications. It can properly identify a user, which is a necessity when 
providing access to corporate or private databases over the Internet. Speech recognition’s natural 
successor, natural language processing, is still poorly developed. However, developments, such as 
automated language translation, are advancing quickly. 
Perhaps the most ambitious examples of AI development that are currently ongoing, relate to 
computer learning. The aim of computer learning is to reason in a variety of ways, learn from 
experience, and adapt to surprises. Programs exist which can be said to primarily reason. Automated 
reasoning helps produce software which allows computers to reason completely or nearly completely, 
automatically. Other reasoning programs are based on heuristic classification. These AIs have found 
their way into the cockpits of fighter jets, where their main role is to reduce the workload on the pilot 
by providing advice in certain stressful situations. 
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Recent AI research defines intelligent agents. An "agent" is something which perceives and acts in an 
environment. A "performance measure" defines what counts as success for the agent.  If an agent acts 
to maximize the expected value of a performance measure based on past experience and knowledge 
then it is intelligent.  The disadvantage of this standard is that it fails to differentiate between "things 
that think" and "things that do not". By this definition, even a thermostat has intelligence. A few 
families of intelligent systems already have broad applicability across a wide range of sectors (Arnall, 
2003).These are intelligent simulation systems, intelligent information resources, intelligent project 
coaches, and robots. 
1) Intelligent simulation systems: An Intelligent Simulation System (ISS) may be generated to learn 
more about the behavior of an original system, when the original system is not available for 
manipulation. The modeling of climate systems is a good example. An ISS may also be employed for 
training purposes in anticipation of dangerous situations, when the cost of real-world training is 
prohibitive. Such technologies are particularly well advanced in military applications through the 
simulation of war ‘games’. Another very big business in the realm of ISSs is the videogame market, in 
which a ISS creates a sense of reality for the game-player.  
2) Intelligent information resources: Intelligent systems may provide access to a wide variety of 
information, including visual and audio data, with ‘data mining’ receiving much attention. Data 
mining is used to extract general regularities from online data. Commercial and government 
institutions are now logging huge volumes of data and require the means to optimize the use of these 
vast resources. AI can look for patterns in the data that human users might not look for. 
 
3) Intelligent project coaches: Intelligent project coaches can function as co-workers, assisting and 
collaborating in a wide range of teams. ‘Interface agents’ are computer programs that employ AI 
techniques to provide active assistance to a user for computer- based tasks. These agents acquire their 
competence by learning from the user as well as from agents assisting other users.  For example, in 
the US, start-ups are marketing software tools that learn individual users’ buying patterns and make 
personalized recommendations accordingly.          
3.2.1 Embodied Artificial Intelligence 
Embodiment, the hosting of an AI agent in a physical body, which the AI agent can manipulate, is 
nowadays considered by many researchers a condition sine qua non for any form of intelligence. 
Pfeifer and Scheier (1999), for example, argue that “intelligence cannot merely exist in the form of an 
abstract algorithm but requires a physical instantiation, a body”. This contrasts with the traditional 
view that Artificial Intelligence is a computational process, encompassing only disembodied tasks, 
such as abstract problem solving and reasoning, knowledge representation, theorem proving, formal 
games like chess, search techniques, and natural language.   
By the mid 1980s, the classical computational approach had brought forward many successes in terms 
of computer and engineering applications: clever machine learning algorithms, text processing 
systems which utilize matching algorithms, controls for appliances using fuzzy logic, embedded 
systems (as they are employed in fuel injection systems, breaking systems, air conditioners, etc.), 
control systems for elevators and trains, natural language interfaces to directory information systems, 
translation support software, etc.  
Until the late 1980s, in cognitive science generally, but particularly in artificial intelligence, the logic 
paradigm prevailed. The assumption was that reasoning amounted to the mechanical manipulation of 
abstract symbols. The mind was an abstract machine, manipulating symbols by algorithmic 
computation in the way a computer does. All meaning arose via correspondences between symbols 
(words, mental representations) and things in the external world. These symbols formed internal 
representations of external reality, independent of any limitations of the human body, the human 
perceptual system, and the human nervous system. Human thought was seen as abstract and 
disembodied. The brain was merely a specific instance of a computing engine which, in principle, 
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could be replaced by a computer, and computers could do anything that brains could do. Machines 
that mechanically manipulate symbols that correspond to things in the world were believed to be 
capable of meaningful thought and reason.  
Such approaches to knowledge, which models intelligence as disembodied symbol manipulation, 
could only lead to simulated rather than to real human intelligence. The reason is that intelligent 
behavior encompasses not just symbolic manipulation and deductive reasoning, but also interaction 
with others, attunement to one’s surroundings, and awareness of the relationship between oneself and 
one’s world. It also includes creativity, physical coordination, emotion, and countless other behavioral 
manifestations. Real human intelligence includes all of these dimensions. Creatures (humans and 
animals) have in common strategies to live and survive in their environment by using their cognitive 
abilities of intelligence which are shaped by their interactions with the environment. 
In the early 1990s, a major paradigm shift occurred, with developments in cognitive science moving 
towards the inclusion of such dimensions. In particular, the connections between the structure of 
mental processes and physical embodiment were recognized. This approach, known as embodied, or 
situated, cognition treats mental processes as an activity that is structured by the body and how it is 
situated in its environment -- that is, as embodied action. Cognition depends upon the experience of 
having a body with sensorimotor capacities which is embedded in a biological, psychological, and 
cultural context. An example of embodied cognition is seen in the area of robotics, where movements 
are based on the robot’s direct and immediate interaction with its environment. 
While many researchers now agree that cognition has to be embodied, it is far from clear what kind of 
body artificial intelligence would have to be equipped with. The claim that intelligence requires a 
physical body is not generally accepted. For example, software systems with no body in the physical 
sense have been considered to be intelligent, since they ‘structurally couple’ to their environment 
(Maturana and Varela, 1987). All that is required for a system to be embodied in an environment is 
that perturbatory channels exist between the two. That means that the environment has the capacity to 
perturb the system, and that the system has the capacity to perturb the state of the environment. 
The disadvantage of this definition is that it is of limited use, because it is not particularly restrictive, 
and because every system is in one sense or another structurally coupled with its environment. A 
granite outcrop on the Antarctic tundra is persistently perturbed by the wind, and in turn perturbs the 
flow of air. Hence, it is an embodied system according to the above definition, but certainly it is not 
an example of embodied cognition. 
Summarizing, proponents of the embodiment approach of AI argue that all aspects of cognition, such 
as ideas, thoughts, concepts and categories are shaped by aspects of the body. These aspects include 
the perceptual system, the intuitions that underlie the ability to move, the activities and interactions 
with our environment, and the understanding of the world that is built into the body and the brain. The 
argument is that true artificial intelligence can only be achieved by machines that have sensory and 
motor skills and are connected to the world through a body. With the advent of embodiment, the 
nature of AI has changed dramatically. It has partially moved out of computer science laboratories 
and into robotics, engineering and biology labs. Implicit in an embodied view of cognition is  that 
intelligence lies less in the individual brain, and more in the dynamic interaction of brains with the 
wider world, including the social and cultural worlds that are so central to human cognition.   
 
3.2.2 Enactive Artificial Intelligence  
 
Enactivism may be considered as the most developed model of embodied situated cognition. 
Enactivism emphasizes the idea that subject and object co-arise. Knowing is inseparable from doing. 
All knowledge is situated in specific activity bound to a social, cultural and physical context. Activity 
and learning are tied to the specific situations in which they occur. Therefore, cognition cannot be 
separated from its context, the activity, people, culture, and language, in which it occurs.  
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With the publication of the book The Embodied Mind by F.J. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch 
(1991), the enactive paradigm emerged. It argued that thinking and cognition are grounded in bodily 
actions: it is not knowledge-as-object but knowledge-as-action.  Actions are not simply a display of 
understanding, but they are themselves understandings. For the enactivist, the cognitive system is a 
producer of meaning in actions rather than a processor of information.  
The basic idea of Enactivism is that living beings that actively generate and sustain themselves enact 
or bring forth their own domains of value and sense-making. They do so with their sensorimotor 
activity, and the world and the organisms mutually co-determine one another. Living systems achieve 
autonomy by acting in some way to adjust to local conditions. This idea is encapsulated in the phrase 
"Knowing is being in doing." In being, doing, and coming to know, that is, in learning, a system 
defines the world in which it lives. There are certain types of knowledge, such as knowing how to ride 
a bicycle, that obviously seem to be the result of action rather than, say, logical analysis.                                                                           
This enactive approach to mind may be described in terms of five themes, which, taken together, 
serve as a characterization of enactivism. The themes are embodiment, experience, autonomy, sense-
making and co-emergence. For enactivism, cognition is embodied action with the purpose of learning 
about the world, and then acting on the knowledge gained. Cognition, conceived fundamentally as 
meaning-generation and sense-making, arises from the sensorimotor coupling between organism and 
environment.  
                        
Enactivism also incorporates a role for history. Each individual's developmental trajectory shapes his 
understanding of reality. Enactivism tries to understand the regularity of the world we are 
experiencing at every moment. The world which we experience in our co-existence with others 
always has the mixture of regularity and mutability that is typical of human experience. Therefore, 
according to enactivists, cognition is the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of 
a variety of actions that a being in the world performs.  
Living organisms are autonomous by virtue of their self-generated identity as distinct entities, and 
they use their experience to build an identity. The establishment of identity entails a relationship 
between the organism and its environment, which is not predetermined, but rather co-determined by 
that organism and its environment. The notion of autonomy captures how living beings are internally 
self-constructive in establishing a boundary between themselves and the world with which they are 
tightly coupled.  
The notion of agent is crucially important in Enactivist theory and a change in the structure of the 
agent occurs through learning, not through an environmental stimulus, but through one’s internal 
structure. For enactivists the same stimulus will not cause the same response in all individuals, 
because the organism is continuously changing and the response to a stimulus depends on what it has 
previously interacted with. It is not the environment that determines learning, but the agent itself. The 
reason is that experiences are understood and interpreted on the basis of the agent’s knowledge and 
prior experiences. It is the agent’s knowledge, its structure, or its internal dynamics, that affects its 
reaction. 
Although these considerations are rather vague, living biology gives a more precise definition of the 
living identity. In order to explain the nature of living systems the notion of autopoiesis which 
originated in the work of the Chilean biologists Maturana and Varela in the 1970’s, provides a useful 
framework. This term combines the Greek auto- (meaning self) and poiesis (meaning 
creation/production.)  An autopoietic system is to be contrasted with an allopoietic system, such as a 
car factory, which uses raw materials to generate a car which is something other than the factory 
itself. Most industrial production processes are allopoietic. An autopoietic system creates itself, 
sustains itself and produces itself, whereas an allopoietic system is externally created and produces 
something other than itself. 
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The difference between autonomy and autopoiesis is that autopoietic systems must produce their own 
components in addition to conserving their organization. Autonomous machines need only exhibit 
organizational closure (in the sense that there are sufficient processes within it to maintain the whole), 
and they are not required to produce their own components as part of their operation. Autopoiesis 
requires that the operationally closed network produces and realizes itself as a spatially bounded 
system. 
Sense-making is encountered only by those systems whose being is their own doing.  Mere 
autopoiesis is not sufficient for sense-making. Adaptivity needs to be added to autopoiesis in order to 
generate sense-making. Autopoietic systems are called adaptive if they actively regulate their 
environmental coupling and if their inner workings have their own endogenous dynamics. A non-
adaptive autopoietic system would passively react to stimuli so as to maintain its self-generated 
identity.  
Emergence/ Co-enaction 
Under the enactive approach, the concepts of autopoiesis and sense-making invoke some notion of 
emergence. The idea of emergence stems from the phenomenon of self-organization. Emergence 
describes the formation of a novel property or process, arising from the interaction of different 
existing processes or events. The new level is not only autonomous, exhibiting its own identity and 
laws of transformation, it also introduces, through interaction with its co-defined context, modulations 
to the boundary conditions of the processes that give rise to it.  
Knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or 
dependence. In traditional biological theories, there is adaptive evolution of historical lineages 
because, “the organism proposes and the environment disposes” (Varela et al, 1991). A more modern 
view is that lineages are adapting to a “moving target” – an environment that is itself changing. 
Lineages and environments are changing because changes in one bring about changes in each other. 
The evolving world environment is evolving partly because organisms are themselves changing.  
3.2.3 Generative Artificial Intelligence 
 
Machines are gaining in intelligence and there is no reason to believe that they cannot become smarter 
than humans. Even before that happens, machine intelligence can be designed to operate more 
effectively, that is, with less intervention of humans. Eventually, however, machine intelligence has to 
be able to create its own internal structures and its own thinking automatically. This automation of 
mental capabilities of machines is what has been called Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI). 
In contemporary AI, algorithms are used for convergence to some optimum. The theory of GAI claims 
that this is the wrong approach. GAI systems do not look for an optimum to converge to, but for an 
optimal generation of possibilities which can be used by the next system to improve itself. This leads 
to dynamically interacting architectures, in which the sub-components have many feedback 
mechanisms and interactions. GAI claims that AI research should be focusing on the dynamical 
creation of interaction mechanisms and feedback loops, instead of focusing on the creation of a fixed 
topology that is characteristic of most contemporary AI systems. 
Contemporary AI uses the “Input→ Transform → Output” (ITO) framework to create intelligent 
behavior in machines. However, this simple process leads to local optimization procedures which 
result in fragile and inflexible systems. Working on the basis of the ITO system implies that there is 
optimization toward a stable end-state with a predictable outcome. As long as the human is the 
generator of the “transform” part, machines will not be intelligent, but merely display a fraction of the 
intelligence of their creators. However, the ITO procedure is not outdated. There are many examples 
in the world that, on a local scale, use ITO mechanisms. But often it is better to find the “global 
optimum”. With the rise of computational power and smarter algorithms, according to Van de Zant 
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(2010), it is now time to change the ITO system and to instead create Generative Science and 
Generative AI. 
One of the most important outcomes of science will be the formation of useful new structures of 
existing matter and energy. Philosopher De Landa (1991) calls this the tracking of the ’machinic 
phylum’. The machinic phylum is a broad group of abstract machines that drives evolution. There is 
an overall set of self-organizing processes, in which a group of previously disconnected elements 
suddenly reaches a critical point. At this point, group members begin to "cooperate" to form a higher 
entity. The machinic phylum, the intrinsic self-organizing property that pervades the universe, is older 
than life on Earth. Generative science not only tracks the machinic phylum, but also automates these 
tracking procedures to generate models. These automated procedures have to be able to learn, in order 
to generalize on the basis of observations and theories. 
The new Generative Science occupies itself with the tracking of the machinic phylum, to find new 
ways of working with the physical world. Specializations have to be allowed and are an essential 
feature of GAI, because every machine and every organism has limited resources and capabilities. At 
a deep level these self-assembling processes share similar mathematical structures, which blur the 
distinction between organic and non-organic life. Both human and robot bodies would ultimately 
belong to the machinic phylum. 
GAI differs from Generative Science in that GAI can do more than tracking the phylum. GAI would 
allow a large number of alternative options to solve a certain task. If the options do not satisfy the 
criterion set out by the system, then it might not be solvable. In some cases, the limitations on the 
generators should be loosened. This could be interpreted as ’thinking out of the box’.  
In GAI there is no single solution, but there are many possible configurations. The goal of the 
machine is to generate sensible possibilities and track those that make sense. This means using the 
feedback from the environment as a sorting mechanism to learn which possibilities actually work and 
form the best configuration in the struggle between interacting structures, which are called 
meshworks.  
These generated structures posses the same kind of function, which is that they form similar parts of 
an abstract search engine. This search engine consists of many different configurations of the same 
class or type of instances.  
The configurations best adapted to their fluctuating environment become the most powerful. There is 
not a single ’best’ configuration, but there are different possibilities. Their interactions are dynamic, 
and adapt themselves continuously to changing circumstances. Hence there is a cyclic flux of many of 
the generators, such as daily, seasonal and generational patterns. Although the structure of a 
settlement changes slowly, when the cyclic flux of the generative processes comes to a halt, any 
structure depending on the cyclic flux usually deteriorates quickly. 
The seeming stability of a structure does not imply that there is little internal activity. The feedback 
loops created by some of the generators can have (adjustable) control parameters that can steer the 
generated structures into desired directions. Sorting machines can be interpreted as selection 
mechanisms searching for preferable values of the control parameters of generators in flux. 
The rise of cities, as well as evolution and natural selection are examples of such abstract searching 
machinery. In these cases the pattern is the same.There are generators, a sorting machine and an 
abstract searching mechanism.  
The focus in this new analysis is on mechanisms which create learning. They do so with a loopy kind 
of structure, which can fold back upon itself in order to create a better one. It is very difficult to create 
these kinds of learning mechanisms. Environments might be created where these mechanisms can 
evolve in an open ended manner, e.g. using evolutionary computation or genetic programming, which 
explores the possibilities of creating new patterns with new properties.  
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This involves a search from a population of solutions, in which a competitive selection weeds out 
poor solutions. The solutions with high fitness are recombined with other solutions by swapping parts 
of a solution with another one. This process continues until some convergence criteria are satisfied. 
Focusing on the automated creation of networks/meshworks using AI probably means that it will be 
hard, if not impossible, for humans to understand exactly what goes on in the AI. But using the correct 
tools it should be possible to steer the development of AI systems.  
An example could be a robot which is shown some locations in a building and then starts to wander 
around. It may only be necessary to store a few points on his pathway to start and then a nearest 
neighbor algorithm can be used to check where it should go from any position to get to any other one. 
In such a manner the robot does not create a map, but rather it creates the required network of 
pathway points on the fly. Using clustering algorithms on the pathway points ensures generalization 
and allows for open ended continuous learning. 
Machine intelligence should possess general methods or strategies to find solutions for many types of 
problems. The reason for this is simple: complex real world problems often require complex 
solutions. The linear increments of the complexity of the methods used in classical AI do not show 
general applicability, general intelligence, or intelligent behavior. The intelligent systems of classical 
AI created by humans are not intelligent, but perform a smart trick. The methods of AI are good at 
optimization of a solution to a specific problem, but there is no bifurcation principle that allows the AI 
to grow.  
Bifurcation theory studies phenomena characterized by sudden shifts in behavior arising from small 
changes in circumstances, such as e.g. the unpredictable timing and magnitude of a landslide, the 
stability of ships at sea and their capsizing, bridge collapse, the flight-or-fight behavior of animals. 
 
Predicting critical transitions is difficult because the state of the system may show little change before 
the tipping point is reached. Also, models of complex systems are usually not accurate enough to 
predict reliably where critical thresholds may occur. However, it now appears that certain generic 
characteristics are present in a wide class of systems as they approach a critical point and this is 
regardless of differences in the details of each system (Marten Scheffer, 2009. Therefore, sharp 
transitions in a range of complex systems demonstrate common characteristics. Although radical 
changes may be rare, they are of crucial importance to society and there is a need to identify the 
mechanisms behind these critical transitions. The question is whether there are generic early-warning 
signals that may indicate if a critical threshold is approaching. Critical thresholds for transitions have 
been called bifurcations (division into branches), where a system becomes unstable and shifts to the 
alternative state. As systems approach bifurcation points they tend to show a phenomenon known as 
‘‘critical slowing down’’ where a tiny change in conditions can lead to a marked qualitative change in 
the behavior of a system. Near bifurcation points the return time to equilibrium upon a small 
disturbance increases strongly and this makes it difficult and increasingly slow for the system to 
restore its previous equilibrium. This phenomenon is known as critical slowing down.   
 
As a bifurcation is approached certain changes in the characteristics of fluctuations may take place. 
One important feature is that the slowing down may lead to an increase in autocorrelation in the 
resulting pattern of fluctuations. This is intuitively simple to understand. Because slowing down 
causes the intrinsic rates of change in the system to decrease, the state of the system at any given 
moment becomes more and more like its past state. The resulting increase in ‘memory’ of the system 
can be measured by looking at lag-1 autocorrelation, which can be interpreted as slowness of 
recovery. If the system is driven gradually closer to a catastrophic bifurcation, there is a marked 
increase in autocorrelation that builds up long before the critical transition occurs. 
Increased variance in the pattern of fluctuations is another possible consequence of critical slowing 
down as a critical transition is approached. In principle, critical slowing down could reduce the ability 
of the system to track the fluctuations, and thereby produce an opposite effect on the variance. 
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However, usually an increase in the variance arises and may be detected well before a critical 
transition occurs. 
In summary, the phenomenon of critical slowing down leads to three possible early-warning signals in 
the dynamics of a system approaching a bifurcation: slower recovery from disturbances, increased 
autocorrelation and increased variance. 
Under Generative AI, the internal dynamics of the system and the interactions with the environment 
automatically create unpredictable results and the system learns while executing. From the perspective 
of Generative AI there is no global optimum, but there are processes that generate possibilities, 
leading to the next bifurcation and new outcomes.           
In GAI the data, the internal mechanisms and the environment lead to the construction of informative, 
though dynamic, states and processes. This combination of steering by data, internal processes and the 
environment embeds the machine and its intelligence in the environment. Context thus becomes an 
integral part of the development of intelligent machines. A system developed using GAI principles 
should be able to adapt itself, to grow mentally, and to optimize itself for tasks. The capacities of such 
an intelligent machine depend on the initial state, and the history of the system. Small fluctuations in 
the initial conditions can propagate through the system resulting in different perspectives. Different 
histories can also result in different perspectives. 
One of the tasks of GAI is to find the initial conditions of mental processes which have the greatest 
probability of developing into the mature machine intelligence thatdesigners (or users) of the 
intelligent machines desire. 
3.3 Applications of Artificial Intelligence  
AI research has resulted in an extensive body of principles, representations, algorithms, and spin-off 
technologies. The focus in this subsection is on applications of weak AI, where considerable effort has 
resulted in some real-world product success.                                                                             
Expert Systems 
A large area of application of artificial intelligence is in expert systems. AI programs that achieve 
expert-level competence in solving problems in specific task areas by bringing to bear a body of 
knowledge are called knowledge-based or expert systems. They seek to exploit the skills or 
knowledge that specialists in particular areas have. Expert systems can be thought of as a 
computerized consulting device.  An expert system is software that uses a knowledge base of human 
expertise for problem solving, or to clarify uncertainties where normally one or more human experts 
would need to be consulted.  
Expert systems were introduced by researchers in the Stanford Heuristic Programming Project, 
including the "father of expert systems" Edward Feigenbaum, with the Dendral and Mycin systems. 
Principal contributors to the technology were Bruce Buchanan, Edward Shortliffe, Randall Davis, 
William vanMelle, Carli Scott, and others at Stanford. Expert systems were among the first truly 
successful forms of AI software.  
Expert systems are most valuable to organizations that have a high-level of experience and expertise 
that cannot be easily transferred among members. Expert systems are designed to carry the 
intelligence and information found in the intellect of experts and provide this knowledge to other 
members of the organization for problem-solving purposes. Generally, expert systems are used for 




Expert systems have been used to facilitate tasks in the fields of accounting, medicine, process 
control, financial services, production, human resources, among others. They are also used in 
engineering and manufacture in the control of robots, where they inter-relate with vision systems.  
The most important ingredient in any expert system is knowledge. However, knowledge is almost 
always incomplete and uncertain. Typically, the problem areas are so complex that a simpler 
traditional algorithm cannot provide a proper solution. As such, expert systems do not typically 
provide a definitive answer, but make probabilistic recommendations.  One method of operation of 
expert systems is through a quasi-probabilistic approach with confidence factors or weights, which 
quantify uncertainty in the degree to which the available evidence supports a hypothesis.  
The internal structure of an expert system can be considered as consisting of three parts: the 
knowledge base, the database, and the rule interpreter. The knowledge base captures the knowledge 
from the expert and holds the set of rules of inference that are used in reasoning. Most of these 
systems use IF-THEN rules to represent knowledge. Typically, such systems have between a few 
hundred and a few thousand rules. Because each rule is a unit, rules may be deleted or added without 
affecting other rules, though these changes can affect which conclusions are reached. 
The database gives the context of the problem domain and is generally considered to be a set of useful 
facts. These are the facts that comprise the condition part of the action rules. In order to simulate the 
human reasoning process, a vast amount of knowledge needs to be stored in the knowledge base.The 
rule interpreter is known as an inference engine that uses the rules together to draw conclusions. It 
controls the knowledge base, using the set of facts, to produce even more facts. 
Communication with the system is ideally provided by a natural language interface. This enables a 
user to interact directly with the intelligent system. Once the system is developed, it is placed in the 
real world to solve the problem,  typically as an aid to human workers or as a supplement to some 
information system. Expert systems may or may not have learning components. When one finds that 
the expert system does not produce the desired results, work begins to expand the knowledge base, 
not to re-program the procedures.  
In the past most expert systems have been run only on large information handling systems. The 
increasing storage capacity of personal computers has made it possible to consider running some 
types of simple expert systems on them. However, this ability depends on the nature of the 
application, and the amount of stored information required.  Early expert systems required the entire 
rulebase to be stored, since all the rules were, in effect, chained or linked together by the structure of 
the rulebase.  However, segmentation of the rulebase, into contextual segments or units, made it 
possible to eliminate the portions of the rulebase containing data or knowledge that are not needed for 
a particular application. Segmentation also allows much smaller memory capacities than were 
possible with earlier arrangements. Of course, provisions must be made to manage various 
intersegment relationships.  
The principal difference between expert systems and traditional problem solving programs concerns 
the way in which the problem related expertise is coded. In traditional applications, problem-related 
expertise is encoded in both program and data structures. Under the expert system approach, the 
problem expertise is mostly encoded in data structures. The program (inference engine) of an expert 
system is relatively independent of the problem domain and it processes the rules without regard to 
the problem area they describe. 
Real time expert systems are designed to reason over time, and to change conclusions as the state of 
the monitored system changes. Therefore, these systems must respond to constantly changing input 
data. The inference engine must track the times of each data input and each conclusion, and propagate 
new information as it arrives. It must ensure that all conclusions are still current. Facilities for 
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periodically scanning data, acquiring data on demand, and filtering noise, become essential parts of 
the expert system. 
Simple expert systems merely use simple true/false logic to evaluate data. More sophisticated systems 
are capable of performing some evaluation, taking into account real-world uncertainties. Such 
sophistication is difficult to develop and still highly imperfect.                                                 
Nevertheless, compared to traditional programming techniques, expert-system approaches provide 
added flexibility and easier modifiability. They have the ability to model rules as data rather than as 
code. In practice, modern expert-system technology is employed as an addition to traditional 
programming techniques, and this hybrid approach allows the combination of the strengths of both 
approaches. 
However, an expert system provides no guarantee about the quality of the rules on which it operates. 
All self-designated "experts" are not necessarily actually expert, and a challenge is to recognize the 
limits to their knowledge.Furthermore, expert systems are notoriously narrow in their domain of 
knowledge. An amusing example is a case in which a researcher used a "skin disease" expert system 
to diagnose his rustbucket car. The system concluded that the car was likely to have developed 
measles. Expert systems are thus prone to making some errors that humans would easily spot, but also 
some that may go unnoticed for some time.  
An expert system is not optimal for all problems, and considerable knowledge is required to use such 
a system properly. The ease of rule creation and rule modification can be a double-edged sword. A 
system can be sabotaged by a non-expert user who can easily add worthless rules, or rules that 
conflict with existing ones. Many systems fail because of the absence of or the neglect of facilities for 
system auditing, detection of possible conflict, and rule lifecycle management. 
In general, such applications are used to increase the productivity of knowledge workers by 
intelligently automating their tasks, or to make technical products of all kinds easier to use for both 
workers and consumers through intelligent automation of their complex functions.   
Examples of applications of AI  
 
There are many interesting applications of artificial intelligence at the present time. A few examples 
are given here. 
Autonomous planning and scheduling: A hundred million miles from Earth, NASA's Remote Agent 
program became the first on-board autonomous planning program to control the scheduling of 
operations for a spacecraft. Remote Agent generates plans from high-level goals specified from the 
ground. It monitors the operation of the spacecraft as the plans are executed, detecting, diagnosing, 
and recovering from problems as they occur. 
Game playing: Deep Blue became the first computer program to defeat the world champion in a chess 
match when it bested Garry Kasparov by a score of 3.5 to 2.5 in an exhibition match. Kasparov said 
that he felt a "new kind of intelligence" across the board from him. Newsweek magazine described the 
match as "The brain's last stand."  
Autonomous control: The computer vision system ALVINN steered a car to keep it following a lane. 
NAVLAB video cameras transmitted road images to ALVINN, which then computed the best 
direction to steer, based on experience from previous training runs. 
Diagnosis: Medical diagnosis programs have been able to perform at the level of an expert physician 
in several areas of medicine. For example, in one case, a leading expert on lymph-node pathology 
scoffed at a program's diagnosis of an especially difficult case, but eventually, the expert agreed with 
the decision and explanation of machine’s program. 
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Logistics Planning: During the Persian Gulf crisis of 1991, U.S. forces deployed a Dynamic Analysis 
and Replanning Tool, DART, to do automated logistics planning and scheduling for transportation. 
This involved up to 50,000 vehicles, cargo, and people at a time, and had to account for starting 
points, destinations, routes. The AI planning techniques allowed a plan to be generated in hours that 
would have taken weeks with older methods. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 
(DARPA) stated that this single application more than paid back its 30-year investment in AI. 
Robotics: Many surgeons now use robot assistants in microsurgery. Computer vision techniques are 
used to create a three-dimensional model of a patient's internal anatomy. Robotic control is then 
applied to guide the insertion of a hip replacement prosthesis. 
Language understanding and problem solving: There are computer programs that solve crossword 
puzzles better than most humans, using constraints on possible word fillers, a large database of past 
puzzles, and a variety of information sources including dictionaries and online databases.  
These are just a few examples of artificial intelligence systems that exist today. It is not magic or 
science fiction - but rather science, engineering, and mathematics. Ironically, AI is a victim of its own 
success. Whenever an apparently mundane problem was solved, such as building a system that could 
land an aircraft unattended, or read handwritten postcodes to speed mail sorting, the problem was 
deemed by some not to have been AI in the first place. If it works, it can not be AI, was the saying.  
The effect of repeatedly moving the goal-posts in this way was that AI came to refer to blue-sky 
research that was still years away from commercialization. Researchers joked that AI stood for 
'Almost Implemented'. Meanwhile, the technologies that worked well enough to make it on to the 
market, such as speech recognition, language translation and decision-support software, were no 
longer regarded as AI. Yet all three once fell well within the umbrella of AI research. AI-inspired 
systems are already integral to many everyday technologies such as internet search engines, bank 
software for processing transactions and in medical diagnosis.  
One measure of the growth of practical applications is the rapid growth in the number of patents 
mentioning the term artificial intelligence and related terms (knowledge based, fuzzy logic, expert 
system, genetic algorithm). Other patents using AI techniques might be classified in an area of 
application such as medicine. These numbers confirm another important trend: AI technology is more 
likely to be embedded in some larger system than embodied in a stand-alone system. Successful 
applications of AI are part of, and buried in, larger systems that probably do not carry the label AI 
inside.  
4.  Artificial Happiness  
Since the dawn of time, humans have sought short-cuts to happiness.  The drugs of today promise 
ecstasy, or the transcending of normal consciousness, in a pill. Neuroscientists are beginning to 
document the neural correlates of happiness. The future will tell whether artificial intelligence can 
increase happiness. In principle this could occur in several ways, but two seem most obvious. One 
way is through a direct channel. Artificially intelligent entities could use their intelligence to develop 
technologies for producing artificial happiness, much as they could invent methods of achieving 
Methuselarity. Another channel is indirect. By increasing wealth and living standards, AI could make 
people happier. We argue in this chapter that, if historical experience is a guide, AI is unlikely to lead 
to greater happiness through either of these mechanisms. 
What is Happiness? 
There is no consensus among experts on the definition of happiness. Some have viewed happiness 
primarily as a matter of positive emotion. For example, the economist Richard Layard (1980) suggests 
the following definition: happiness is feeling good, enjoying life, and wanting the feeling to be 
maintained. This dimension of happiness is sometimes referred to as subjective well being (Diener, 
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1984; Seligman, 2002; Kahneman et al., 1999). In recent years, broader definitions have gained 
acceptance. Jonathan Haidt (2005) emphasizes the role of relationships: “between yourself and others, 
between yourself and your work, and between yourself and something larger than yourself”. Tal Ben 
Shahar (2007) defines happiness as "the overall experience of pleasure and meaning." Mihaly 
Csíkszentmihályi (1990) includes a notion of flow, or engagement, living and working in fullness, and 
performing work that enables us to express our uniqueness. He writes, "It is the full involvement of 
flow, rather than happiness that makes for excellence in life. We can be happy experiencing the 
passive pleasure of happiness, but this kind of happiness is dependent on favorable external 
circumstance. The happiness that follows flow is our own making, and it leads to increasing 
complexity and growth in consciousness." Seligman (2011) proposes the PERMA model, which 
emphasizes that happiness consists of five components: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, 
meaning and accomplishment.  
What Makes People Happy? 
A large literature has studied the factors that correlate with happiness, and some consistent patterns 
have emerged (Myers, 2007). 
Happy people have certain emotional traits: Extraversion, self-esteem, optimism, and a sense of 
personal control are among the hallmarks of happy individuals. Some of these traits, such as 
extraversion, are genetically influenced. Like cholesterol level, happiness is affected by genes, yet 
also somewhat amenable to volitional control.  
The type of work and leisure one engages in influences happiness: Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi reports 
an increased quality of life when work and leisure enlarge one's skills. Between the anxiety of being 
overwhelmed, and the boredom of being underwhelmed, lies the unself-conscious, absorbed state of 
flow.  
Happy people have strong relationships: Humans are social animals, with an obvious need to belong. 
For most people, solitary confinement results in misery. Having close friends, and being with them, is 
pleasurable. People who are in good romantic relationships are happier than those who are not. In 
National Opinion Research Center surveys of more than 42,000 Americans since 1972, 40 percent of 
married adults describe themselves as very happy, in contrast to 23 percent of adults who have never 
been married. The marital happiness gap also occurs in other countries and is similar for men and 
women.  
Those with faith are happier: The same National Opinion Research Center surveys reveal that 23 
percent of those who never attend religious services report being very happy, in contrast with 47 
percent of those who attend more than weekly. To explain this pattern, psychologists have pointed out 
that religious organizations often offer social support, meaning, and assistance in managing the terror 
of one's inevitable death.  
 
There seems to be a genetic component: David Lykken and Auke Tellegen (1996), from the 
University of Minnesota, studied the role of genes in determining satisfaction in life. From 
information on 4000 sets of twins they found that about 50% of one’s satisfaction with life comes 
from a genetic predisposition. However, neuroscientists have established that the brain is plastic, in 
that it rewires and changes itself in response to experience. Thus, a genetic predisposition does not 
mean a particular trait is always expressed or cannot be modified. 
 
Happiness changes over the life cycle: Happiness tends to evolve with age. Self-reported happiness is 
relatively high in youth and declines until one’s reaches his 40s. It then begins to rise again and 
continues to rise into old age. Perhaps fittingly, the relationship between happiness and age is smile 
shaped. Controlling for age, healthy people are happier than sick people.  
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People are not very good at predicting what will make them happy and how long that happiness (or 
unhappiness) will last. They expect positive events to make them much happier than those events 
actually do, and they expect negative events to make them unhappier than they actually do. For 
example, 73 percent of Americans in 2006 answered "yes" when Gallup asked "Would you be happier 
if you made more money?" However, as we discuss below, the relationship between income and 
happiness is very weak. 
Ed Diener et al (1985) have shown that the frequency of positive experiences is a much better 
predictor of happiness than is the intensity of positive experiences. Diener has shown that how good 
experiences are does not matter nearly as much as how many good experiences you have. Somebody 
who has a dozen mildly nice things happen each day is likely to be happier than somebody who has a 
single truly amazing thing happen. This is consistent with the general findings that specific events 
create only temporary changes in happiness.  
Dan Gilbert (2007) describes a study which measured the happiness of lottery winners and 
paraplegics. In the short-run, winning the lottery made individuals happier and becoming paraplegic 
made people less happy. However, surprisingly, they showed no difference in happiness a year after 
the incident occurred. This means that individuals have a set level of happiness that they tend to revert 
to regardless of the events they experience.          
The Current State of Artificial Happiness 
Currently, unhappiness is mainly fought with pharmacology, which has replaced psychotherapy over 
the last few decades. More than 15% of Americans, including 10% of children, now use anti-
depressants, such as Prozac, Zoloft, and Paxil, and the diagnosis of depression is made more and more 
liberally (Angell, 2011).  Most antidepressants are serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), slowing the 
reabsorption of serotonin by the neurons that release it, so that more remains in the synapses for a 
longer period of time. The scientific rationale for this type of treatment is biogenic amine theory, 
which claims that happiness is a matter of brain biochemistry and that emotional valence is 
determined by thechemical imbalance in the brain. If this is the case, then changing the chemical 
balance in the proper way would increase the happiness of the subject.  
However, this claim is in dispute. Ed Diener and others argue that pharmacological routes to 
happiness merely mask symptoms rather than treat causes. In this regard, antidepressants act like 
drugs such as alcohol or narcotics, which do not create happiness. They simply alter human 
consciousness in a way that allows the mind to temporarily change its mood. These drugs work by 
dampening certain aspects of brain function and creating an altered mental state, so that true reality 
becomes concealed from a person's consciousness. The dampened brain functions allow a person to 
imagine an alternate reality that is generally more pleasing. It is by dampening or altering brain 
functions and by affecting consciousness that alcohol transforms how we feel.  
Furthermore, whether antidepressants have anything beyond a placebo effect is in question. Irving 
Kirsch et al. (2008) reviewed thirty-eight published clinical trials that compared various treatments for 
depression with placebos, or compared psychotherapy with no treatment. Most these trials lasted for 
six to eight weeks, and during that time, patients tended to improve somewhat even without any 
treatment.  Kirsch found that placebos were three times as effective as no treatment. Antidepressants 
were only marginally better than placebos. Placebos were 75 percent as effective as antidepressants.  
In follow up research, Kirsch (2010) examined a data set from 42 trials of six antidepressant drugs 
approved between 1987 and 1999: Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Celexa, Serzone, and Effexor.  Overall, 
placebos were 82 percent as effective as the drugs, as measured by the Hamilton Depression Scale 
(HAM-D), a widely used score of symptoms of depression. The results were much the same for all six 
drugs: they were all equally unimpressive. Yet because the positive studies were extensively 
publicized, while the negative ones which failed to show effectiveness were hidden, it came to be 
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believed that these drugs were highly effective antidepressants. This practice greatly biased the 
medical literature, medical education, and treatment decisions. 
Moreover, Kirsch observed that even treatments that were not antidepressants, such as synthetic 
thyroid hormone, opiates, sedatives, stimulants, and some herbal remedies, were as effective as 
antidepressants in alleviating the symptoms of depression. Kirsch writes “Antidepressant drugs that 
increase, decrease, or have no effect on serotonin all relieve depression to about the same degree.” 
Kirsch reaches the overall conclusion that antidepressants are probably no more effective than 
placebos.  
Indeed, serotonin reuptake inhibitors may actually be harmful and create a dependency. When an 
SSRI antidepressant increases serotonin levels in synapses, it stimulates compensatory changes 
through negative feedback. In response to high levels of serotonin, presynaptic neurons release a 
smaller quantity, and the postsynaptic neurons become desensitized to it. In effect, the brain is trying 
to nullify the drug’s effects (Whitaker, 2010).  
Long-term use of psychoactive drugs alters neural function. After several weeks on psychoactive 
drugs, the brain’s compensatory efforts begin to fail, and side effects emerge. These side effects are 
often treated with other drugs, and many patients end up on a cocktail of psychoactive drugs 
prescribed for multiple diagnoses. Nancy Andreasen et.al. (2011) present evidence that the use of 
antipsychotic drugs is associated with shrinkage of the brain, and that the effect is directly related to 
the dose and duration of treatment.  
Getting off the drugs is exceedingly difficult, according to Whitaker, because when they are 
withdrawn the compensatory mechanisms are left unopposed. When the drug is withdrawn, serotonin 
levels fall precipitously because the presynaptic neurons are not releasing normal amounts, and the 
postsynaptic neurons no longer have enough receptors. The symptoms produced by withdrawing 
psychoactive drugs are often confused with relapses of the original disorder. This can lead 
psychiatrists to resume drug treatment, perhaps at higher doses. 
Cosmetic Happiness 
There have been several studies in recent years suggesting that people, who undergo cosmetic 
enhancements, either through surgery or less invasive procedures such as Botox injections, not only 
experience improved self-esteem but also enhanced mood. Facial expressions have a direct correlation 
with emotional state. While it is obvious that certain emotions lead to specific facial expressions, 
causality may also go in the other direction at the same time. In other words, when you look happier, 
you feel happier. Hence, the question is: should you get Botox injections or undergo cosmetic surgery 
if you’re depressed? Jonathan Haidt (2006) argues that cosmetic surgery can increase happiness for a 
long period of time. However, it seems likely that most of the effect is due to the enhancement to ones 
self-esteem, and the persistent positive feedback from others that is received. Hamermesh and 





Synthetic Happiness is distinct from artificial happiness (Daniel Gilbert, 2007). Synthetic happiness is 
the ability (instinctive as well as learned) for a human being to manufacture her own happiness. This 
is very different from the natural happiness that is based on favorable external events that a human 
experiences. 
One way to understand synthetic happiness is in terms of competing freedoms.  Freedom is the friend 
of natural happiness:  when you get what you want, this is natural happiness.  Freedom to choose, on 
the other hand, can be considered the enemy of synthetic happiness, because it is often when you don’t 
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get what you want that the potential for manufacturing synthetic happiness comes into play.  Dan 
Gilbert provides the following example of the production of synthetic happiness. 
 “Imagine a gallery is giving away two free paintings. You are determining which to get and believe 
you should go with option A, when someone else takes it. So, you take option B instead. You secretly 
desired A more, but after getting accustomed to B you find that it is a much better choice and are 
completely happy with the painting your received. This is called synthetic happiness “. Although most 
people tend to think that synthetic happiness will never come close to the feeling of natural happiness, 
but Gilbert says that this is not the case. Synthetic happiness is perfectly real. Synthetic happiness is 
what we can produce when we do not get what we want, while natural happiness is what we 
experience when we do. They have different origins, but they are not necessarily different in terms of 
how they make us feel.  
Money and Happiness 
Research shows that in Western countries, even as per capita GDP has gone up in recent decades, 
happiness levels have either stayed the same or have decreased. There is some tendency for 
prosperous nations to have happier and more satisfied people (though these also tend to be countries 
with high literacy, civil rights, and stable democracies). But the correlation between national wealth 
and well-being tapers off above a certain level. Countries with high levels of income equality, like 
Scandinavian countries, have higher levels of happiness than countries with an unequal distribution of 
wealth, such as the United States Scandinavian countries have high levels of community integration, 
which further supports subjective wellbeing. 
The happiness of a people does not increase with rising affluence. Citizens of developed nations 
consume many products that their grandparents of a half century ago seldom knew: air conditioning, 
the Internet, MP3 players, and bigger houses. Yet they are no happier. Americans’ average buying 
power has almost tripled since the 1950s, while reported happiness has remained almost unchanged. 
The same is true in other countries, according to economist Richard Easterlin (1974). Economic 
growth in affluent countries has not demonstrably improved human morale. The same applies to 
China, where Gallup surveys since 1994 reveal huge increases in the percentage of households with 
modern itens such as color TVs and telephones, but somewhat diminished life satisfaction.  
 
At the individual level, there is no significant relationship between how much money a person makes 
and how happy they are. Diener and Seligman (2004), interviewed members of the Forbes 400, (the 
richest Americans), and found that they were only a tiny bit happier than the rest of the population. 
Indeed, the pursuit of such riches may result in unhappiness. Kasser and Ryan (1993) discovered that 
people for whom money, success, fame and good looks (extrinsic goals) are especially important are 
less satisfied than those who strive for good relationships with others, develop their talents and are 
active in social causes (intrinsic goals). 
 
One explanation of this phenomenon lies in the concept of the hedonic treadmill. When we want 
something and then attain it, we do not seem to be any better off. It is like we are walking on a 
treadmill but not really getting anywhere because we are adapting to things. Brickman and Campbell 
(1971) studied lottery winners and found that one year later, life satisfaction was not significantly 
greater for the winners. This process of adaption explains why we are not significantly happier despite 
significant increases in the material standard of living over the last 50 years. 
Although the correlation between personal income and happiness is surprisingly weak, recent surveys 
do indicate that across individuals, as across nations, the relationship is curvilinear: the association 
between income and happiness is positive for poor individuals but tapers off once people have 




Pharmacological Avenues to Intelligence? 
The abuse of drugs that are prescribed to treat attention deficits, such as Ritalin and Adderall, is 
increasing among individuals who want to improve their mental performance. Similar issues arise 
here as for drugs that treat unhappiness. These drugs do not make you smarter, but temporarily make 
you perform better on cognitive tasks. They do so by temporarily increasing the level of dopamine in 
the synapses of dopamenergic neurons, by slowing the reuptake of dopamine after neuronal firing.   
The active ingredient in Ritalin is methylphenidate. This compound shares many of the 
pharmacological effects of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and cocaine.  Methylphenidate is now 
the most commonly prescribed psychotropic medicine for children in the U.S. 
 
Methylphenidate potentially improves the performance of anyone — child or not, ADD-diagnosed or 
not, on cognitive tasks. On the basis of methylphenidate’s recreational appeal, criminal entrepreneurs 
have responded with interest, resulting in many thefts of methylphenidate at pharmacies and an active 
secondary market. 
 
Can artificial intelligence increase happiness? 
 
Artificial happiness seems difficult to achieve, if the evidence from antidepressant drugs is any guide. 
The effects on emotion are temporary, treat symptoms rather than causes, and result in dependency. 
There is no evidence that new technologies can create happiness. Whether artificial intelligence can 
develop a new technology to increase happiness is an open question. However, such a feat would be a 
difficult challenge since it would rely on entirely novel technology, rather than improvement upon 
existing ones.   
It also seems unlikely that artificial intelligence could provide a means to increase natural happiness. 
While robots may provide new and fruitful relationships for many individuals and artificial 
experiences may provide engagement, it is difficult to see how artificial intelligence might give 
individuals more meaning in their lives or a sense of accomplishment. In fact, if they replace humans 
in many of the tasks and types of employment that people find fulfilling, humans might experience 
less meaning and accomplishment in their lives.  
Artificial intelligence promises to raise material living standards. However, the evidence from the past 
several decades shows that the huge increase in wealth and consumption that has occurred over that 
period has not increased happiness. There is no reason to suppose that future innovations would be 
any different. Furthermore, an increase in average wealth may even decrease average happiness if it is 
accompanied by an increase in income inequality, which would occur if some individuals can profit 
from it more than others.  
5 Issues in Artificial Intelligence 
5.1 Competition between Humans and Computers 
In information technology there is a spectrum of processing tasks. At one end are easily automated 
tasks, requiring straightforward application of existing rules. Such tasks include performing arithmetic 
to pattern recognition tasks such as in automatic driving in traffic. 
At present, embedding human knowledge in software for highly structured situations, such as 
operating a driverless vehicle, is an enormously difficult task. Popular science has been promising 
driverless cars since the 1940s. In 2004, economists Frank Levy and Richard Murnane argued that the 
kind of pattern recognition that driverless cars require was impossible (Ozimek, 2012): 
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”The... truck driver is processing a constant stream of [visual, aural, and tactile] information from his 
environment. ... To program this behavior we could begin with a video camera and other sensors to 
capture the sensory input. But executing a left turn against oncoming traffic involves so many factors 
that it is hard to imagine discovering the set of rules that can replicate a driver's behavior. ...” 
In that same year, 2004, DARPA held their first Grand Challenge, which asked competing teams to 
build a driverless car that can make it across 150 miles of dessert. Confirming Levy and Murnane's 
pessimism, the longest any car made it was 8 miles, and this took several hours. 
However, Google has recently made astounding headway in building a functioning driverless car. Its 
current capabilities are already very impressive, so much so that the state of Nevada recently became 
the first American state to pass regulations allowing autonomous cars. 
A deep aversion to handing over control to a computer may act as an impediment to the driverless car. 
But it need not be the case that the first time that control is handed over to a robot that it will speed 
down the interstate at 70 miles-per-hour. Autonomous driving might first be used for slow moving, 
stop-and-go traffic. A precursor to this can be seen in cars that park themselves. We can ease our way 
into comfort with it. However, we should have little doubt: driverless cars are in our future. 
Complex communication is another example that is hard for machines to emulate especially in 
emotional or ambiguous situations. In this vein, IBM's Jeopardy! winning supercomputer Watson may 
be cited as further technological proof that the world is on the cusp of change. The supercomputer 
Watson, developed at IBM, played the game show Jeopardy. This required the ability to engage in 
complex communication and pattern matching. It appears that even the best human players could not 
keep up with the new computer contestant. Watson shows not only more of the impressive pattern 
recognition seen in driverless cars, but also demonstrates complex language skills that were once 
thought beyond the province of computers. Supercomputers like Watson will drastically change 
medicine and other fields of knowledge fields. In fact, IBM and Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer 
Center are already working on teaching Watson to aid in diagnosis and to suggest treatments for 
cancer. 
Therefore, digital pattern recognition abilities have recently advanced rapidly into territory thought to 
be uniquely human. This remarkable progress can be attributed to Moore’s Law, which states that the 
number of transistors in a minimum-cost integrated circuit doubles every 18 months. It also seems 
that software can progress at least as rapidly in some domains as hardware does. 
As a consequence, according to Susanto Basu and Johen Fernald (2008), inexpensive information and 
communication technology allow departures from business as usual by fostering an ever-expanding 
sequence of complementary inventions in industries using ICT. Hence, digitization is not a single 
project providing one-time benefits but it is an ongoing process of creative destruction that will make 
profound changes at the level of the task, the job, the process and the organization itself. 
A popular idea is that the potential for technology makes human labor obsolete.  However, this is not 
at all what happened with technological progress such as during the Industrial Revolution in which 
more human workers were needed, not fewer. Over time, technological progress creates opportunities 
in which people compete using machines, and humans and machines collaborate in order to produce 
more, to capture markets and to compete with other teams of humans and machines. As an example, 
the best chess players are not computers, nor are they humans; the best chess payers are teams of 
humans using computers. As Gary Kasparov noted, teams of human plus machines dominate the 
strongest computers. Weak human + machine + better process is superior to a strong computer alone 
and superior to a strong human + machine + inferior process.  
This pattern applies throughout the economy. The key to winning the competition is not to race 
against machines, but to win by using machines. Although computers win at routine processing, 
repetitive arithmetic and error-free consistency, and are becoming better at complex communication 
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and pattern matching, computers have three failings. Computers lack intuition and creativity, they 
may be fragile in uncertain or unpredictable environments, and they are lost when working outside a 
predefined domain.  
The solution for the implementation of the winning human + machine strategy is organizational 
innovation that leverages both ever-advancing technology and human skills. Simply substituting 
machines for human labor rarely adds much value or high returns. It only results in small productivity 
improvements. In order to create value, what is required is to combine workers with digital 
technology. 
Several especially promising ways of mixing human and machine capabilities are listed by 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011). They include                                               
1)  Combining the speed of technology with human insight;                        
2)  Using technology to test creative human ideas;                                            
3) Leveraging IT to enable new forms of human collaboration and commerce;                                                                                                         
4) Using human insight to apply IT and their data to create more effective processes; 5) Using IT to 
propagate newly developed and improved business processes.    
5.2 Threatening Artificial Intelligence 
AI is viewed by most people as scary and threatening because of the human loss of control over 
autonomous intelligent machines. One might consider this fear misplaced since AI is still in its 
infancy and the many currently existing technologies – such as nuclear and biological weapon 
systems - are far more threatening than anything AI has to offer. However, AI may represent a threat 
not so much as a technology, but as a social movement in which a rational, scientific world-view 
prevails over older cultural and religious beliefs. AI machines may destroy us because it is the vehicle 
through which the world-view of their builders triumphs, changing our notions of who and what we 
are. In this sense AI is scary to some.   
Several critics have argued that AI technology has the potential to disrupt existing society and 
introduce new dangers and malaise. Nick Bostrom, Teacher and Philosopher at Oxford University, 
published a paper "Existential Risks" in the Journal of Evolution and Technology (2002). Bostrom 
states that Artificial Intelligence has the capability to bring about human extinction, which is, of 
course, not what society intends for Artificial Intelligence to do. A well-known movement opposing 
technological development was the “Luddite” movement which began in 1811 in Nottingham, 
England, and destroyed many wool and cotton mills until the British government harshly suppressed 
the movement by making machine breaking a capital crime. The Luddite fallacy has become a precise 
concept in neoclassical economics, where it refers to the belief that labor-saving technologies, which 
increase output per worker, would increase unemployment by reducing the demand for labour. The 
fallacy is that instead of seeking to keep production constant by employing a smaller, more productive 
workforce, employers increase production while keeping workforce size constant.   
The modern incarnations of the Luddites oppose the development of new technologies, and may grow 
increasingly vocal and radical if the pace of innovations accelerates.  Although neo-Luddites might 
delay the application on some new technologoes, the march of technology is irresistible in the long 
run. 
5.3 Friendly Artificial Intelligence 
Technology does not always introduce new danges and risks for human health or the environment. It 
has always been a mixed blessing, bringing benefits too, such as longer and healthier lifespans, 
freedom from physical and mental drudgery. Artificial intelligence may also be used to benefit 
humanity. The ethics of artificial intelligence is a part of a broader discussion of the ethics of 
technology. AI systems with goals that are not perfectly identical to or very closely aligned with 
human ethics are intrinsically dangerous unless measures are taken to ensure the safety of humanity. 
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A very strong case can be made that, out of all the advanced technologies being debated, Friendly AI 
is the best technology to develop first. A Friendly AI is an AI that takes actions that are beneficial to 
humans and humanity. Friendliness should be the sole top-level goal ("supergoal") of the AI system. 
This is consistent with the “precautionary principle” often applied as a criterion in technology policy. 
According to the Precautionary Principle, if the consequences of a new technology are unknown but, 
as judged by scientists, have a risk of being negative, it is better to not implement the technology. The 
burden of the proof that it is not harmful falls on those introducing the new technology. In practice, 
that principle is strongly biased against technological progress which may be vital to the continued 
survival and well-being of humanity. An alternative more sophisticated principle that incorporates a 
more extensive and accurate assessment of options is the Pro-actionary Principle which balances all 
the consequences, good as well as bad, the risks of action and inaction by weighing the opportunity 
cost of not acting with the new technology and the option value of waiting for further information 
before acting. 
Eliezer Yudkowsky (2008) of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence has called for the 
creation of “Friendly AI”, smart enough to improve on its own source code without programmer 
intervention, to mitigate the existential threat of hostile intelligences. However, the field of AI is not 
advanced enough to pronounce with certainty that Friendly AI can be created. 
Joseph Weizenbaum (1976) argued that AI technology should not be used to replace people in 
positions that require respect and care, such as customer service representatives (AI technology is 
already used today for telephone-based interactive voice response systems), therapists, nursemaids for 
the elderly, judges, or police officers. Weizenbaum explains that authentic feelings of empathy are 
needed from people in these positions. However, there would seem to be conditions where we might 
prefer to have automated judges and police that have no personal agenda at all.  
A Friendly AI is not a tool, but rather a mind that is at least equivalent to a human, and possibly 
transhuman.  Once created, a Friendly AI is independent of its programmers. If an unconscious 
preconception manages to distort some belief provided by the programmers when the AI is young, the 
AI will grow up, test the belief, find out that the belief is incorrect, and correct it. A Friendly AI 
would have full access to its source code and program state, and could thus be more self-aware than 
an un-augmented human. 
Friendliness proponents stress less the danger of a superhuman AI that actively seeks to harm 
humans, but more of an AI that is disastrously indifferent to them. Superintelligent AI may be harmful 
to humans if steps are not taken to specifically design it to be benevolent. Doing so effectively is the 
primary goal of Friendly AI. Designing an AI without such friendliness safeguards, would be seen as 
highly immoral, especially if the AI could engage in recursive self-improvement and self-revision 
potentially leading to a significant power concentration. An AI able to reprogram and improve itself is 
known as Seed AI. Once a seed AI gains a certain degree of intelligence, it could entirely take over the 
job of programming itself. This could result in an open-ended cycle of intelligence improvement, a 
Singularity. Seed AI is likely to create a huge power disparity between itself and a statically 
intelligent human mind.  Its ability to enhance itself would very quickly outpace the human ability to 
exercise any meaningful control over it. A benevolent seed AI could probably do more good for 
humanity than any other technology, which is why Singularitarians have selected its creation as a 
humanitarian goal. 
Humans are often ill-suited to solving problems in AI, because a human comes with too many built-in 
inflexible features.  Reasoning by analogy with humans is exactly the wrong way to think about 
Friendly AI.  Humans have a complex, intricate architecture.  Some of it, from the perspective of a 
Friendly AI programmer, is worth duplicating, some is decidedly not worth duplicating, and some of 
it needs to be duplicated, but differently.  Assuming that AI automatically possesses negative human 
functionality leads to expecting the wrong malfunctions; to focusing attention on the wrong 
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problems.  Assuming that AIs automatically possess beneficial human functionality means not taking 
the effort required to deliberately duplicate that functionality. 
Anthropomorphism, the attribution of human characteristics or behavior to nonhuman minds, is one of 
the greatest sources of human error in the analysis of AI psychology, and of Friendly AI in particular. 
Because human social instincts are emotional instincts, anthropomorphic errors often carry with them 
a weight of emotional investment, making them unusually hard to dispel. Human analogies are 
dangerous, both because they assume far too much built-in positive functionality, and because they do 
not warn against possible negative outcomes resulting from human behaviors, which may not be 
shared by an AI. The appropriate response to the threat posed by such superintelligence is to attempt 
to ensure that such intelligent minds specifically feel motivated to not harm other intelligent minds 
and will deploy their resources towards devising better methods of keeping them from harm. If an AI 
would be free to murder, injure, or enslave a human being, it would strongly desire not to do so and 
would only do so if it judged that some vastly greater good to that human or to human beings in 
general would result. This idea is explored in Asimov's I. Robot stories, via the Zeroth Law: “A robot 
may not harm humanity, or, by inaction, allow humanity to come to harm".      
The Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (SIAI), a nonprofit corporation, has produced 
Guidelines on Friendly AI. The Guidelines do not currently represent an academic consensus or an 
industry standard. Rather, the SIAI’s commitment to Friendly AI is intended as a focal point, around 
which debate and consensus can grow. The difficulty of creating AI decreases with increasing 
computing power, but the difficulty of designing Friendly AI does not decrease. Therefore, it is 
unwise to hold off too long on creating Friendly AI.  
One of the more contentious, recent hypotheses in Friendliness theory is the Coherent Extrapolated 
Volition model, also developed by Yudkowsky (2004). He believes that a Friendly AI should initially 
seek to determine the coherent extrapolated volition of humanity. It should define an objective 
morality, with which its goals can be set to conform. “Our coherent extrapolated volition is our 
choices and the result of actions we would collectively take if we knew more, thought faster, were 
more the people we wished we were, and had grown up closer together. However, it is doubtful that 
the collective will of humanity will converge to a single coherent set of goals even if we knew more, 
thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, and had grown up closer together." 
Several notable futurists have voiced support for Friendly AI, including author and inventor Raymond 
Kurzweil, medical life-extension advocate Aubrey de Grey, and World Transhumanist Association 
co-founder Nick Bostrom of Oxford University. Others, like Ben Goertzel, an AGI researcher, support 
the basic principles of the Friendly Artificial Intelligence concept, but believe that guaranteed 
friendliness is not possible. One notable critic of Friendliness theory is the late Bill Hibbard (2002), 
author of Super-Intelligent Machines, who considers the theory incomplete. Hibbard writes there 
should be broader political involvement in the design of AI and AI morality, but he also believes that 
Seed AI could initially only be created by powerful private sector  interests. He proposes an AI goal 
architecture in which human happiness is determined by human behavior. AI should operationalize 
and try to increase human happiness by applying algorithms that recognize happiness in human facial 
expressions, voices and body language. Yudkowsky later criticized this proposal by remarking that 
such an objective would be well satisfied with microscopic smiling mannequins than by making 
existing humans happier. 
5.4 Social Nature of Artificial Intelligence 
All of the AI approaches discussed so far essentially view the mind as something associated with a 
single organism, a single computational system. However, in reality the mind is social – it exists, not 
in isolated individuals, but in individuals embedded in social and cultural systems. 
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One approach to incorporate the social aspect of mind is to create individual AGI systems and let 
them interact with each other. This is an important part of the Novamente AI project, which involves a 
special language for Novamente AI systems to interact with each other (Goetzel, 2007). 
Another approach is to consider sociality at a more fundamental level, and to create systems from the 
beginning that are at least as social as they are intelligent. One example of this sort of approach is 
Steve Grand’s neural-net architecture as embodied in the Creatures game.  His neural net based 
creatures are intended to grow more intelligent by interacting with each other – struggling with each 
other, learning to outsmart each other, and so forth. John Holland’s classifier systems are another 
example of a multi-agent system in which competition and cooperation are both present. The system 
interacts with an external environment and must react appropriately to the stimuli received from the 
environment. When the system performs the appropriate actions for a given perception, it receives a 
reward.  
Another important example of social intelligence is research inspired by social insects. Swarm 
Intelligence and Ant Colony Optimization are popular forms of social intelligence. Swarm Intelligence 
systems are a new class of biologically inspired tools. These systems are self-organized, relying on 
direct and indirect communication between agents, and capable of learning and adaptation. These 
systems are naturally stochastic, relying on multiple interactions and on a random component. They 
often display highly adaptive behavior in a dynamic environment. Social Intelligence cases show the 
value of cooperative emergent behavior in an impressive way. 
Under Vladimir Red’ko’s self-organizing agent-system approach, the agents live in a simulated 
environment in which they can move around, looking for resources, and they can mate. Mating uses 
the typical genetic operators of uniform crossover and mutation, which leads to the evolution of the 
agent population. Agents just move around and eat virtual food, accumulating resources to mate. The 
agents can communicate with each other, and modify their behavior based on their experience. None 
of the agents individually are all that clever, but they communicate their knowledge about resources, 
thereby leading to the emergence of adaptive behavior. 
5.5 Artificial Intelligence and Robotics 
AI has been defined as the part of computer science concerned with designing systems, computer 
programs to imitate or duplicate human intelligence in computers and robots.  A robot is an automatic 
device that performs functions normally ascribed to humans, or is a machine with the physical form 
similar to a human or animal. Robotics is the study of the design, construction and use of robots 
aimed at extending human motor capabilities with machines.  
Early technical work in cybernetics gave impetus to the issue of autonomy of robots. The goal was 
simply to develop a device that can work unattended to arrive at its own conclusions, decisions, and 
actions. It is important to realize that most work in robotics is not devoting any major effort to model 
something approximating human autonomy.  
Typically, autonomy is meant to indicate that there are conditions for which the robot cannot be pre-
programmed. This means that various techniques have to be implemented to allow it to adapt, 
succeed, and survive on its own, “freed” from the intentions of its designers (Pfeifer and Scheier 
2001).  
AI is realized in software, and robots are manufactured as hardware. The connection between those 
two is that the control of the robot is a software agent that reads data from the sensors, decides what to 
do next and then directs the effectors, i.e. the means by which robots act in the physical world. One of 
the most common effectors is the gripper consisting of two fingers which can open and close to pick 
up and let go of a range of small objects. 
The term ”robot” can be traced to the Czech author Karel Capek who in 1921 described fabricated 
workers in a science fiction play called ”Rossum’s Universal Robots  (R.U.R.)”. The word”Robot” is 
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derived from the Czech word meaning “forced labor.” However, the concept was already present in 
antiquity. The ancient Greek poet Homer described mechanical helpers. In 1495, Leonardo da Vinci 
drew plans for a mechanical man. Real robots were only made possible in the 1950s and 1960s with 
the appearance of transistors and integrated circuits. Following the early instances of robots in plays 
and science fiction stories, robots started to appear on television shows (an early example is Lost in 
Space, in which the robot even demonstrated human feelings and emotions) and in Hollywood 
movies, such as Star Wars. Unimate was the first industrial robot, which worked on a General Motors 
assembly line in New Jersey, in 1961. The machine undertook the job of transporting die castings 
from an assembly line and welding these parts on automobile bodies. This was a dangerous task for 
workers, who could be poisoned by exhaust gas or lose a limb if they were not careful. 
To some extent, the field of robotics has followed similar lines as that of AI, attempting to rebound 
from the overly optimistic predictions of the 1950s and 1960s. While few of the innovations that 
emerge from robotics research ever appear in the form of robots, their results are widely applied in 
industrial machines not defined as such.  
In spite of significant challenges, there are some good examples of AI-controlled robotic systems. For 
example, DARPA is in the process of developing an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) which 
autonomously performs extremely dangerous and high priority combat missions, which can be revised 
en route. A distinction can be made between robots working in informational environments, and 
robots with physical abilities. The former has little need for investment in additional expensive or 
unreliable robotic hardware, since computer systems and networks provide adequate sensor and 
effector environments. Physical robots, in contrast, require mechanization of various physical sensory 
and motor abilities. The challenges involved in providing such an environment are considerable, 
especially when complete automation is sought.  
Robots are also used extensively for exploration in space missions, in the Antarctic, exploring 
volcanoes, underwater exploration; in medical science robots operate as surgical assistant; in factories 
robots perform assembly activities; robots are used by bomb squads to locate and dispose of bombs 
(the Mini-Andros). In 1979 a nuclear accident in the USA caused a leak of radioactive material which 
led to the production of a special robot to handle this. 
However, robots are also designed to perform mundane household tasks, such as grass cutting and 
nursing, and modern toys which are programmed to do things like talking, walking and dancing. 
Robots are used for many of the following reasons. Robots do not get bored with repetitive tasks. 
Robots never get sick or need time off. Robots can do tasks considered too dangerous or dirty for 
humans. Robots can operate equipment to much higher precision than humans. Robots may be able to 
perform tasks that are impossible for humans. Robots may be cheaper over the long term.  
Although most robots in use today are designed for specific tasks, the goal is to make universal 
robots, which are flexible enough to do almost anything a human can do. Robots may be mobile or 
stationary. Mobile robots move around on legs, tracks or wheels. Stationary robots remain in one 
place but have arms that move.                                                                            
Robot teams potentially have applications in a wide range of areas. While individual robots may only 
have limited capacity, robots working together in groups might be able to perform complex tasks with 
a functionality that exceeds the sum of their parts. These include military surveillance, mine removal, 
automated household tasks, large scale laboratory projects and assembly. Robots working in teams 
allow for solutions in which knowledge, expertise and motor capability may be distributed in time and 
space. 
One potentially far-reaching development involves the development of cyborg technology, the 
applications of which could lead to humans having certain physiological processes aided or controlled 
by mechanical or electronic devices. In 2009 scientists developed a prosthetic hand, called Smart 
Hand, which functions like a real one. It allows patients to write, type on a key board, play piano and 
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perform other fine movements. Recent scientific work in neuroscience has allowed people to directly 
interface their brains, using a number of different technologies. These technologies are often referred 
to as “brain-computer interfaces” (BCI) which forms a direct connection between a human (or 
animal) brain with an external device. These connections range from non-invasive technologies that 
recognize brain signals externally, to invasive technologies that involve surgery and direct electrode 
implantation. While many of these technologies have the purpose of restoring function to disabled 
people, others aim to improve upon or augment existing functions. 
The most high-profile demonstration in this area is ‘robo-rat’. This is a rat with electrodes implanted 
in the medial forebrain bundle (MFB) and sensorimotor cortex of its brain, developed in 2002 by 
Sanjiv Talwar and John Chapin at the State University of New York Downstate Medical Center. The 
rat wears a small electronic backpack containing a radio receiver and electrical stimulator. The rat 
receives remote stimulation that causes it to feel a sensation in its left or right whiskers, and 
stimulation in the MFB that is interpreted as a reward or pleasure. This project has been successfully 
guided by a human controller.  
A similar experiment has also been demonstrated by Steve Potter, Professor of Biomedical 
Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology, who has developed a ‘rat-controlled robot’.  This 
device results from placing a droplet of solution containing thousands of rat neuron cells onto a 
silicon chip and then relaying the resulting electrical activity to a robot. The robot then manifests 
these signals with physical motion, each of its movements a direct result of neurons communicating 
with neurons. Such examples of merging computer chips with living tissue may seem crude, but 
scientists describe them as ‘momentous’ – an event comparable to the first organ transplant or cloned 
animal. This is because such experiments open up the possibility of using computer technology to 
supplement human intelligence, rather than to merely replace it. 
Robot ‘take-over’ and machine rights 
The possibility of a scenario of AI’s overtaking humankind and thus competing with him may 
generate a call to establish an international commission to monitor and control the development of 
artificial intelligence systems. A cultural climate of reliance, in which humans allow a position of 
dependency on AI and robotics to develop with co-evolution, so that human and machine become 
inextricably intertwined, may be regarded as a possible objective. The strong public reaction to 
machine takeover appears not to be well-founded in rational arguments, especially is Isaac Asimov’s 
three laws become effective
2
. Nevertheless, the creation of Friendly AI would be a way to address 
such concerns. 
If it becomes possible for humankind to create a truly intelligent machine, a deep issue arises: how 
will a sentient artificial being be received by humankind and by society? Would it be forced to exist 
like its machine predecessors, who have effectively been our slaves, or would it enjoy the same rights 
as the humans who created it, simply because of its intellect? This question touches on religion, 
politics and law, but to date little serious discussion has been given to the possibility of a new 
intelligent species and to the rights it might claim. 
 
                                                          
2
 The Three Laws of Robotics are: 
Law 1:  A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; 
Law 2:  A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with 
the First Law; 




Socially Intelligent Robots 
Humans have always shown a particular curiosity for understanding and simulating nature, and 
human beings in particular. However, a realistic replication of human activities with smart robots 
requires recognition of the importance of social intelligence. In the field of human-robot interaction 
(HRI), the social interaction of robots with people is a necessary part of the research agenda. Previous 
research on intelligent robots has focused on equipping robots with planning, reasoning, manipulation 
and other skills necessary to interact with and operate in the non-social environment. However, 
developing an intelligent robot means developing a socially intelligent robot. This is the research 
agenda of developmental robotics. Kerstin Dautenhahn (2007) has reviewed research on robots that 
have social skills and interact with people.  
Dautenhahn shows that the notion of social robots and the associated degree of robotic social 
intelligence is diverse and depends on the particular research emphasis.The first question to be 
answered is why should robots, where their usefulness and functionality are a primary concern, 
possess social skills? The answer depends on the specific requirements of a particular domain of 
application. At one end of the spectrum of the social skill requirements, are those robots,, who need 
only to interact with other robots.  At the other end of the spectrum are robots that must interact 
extensively with humans. Examples include robots that serve as companions in the home for the 
elderly or assist people with disabilities.  They need to possess a wide range of social skills tomake 
them acceptable to humans. Social skills, the development of a robotic etiquette, or robotiquette, as a 
set of heuristics and guidelines on how a robot should behave and communicate in its owner’s home 
are not only desirable but also essential for the acceptance of a robot companion. Without these skills, 
such robots would fail in their role.  
Different paradigms regarding human–robot interaction                                  
Regarding the relationships between humans and robots in HRI, Dautenhahn has distinguished two 
paradigms: the caretaker paradigm and the assistant/companion paradigm. 
The caretaker paradigm considers humans as caretakers of robots. The role of the human is to 
identify and respond to the robot's emotional and social needs. The human needs to keep the robot 
‘happy’. This implies showing behaviors towards the robot which are characteristic of behavior 
towards infants or baby animals. This approach is clearly demonstrated in Cynthia Breazeal's (2002) 
work on Kismet, a robotic head with facial features. The robot is meant to be treated as a baby infant 
or puppy, with exaggerated child-like features satisfying the baby pattern, which appeals to the 
nurturing instinct in people.  
However, it is important to ask whether we really want to bond with computers. Humans are selective 
regarding how many friends they have. According to Dunbar (2003) there is an evolutionary cognitive 
limit of 150 on the number of members of our social networks. Thus, if robots are trying to be our 
friends, and are requiring us to treat them like friends, this might overload our cognitive capacities. 
Moreover, social interaction and communication with robots is costly, just as with family and friends. 
Friendship requires emotional, psychological, and physiological investment. Therefore, if humans are 
expected to interact with robots similarly as with human friends or children, these costs will also 
occur in HRI. Do we want to make the same investments in robots that we make, for example, in our 
friends or children? Do we want to worry about how to fulfill our robots' emotional and social needs? 
Do we get the same ‘reward’ from an infant robot smiling at us as we would from a child? Is a robot 
really ‘happy’ when it smiles? Can mechanical interactions be as rewarding as those with biological 
organisms? Do we get the same pay-off from HRI, as from human interaction in terms of emotional 
support, friendship and love? The answers to these questions are not obvious and may be culturally 
dependent.  
The assistant/companion paradigm considers robots as caretakers or assistants of humans. Such a 
robot has to be considerate, proactive and non-intrusive, to work towards a relationship of trust and 
38 
 
confidentiality with the human, to possess good communication skills, to be flexible, to be willing to 
learn and adapt, and to be competent.  
Conclusion                                                                                                                   
HRI is a young but growing research field. The future will tell whether it will have a long-lasting 
place in the scientific landscape. According to Dautenhahn, several challenges need to be addressed.  
The field of human–computer interaction can provide starting points for the design and analysis of 
HRI experiments. However, robots are not people. In interactions with machines, humans use 
heuristics derived from human–human interaction. This gives us interesting insights into the social 
heritage of our intelligence. However, people do not treat machines like human beings (e.g. we 
immediately replace our broken or inadequate laptop with a new one). Thus, care must be taken when 
adopting methodologies from social sciences, and apply them unchanged to HRI studies. However, 
robots are not computers, either. Interacting with physically embodied and socially situated machines 
is different from interaction via computer interfaces.  
HRI is a highly challenging area that requires interdisciplinary collaboration between AI researchers, 
computer scientists, engineers, psychologists and others.  New methods need to be created in order to 
develop, study and evaluate interactions with a social robot. It may result in social robots that can 
behave adequately in a human-inhabited social environment, but it also raises many fundamental 
issues about the nature of social intelligence.  
Although the social domain is part of that distinguishes us as human, it is still open as to what social 
intelligence for robots could or should mean from the perspective of humans. It is unclear whether the 
social–emotional dimension of human–human interaction can be fulfilled by robots, i.e. whether the 
inherently mechanical nature of HRIs can allow truly meaningful social exchanges. While it is 
doubtful that robots can overcome their robotic heritage, it may be more realistic to view them as part 
of a social environment including human interaction, rather than viewing them as selfish machines.  
Examples of Social Robots                                                        
Kismet is a robot made in the late 1990s at Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Cynthia 
Breazeal. The robot's auditory, visual and expressive systems allow it to participate in human social 
interaction and to demonstrate simulated human emotion and appearance. Kismet contains input 
devices that give it auditory, visual, and proprioception abilities. Kismet simulates emotion through 
various facial expressions, vocalizations, and movement. Facial expressions are created through 
movements of the ears, eyebrows, eyelids, lips, jaw, and head. 
To visually perceive the person who interacts with it, Kismet is equipped with four color cameras. A 
microphone worn by the person is used to process her vocalizations. 
The design of Kismet’s synthetic nervous system, particularly the perceptual and behavioral aspects, 
is heavily inspired by the social development of human infants. Kismet is endowed with a substantial 
amount of infrastructure that enables it to leverage from playful, infant-like interactions, to foster its 
social development. 
The skills and mechanisms allow it to cope with a complex social environment and these skills 
include feedback to the human it interacts with. It can direct its attention to establish shared reference, 
and give readable, expressive feedback to the human. It has the ability to recognize expressive 
feedback such as praise and prohibition, the ability to take turns to reflect the learning episodes, and 




                                 
                                 Source: Wikipedia 
An example of trials where a mobile robot interacted with children with autism is research project 
Aurora (AUtonomous Robotic platform as a Remedial tool for children with Autism) project of the 
National Autistic Society (NAS) carried out since 1998 in the UK. The aspect of play is a core part of 
the project, because play is beneficial to  children with autism. These children may have difficulty in 
expressing feelings and thoughts in words. Play gives them chance to express themselves and offers 
them opportunities to develop the social skills that they lack, in particular turn-taking and imitation.  
Robonaut is a humanoid robot under development at NASA’s Johnson Space Center to ultimately 
serve as an astronaut’s assistant. 
PaReRo is a small mobile household robot under development by NEC corporation. 
Health-related applications are also being explored. These include the use of robots as nursemaids to 
help the elderly, and robotic pets such as Omron’s NeCoRo that are intended to provide some of the 
health related benefits of pet ownership. Like most household cats, NeCoRo does not respond to 
commands or perform tricks. It does what is most important of a cat. It purrs contentedly when 
stroked and gives cuddly emotional feedback to its owner with feline sounds and movements. 
NeCoRo can make 48 different cat noises. It can also perk up its ears, squint its eyes, tilt its head, or 
stretch its legs, to express such feelings as surprise or fatigue. 
Can robots have emotions? 
Science fiction is full of stories of machines that have feelings. Although the gap between science 
fiction and science fact appears vast, some researchers in artificial intelligence now believe it is only a 
question of time before it is bridged. The capacity for emotion is often considered to be one of the 
main differences between humans and machines. This is certainly still true of the machines that exist 
today. People sometimes get angry with their computers and shout at them as if computers had 
emotions, but the computers take no notice. They neither recognize human feelings, nor their own 
feelings.       
But the gap between science fiction and science fact is closing. Today's computers and robots still 
have a long way to go before they acquire a full range of human emotions, but they have already 
made some progress. In order to make further progress, engineers and computer scientists will have to 
join forces with psychologists to study robotics and artificial intelligence. The future is in their hands. 
The new field of affective computing has already made some progress in building primitive emotional 
machines, and every month brings new advances. However, some critics argue that a machine could 
never come to have real emotions like ours. At best, they claim, clever programming might allow it to 
simulate human emotions, but these would just be clever fakes.  
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In recent years computer scientists have been developing a range of 'animated agent faces'. These are 
programs that generate images of humanlike faces on the computer's visual display expressing 
convincing emotions.  
The range of emotional expressions available to Kismet is still limited, but these are convincing 
enough to generate sympathy among the humans who interact with him. Breazeal has invited human 
parents to play with Kismet on a daily basis. When left alone, Kismet looks sad, but when it detects a 
human face it smiles, inviting attention.  
Does Kismet have emotions? Certainly Kismet has some emotional capacity. Kismet does not display 
the full range of emotional behavior observed in humans, but the capacity for emotion is not an all-or-
nothing thing. There is a whole spectrum of emotional capacities, ranging from the very simple to the 
very complex. Perhaps Kismet's limited capacity for emotion puts him somewhere near the simple 
end of the spectrum, but even this is a significant advance over the computers that currently sit on our 
desks, which by most definitions are devoid of any emotion whatsoever. 
As affective computing progresses, it will be possible to build machines with more and more complex 
emotional capacities. Kismet does not yet have a voice, but in the future Breazeal plans to give him a 
vocal system which might convey auditory signals of emotion. Today's speech synthesizers speak in 
an unemotional monotone. In the future, computer scientists will make them sound much more human 
by modulating nonlinguistic aspects of vocalization like speed, pitch and volume. 
Facial expression and vocal intonation are not the only forms of emotional behavior. Emotions may 
also be inferred from actions. For example, for computers to exhibit the kind of emotional behavior 
shown by animals when they fear something and turn round and run away, they will have to be able to 
move around and will have to become mobots (mobile robots). 
Dozens of mobots have already been developed in laboratories, but most of these are very simple. 
Some are only the size of a shoe, and all they can do is to find their way around a piece of the floor 
without bumping into anything. Sensors allow them to detect obstacles such as walls and other 
mobots. Despite the simplicity of this mechanism, their behavior can seem eerily human. To anybody 
watching them, the impression that the mobot is actually afraid of collisions is irresistible. 
Are these mobots really afraid? Or are spectators guilty of anthropomorphism? The current resistance 
to attributing emotions to machines is simply due to the fact that even the most advanced machines 
today are still very primitive. As machines come to resemble humans more, the question about 
whether or not the machines have 'real' emotions or just 'fake' ones will become less meaningful. 
Some experts estimate that we will be able to build machines with complex emotions like ours within 
fifty years. But is this a good idea? What is the point of building emotional machines? Would 
emotions just get in the way of good computing, or even worse, cause computers to turn against 
humans? 
Reasons to give computers emotions 
Giving computers emotions could be very useful for a variety of reasons. First, it would be much 
easier and more enjoyable to interact with an emotional computer than with today's unemotional 
machines. If, by scanning your facial expression, the computer detects that you are in a bad mood, the 
emotionally-aware desktop PC might tell you a joke, or suggest that you read a particularly nice email 
first. If you resent such attempts to cheer you up, the computer might ignore you until you had calmed 
down or had a coffee. Hence, it might be much more productive to work with a computer that was 
emotionally intelligent in this way than with today's dumb machines. 
This is not just a flight of fancy. Computers are already capable of recognizing some emotions. A 
computer is able to recognize facial expressions of six basic emotions. Paired with volunteers who 
pretended to feel one of these emotions, the computer recognized the emotion correctly 98 per cent of 
the cases. This is better than the accuracy rate achieved by most humans on the same task! If 
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computers are already better than us at recognizing some emotions, it is surely not long before they 
will acquire similarly advanced capacities for expressing emotions, and perhaps even for feeling them. 
In the future, it may be humans who are seen by computers as emotionally awkward, not vice versa. 
Many other possible applications for emotional computers have been proposed, including the 
following: 
 Artificial interviewers that train humans on how to do well in job interviews by giving 
feedback on human body language. 
 Affective voice synthesizers that allow people with speech problems not just to speak, but to 
speak in genuinely emotional ways. 
 Frustration monitors that allow manufacturers to evaluate how easy their products are to use. 
 Wearable computers ('intelligent clothing') that give feedback on human emotional states so 
that they can tell when humans are getting stressed and need a break. 
 
All of these potential applications for emotional machines are resolutely utilitarian, but probably 
many or most emotional machines in the future will be built not for any practical purpose, but purely 
for entertainment. Instead of for spacecraft and intelligent clothing, they will befor think toys and 
videogames. The constant demand for better games means that game software is continually 
improving. It might well be that the first genuinely emotional computers are game consoles. 
Entertainment software with proto-emotional capacities is already available in the form of virtual pets, 
which live in personal computers. Many kids now keep dogs and cats as screen-pets, and more 
recently a virtual baby has been launched. A program called Sims allows you to design your own 
people. Soon they may take on a life of their own, which can be fascinating to watch. As characters, 
the Sims are eerily human in their range of emotional behavior: they get angry, become depressed, 
and even fall in love. 
There are also little furry robots, called Furbies, which
3
 fall asleep when tired, and make plaintive 
cries when neglected for too long. There are also robotic dogs and cats that run around your living 
room without ever making a mess. There is even a baby doll with a silicon brain and a latex face that 
expresses distress when it needs feeding. 
All of these creatures are virtual. They live inside the computer, and their only body is a picture on a 
screen. However, the first computerized creatures with real bodies are also now coming onto the toy 
market, and they too have proto-emotional capacities.Most people respond to these artificial life forms 
with natural sympathy. They enjoy playing with them, as they would with a real kitten or baby. 
Is it possible to design computers with emotions?                                                          
It is now possible to design a relatively simple machine that can monitor and control both things in the 
outside world, and things inside itself. If the wiring is done right, even a simple robot can be said to 
have states that are analogues of some human emotions. But it does not necessarily have a complex 
emotional life. To have that requires making machines that interact with people in more natural ways. 
However, it may be argued that beacuse a machine cannot physically feel (itself an assumption up for 
debate), it would be contradictory to suggest that it would be capable of having emotions. 
Should computers with emotions be designed? 
If a machine is to survive, it needs something like emotions to help it respond rapidly and 
appropriately to changes in its environment. There is definitely a need to make complex, flexible 
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robots easy to interact with. They must be understandable to us, and vice versa. Therefore, it would be 
useful if they could show, recognize, and understand emotions.  
How would the computer react to or measure human emotions if it was to have emotions 
itself? 
Much ongoing work is about getting computers to recognize human emotions from information 
extracted from skin galvanometry (measuring levels of sweating), tone of voice, facial expression, and 
so on. This research is interesting, but does not get at the core of human emotions. A computer might 
be able to tell that someone is happy, but it could not (easily) tell what she is happy about. To get this 
kind of information, computers need to able to tell what people are looking at, when they feel an 
emotion, and what they mean when they talk about the world. Much of our conversation and body 
language reveals how we feel about things, directly or indirectly and to tap into this, computers will 
need to be able to understand human communication better.  
Could a computer with emotions have a personality?  
This seems very likely. First, most people experience emotions when they interact with the world and 
with each other. These emotions vary from person to person. That is a feature of personality. If a 
computer has emotions at all, it will automatically project a personality. Secondly, in building 
emotional robots, it makes sense to make them different from one another, rather than giving them all 
identical personalities.  
Does the irrational nature of emotion not conflict with the fundamental way in which 
programs and computers are designed?  
A distinction commonly made is that between emotion and reason. This separation has gone too far, 
and it has been convincingly argued that much reasoning involves emotion (Antonio Damasio, 1995). 
In terms of programming, what matters is whether functional relationships can be worked out between 
cognitive states (like beliefs about the world) and affective states (like strong, positive preferences for 
particular experiences). If there are regular functional relationships, which seems likely, the problem 
can be tackled.  
What is it like to be a conscious computer?                                                                   
The subjective nature of consciousness means that it is impossible to know if a computer is 
experiencing emotions. Therefore, there is no concept of what it is like to be a conscious computer. In 
accordance with the Turing-esque definition, "if it looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it is 
a duck", and if robots can be made to behave in complex ways similar to people, then there is no 
reason to deny them emotional feelings, or conscious states.  
5.6 Whole Brain Emulation                                                                                             
 Whole Brain Emulation (WBE) is the transfer of a mind, the mental structure and consciousness of a 
person, from a biological brain to an external carrier, such as a computer. The term emulation 
originates in computer science, where it denotes closely copying the function of a program or 
computer hardware by having its functions simulated by another program. While a simulation imitates 
the outward results, emulation mimics the internal causal dynamics (at some suitable level of 
description). The emulation is regarded as successful if the emulated system produces the same 
outward behavior and results as the original (possibly with a difference in speed).  
It can be said that a brain emulator is software that models the states and functional dynamics of a 
brain at a relatively fine-grained level of detail. In particular, a mind emulation is a brain emulator that 
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is detailed and correct enough to produce the phenomenological (subjective experience) effects of a 
mind. A person emulation is a mind emulation that emulates a particular mind. 
In the brain, every molecule is a powerful computer and the structure and function of trillions upon 
trillions of molecules, as well as all the rules that govern how they interact, must be simulated.  
Although computers that are trillions of times bigger and faster than anything existing today are 
needed, a detailed functional artificial human brain can be built in principle. Substantial mainstream 
research is being done in the development of faster super computers, virtual reality, brain-computer 
interfaces, animal brain mapping, and simulation. Super computers are expected to reach sufficient 
capacity for whole human brain emulation within a few years.   
The established neuroscientific consensus is that the human mind is largely a property of the 
information processing of the neural network, which can be emulated. The human brain contains 
about 100 billion nerve cells called neurons, each individually linked to other neurons along neural 
pathways. Signals at the terminus of axons, are transmitted across synapses to the next neurons on the 
pathway, by chemical, electrical or mechanical means, depending on the type of neuron. 
Neuroscientists assume that important functions performed by the mind, such as learning, memory, 
and consciousness, are due to purely physical and electrochemical processes in the brain. Many neural 
pathways for specific functions of the brain have been already documented, with the relevant sensory, 
association, and motor areas identified.  
The word emulation describes the aim of achieving as close a functional match as possible, so that the 
mind is altered as little as possible in the transfer keeping the individuality as intact as possible. WBE 
is not  the ”creation” of a new mind.  Since so much of human thinking is directed towards physical 
needs and desires and a person’s personality and skills reside in the brain, a re-instantiated mind needs 
a body. A successful emulation need not predict all details of the original behavior of the emulated 
system; it need only replicate computationally relevant functionality at the desired level of emulation. 
Mind uploading (another term for WBE) is consistent with the view of modern neuroscience and 
cognitive theory that consciousness does not require some mysterious, immaterial, energizing force, 
but is contained in the physical interactions of a brain and its structure, and can thus be quantified and 
described. In cases where the subject's consciousness is transferred to a memory device, the result is 
an artificial intelligence. If a memory device is lodged in an artificial body, the result is a "thinking" 
robot. A very important question is whether or not your uploaded human brain is really you. An 
important element in uploading will be the gradual transfer of intelligence, personality, and skills, to 
the nonbiological portion of human intelligence. 
According to Kurzweil, in the 2020s, nanobots will augment our brain with nonbiological 
intelligence, starting with routine functions of sensory processing and memory, moving on to skill 
formation, pattern recognition, and logical analysis. By the 2030s, the nonbiological portion of our 
intelligence will predominate, because biological intelligence is essentially fixed in its capacity. By 
the 2040s, the nonbiological portion will be billions of times more capable. Gradually we would have 
effectively uploaded ourselves, never quite noticing the transfer. There would be no “Old Me” and no 
“New Me”, but just an increasingly capable “Me”. This gradual but inexorable progression to vastly 
superior nonbiological thinking would profoundly transform human civilization. 
The technologically simplest approach is destructive scanning or serial sectioning in which the brain 
is destructively disassembled during the emulation process. This could be applied immediately after 
death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.  Serial sectioning involves freezing a brain, 
slicing it up using a laser or a diamond knife, examining the slices under a microscope, and 
reconstructing the neurons, synapses and most of the major brain components that are deemed 
functionally imperative, in an artificial brain. There is a need for methods of physically handling and 
storing pieces of tissue. Since most scanning methods cannot image large volumes, the brains will 
have to be sectioned into manageable pieces with less tolerance for damage.  
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Nanotechnology may prove useful in mapping out the brain. The brain will be infused with 
nanoparticles which will map out the brain's physical structure and record chemical interactions. 
While in deep sleep, the nanomachines circulate throughout the brain, and replace existing neurons 
with electronic equivalents. In this case, the person will still be living and interacting with his 
environment as if nothing has happened and he is clearly alive. Hence, the basic idea is to take a 
particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is so faithful to 
the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the 
original brain.  
Non-destructive scanning of living brains appears to be more difficult than the “slice- and-dice” 
approach. Nanomedical techniques may possibly enable non-destructive scanning by use of invasive 
measurement devices. Nanobots could replace damaged brain cells with artificial ones, making way 
for a step by step or gradual transition to an artificial brain. This method is similar to another proposal 
termed cyborging, which also maps the brain and its functions, and replaces each component with an 
artificial one. This may be done systematically until the entire brain has been replaced by artificial 
components. 
A common doubt expressed about the possibility of simulating even simple neural systems is that they 
are analog rather than digital. The doubt is based on the qualitative difference between continuous and 
discrete variables. If computations in the brain make use of the full power of continuous variables the 
brain may be able to achieve “hyper-computation”. Brains are made of imperfect structures which are, 
in turn, made of discrete atoms obeying quantum mechanical rules, which force them into discrete 
energy states. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether quantum computing is required for WBE. Part 
of section 5.6 is devoted to this issue. 
At present, emulating the human brain is not much more than a futuristic speculation. We do not 
understand enough about the brain to make detailed simulations of brain functions.  At present much 
research is ongoing about the modeling of complex neural structures. This has resulted only in neural 
models of different parts of a mind, which may be considered as building blocks for a compete AGI 
design. Intelligent nanobots (bloodcell-sized computerized robots) would be sent into the human brain 
through the capillaries to intimately interact with biological neurons. IBM is now building a detailed 
simulation of a substantial portion of the cerebral cortex in the brain.  
An organization called the Brain Preservation Foundation was founded in 2010 and is offering a 
Brain Preservation Technology prize, to promote exploration of brain preservation technology in 
service of humanity. The Prize, currently $106,000, will be awarded in two parts, 25% to the first 
international team to preserve a whole mouse brain, and 75% to the first team to preserve a whole 
large animal brain in a manner that could also be adopted for humans, in a hospital or hospice setting, 
immediately upon clinical death. Ultimately the goal of this prize is to generate a whole brain map 
which may be used in support of separate efforts to upload and possibly 'reboot' a mind in virtual 
space. 
What are the potential benefits of WBE? 
Immortality/Backup                                                                                                            
In theory, if the information and processes of the mind can be disassociated from the biological body, 
they are no longer tied to the individual limits and lifespan of that body. Information within a brain 
could be partly or wholly copied or transferred to one or more other substrates (including digital 





Speed-up                                                                                                                            
A computer-based intelligence such as an upload could potentially think much faster than a human 
even if it were no more intelligent. Human neurons exchange electrochemical signals with a 
maximum speed of about 150 meters per second, whereas the speed of light is about 300 million 
meters per second, about two million times faster. Also, neurons can generate a maximum of about 
200 to 1000 action potentials or "firings" per second, whereas the number of signals per second in 
modern computer chips is about 2 GHz (about ten million times greater), and expected to increase 
rapidly. Eliezer Yudkowsky of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence has calculated a 
theoretical upper bound for the speed of a future artificial neural network. It could, in theory, run 
about 1 million times faster than a real brain, experiencing about a year of subjective time in only 31 
seconds of real time. That requires an enormously powerful computer or artificial neural network in 
comparison with today's super-computers. The processing demands are likely to be immense, due to 
the large number of neurons in the human brain, along with the considerable complexity of each 
neuron. 
Multiple/parallel existence:  
A concept explored in science fiction is the idea of more than one running copy of a human mind 
existing at once. Such copies could potentially allow an "individual" to experience many things at 
once, and later integrate the experiences of all copies into a central mentality at some point in the 
future. This effectively allows a single sentient being to be at many places at once and do many things 
at once. Such partial and complete copies of a sentient being raise interesting questions regarding 
identity and individuality. 
Copying vs.moving                                                                                                   
Another issue with brain uploading is what the difference would be between a replica and the original 
and whether an uploaded mind is really the "same" sentience. This is the subject of the Swampman 
thought experiment
4
.This issue is especially complex if the original remains essentially unchanged by 
the uploading procedure, thereby resulting in an obvious copy which could potentially have rights 
separate from the unaltered, obvious original. 
Most projected brain scanning technologies may necessarily be destructive so that the original brain 
would not survive the brain scanning procedure. But if it can be kept intact, the computer-based 
consciousness could be a copy of the still-living biological person. Since a brain emulation can be 
started, paused, backed-up and rerun from a saved backup state at any time, the emulated mind would 
forget everything that has happened after the instant of backup. In that case an older version of a 
simulated mind may meet a younger version and share experiences with it. 
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 Swampman is the subject of a thought experiment introduced by Donald Davidson, in his 1987 paper 
"Knowing One's Own Mind". The experiment runs as follows: Suppose Davidson goes hiking in the swamp and 
is struck and killed during a storm by a lightning bolt. At the same time, nearby in the swamp another lightning 
bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of molecules such that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly the 
same form that Davidson's body had at the moment of his untimely death. This copy, whom Davidson terms 
'Swampman', has a brain which is identical to that which Davidson had, and will thus, presumably, behave 
exactly as Davidson would have. He will walk out of the swamp, return to Davidson's office and write the same 
essays he would have written; he will interact like an amicable person with all of Davidson's friends and family, 
and so forth. But Davidson holds that there would nevertheless be a difference, though no one would notice it. 
Swampman will appear to recognize Davidson's friends, but actually he will not recognize them, as he has never 




WBE requires significant computer power and storage for image processing and interpretation during 
the scanning process, and to hold and run the resulting emulation. However, it does appear feasible 
within the foreseeable future to store the full connectivity of all neurons in the brain within the 
working memory of a large computing system. Achieving the performance needed for real-time 
emulation appears to be a more serious computational problem, but full human brain emulations 
should be possible before mid-century. Animal models of simple mammals would be possible one to 
two decades before this. 
There do not appear to exist any obstacles to attempting to emulate an invertebrate organism today, 
but the networks that make up the brains of even modestly complex organisms, are still not fully 
known. Obtaining detailed anatomical information of a small brain appears entirely feasible and 
useful to neuroscience, and would be a critical first step towards WBE. 
It seems that the need for raw computing power for real-time simulation and funding for building 
large-scale automated scanning/processing facilities, are the factors most likely delay the advent of 
WBE. 
Brain Computer Interface 
 
Mind uploading can be seen as a migration process of the core mental functions, which are transferred 
from a human brain to an artificial environment. This process might be performed with a brain-
computer interface, brain transplant or prosthesis. 
A brain–computer interface (BCI) or a brain–machine interface (BMI), is a direct pathway of 
communication between the brain and an external device. BCIs are often aimed at assisting, 
augmenting, or repairing human cognitive or sensory-motor functions. Research on BCIs began in the 
1970s at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) under a grant from the National Science 
Foundation, followed by a contract from DARPA. The field of BCI research and development has 
since focused primarily on neuroprosthetic applications that aim at restoring damaged hearing, sight 
and movement. Thanks to the remarkable plasticity of the cerebral cortex, signals from implanted 
prostheses can, after adaptation, be handled by the brain like natural sensor or effector channels. 
Following years of animal experimentation, the first neuroprosthetic devices implanted in humans 
appeared in the mid-nineties. 
Neuroprosthetics is an area of neuroscience concerned with neural prostheses—using artificial devices 
to replace the function of impaired nervous systems or sensory organs. The most widely used 
neuroprosthetic device is the cochlear implant, which, as of 2006, has been implanted in 
approximately 100,000 people worldwide. There are several neuroprosthetic devices that aim to 
restore vision, including retinal implants. 
The differences between BCIs and neuroprosthetics are mostly in the ways the terms are used: 
neuroprosthetics typically connect the nervous system to a device, whereas BCIs usually connect the 
brain (or nervous system) with a computer system. Practical neuroprosthetics can be linked to any part 
of the nervous system—for example, peripheral nerves—while the term "BCI" usually designates a 
narrower class of systems which interface with the central nervous system. Sometimes the terms are 
used interchangeably. Neuroprosthetics and BCIs seek to achieve the same aims, such as restoring 
sight, hearing, movement, ability to communicate, and even cognitive function. Both use similar 
experimental methods and surgical techniques. 
A distinction can be made between invasive and non-invasive BCIs. Invasive BCI research aims at 
repairing damaged sight and providing new functionality to persons with paralysis. Invasive BCIs are 
implanted directly into the grey matter of the brain during neurosurgery. Since they rest in the grey 
matter, invasive devices produce the highest quality signals among BCI devices. However, they are 
prone to create scar-tissue build-up, causing the signal to become weaker or even lost, as the body 
reacts to a foreign object in the brain. 
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Besides invasive experiments, there have also been experiments in humans using non-invasive, 
neuroimaging technologies as interfaces. Signals recorded in this way have been used to power 
muscle implants and restore partial movement in an experimental volunteer. Although they are easy to 
wear, non-invasive implants produce poor signal resolution because the skull dampens signals, 
dispersing and blurring the electromagnetic waves created by the neurons. Although the waves can 
still be detected, it is more difficult to determine the area of the brain that is exhibiting activation.                                                         
Electroencephalography (EEG) is the most studied potential non-invasive interface, due mainly to its 
fine temporal resolution, ease of use, portability and low set-up cost. Besides the technology's 
susceptibility to noise, another substantial barrier to using EEG as a brain–computer interface is the 
extensive training required before users can work with the technology.                                                                                                  
MEG (Magnetoencephalography) and MRI (Magnetic resonance imaging)  
MEG and functional MRI (fMRI) have both been used successfully as non-invasive BCIs. While also 
imperfect, fMRI is better suited to identifying the location of neurons that are firing. fMRI 
measurements of haemodynamic responses in real time have been used to control robot arms with a 
seven second delay between thought and movement.  
BCI based toys 
A number of companies have scaled back medical grade EEG technology to create inexpensive BCIs 
for toys and gaming devices. Some of these toys have been extremely commercially successful. These 
include NeuroSky and Mattel MindFlex. 
Preparing for mind uploading 
Assuming mind uploading will take place in an immediate as opposed to gradual form, waking up 
may presumably occur in one of two kinds of bodies. This may happen in a human body that wasn't 
yours previously (either because it is the body of a person who suffered brain death or because a 
brainless body was genetically grown for you).  It also may involve waking up in some sort of 
computer environment, like a robot. Waking up in another human body is not likely and is not really 
what mind uploading is all about anyway. In the second situation robots of the future will be free to be 
supple, graceful, warm, and articulate.  
Waking will happen in a body that was not yours previously. This can be both physically and 
mentally challenging. Preparation does not consist of physical preparation because the old body is not 
needed anymore, but mental preparation is necessary. You will appear different to other people who 
know you because you will have different physical abilities and the robotic replacement body will 
likely surpass the original body in most aspects.  
Uploading would cause a dramatic shift in human society. Uploaded minds will be on a fast track to 
accelerated evolution and growth while "leftover" humans will probably seem pretty dull by 
comparison. Preparation will depend on whether there is a short or long period of transition from the 
first upload to a society of primarily cybernetic humans.  
If mind uploading induces a sudden alteration of society, the entire revolution will probably be over 
fairly quickly. Initially, uploading would be expensive but the costs would be expected to decline over 
time.  The rich would get it first and the rest get it later. Aside from the financial cost, a lot of people 
will not accept uploaded humans as a matter of principle. Religious people may declare uploaded 
people dead and soulless and their very consciousness may be denied. It is unclear how religious 
authorities would pronounce on the matter. 
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For late uploaders, preparation is not something to worry about because uploading would be occurring 
en-masse with well-organized forms of training and possibilities to buy an uploading kit.  However, a 
gradual revolution would seem unlikely in the case of a fast uploading procedure, though it might be 
more likely if the uploading process itself is gradual, by way of cybernetic implants or slow brain 
augmentation. This method of uploading may be more realistic than fast uploading. Uploading may be 
something that can be done so quietly that other people do not notice each stage. If the uploading 
procedure occurs near the end of this quiet revolution, then people will have gradually come to accept 
mind uploading. What about physical preparation? Depending on the method of mind uploading, 
your original body could be totally unaffected or may have to be destroyed. The best you can do 
before mind uploading becomes reality is to keep your body healthy. There are not one, but two very 
good reasons to adopt a long-term attitude toward your health in anticipation of new technologies.  
The first reason is that mind uploading provides you with a dramatically extended lifespan. The 
uploaded mind may only be as good as the mind it is uploaded from. Thus, research into Parkinson's, 
Alzheimer's, Schizophrenia, Depression, and other brain diseases is especially valuable. Such research 
will ensure the health of our brains long enough to get to the forthcoming uploading revolution, but it 
will also accelerate brain research in general and thus bring the day of feasible mind-uploading closer 
to the present.  
The second reason to care about your health is to avoid death until mind uploading becomes possible. 
As old-age sets in, a brain and mind that are kept busy and stimulated will remain more adaptive and 
healthy. Keep yourself occupied. Find things you are excited about and embrace them. Maintaining 
your vitality will be absolutely essential to make it to the day when mind uploading will be available, 
and to have a mind fit to upload.  
The Costs and Benefits of Mind Uploading 
Uploading requires not only a complete understanding of neuroscience, but also perfect knowledge of 
how to convert every relevant aspect of the brain’s functioning into electronic computation. 
According to Nicolas Agar (2011) mind-uploading is prudentially irrational. Success in mind 
uploading relies on the soundness of the program of Strong AI—the view that it may someday be 
possible to build a computer that is capable of thought. If Strong AI is a correct view, uploaded 
humans can enjoy the benefits of enhanced cognition unavailable to those who retain their biological 
brains. Conversely, if Strong AI is a false view, then no computer could ever serve as a receptacle for 
a human mind, and mind-uploading would inevitably fail. According to Nicolas Agar the probability 
of strong AI being true is somewhat less than 1, and he therefore concludes that mind-uploading is 
prudentially irrational. 
It may be argued that even those who are convinced by the possibility of mind uploading should also 
take into account that there is a non-negligible chance that they are mistaken, and that mind-uploading 
is fatal. There certainly is a non-zero probability that any manner of ‘‘brain emulation’’ could result in 
death. 
An important question is whether there is reason for thinking that the probability of death-by-
uploading is sufficiently high to justify refusal. Mind-uploading might be worthwhile if the risks of 
death are small and the potential gains are great. 
There may be people who would be undeterred by the risk of death (or an equivalent loss) from failed 
mind-uploading. A person about to expire from a terminal illness can choose between certain death 
from disease and a merely possible death from uploading failure. 
If the gerontologist Aubrey de Grey is right about the near future of our species, we could soon 
become ageless, immunized against cancer, heart failure, or any of the other diseases that might 
incline us to disregard caution about uploading. He claims that there is a good chance that people 
alive today will achieve millennial life spans. They will do this by systematically fixing up their 
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brains and bodies, without recourse to uploading. Longevity Escape Velocity is likely to arrive sooner 
than uploading.  
If mind-uploading is perfected in advance of achieving longevity escape velocity, it is possible that 
candidates for uploading which have been diagnosed with terminal cancer have nothing or very little 
to lose from uploading. Then, uploading could be prudentially rational for them. Those who are not 
terminally ill may direct their hopes and expectations toward lower-risk methods of life extension and 
quality of life improvement. 
The citizens of societies with mind-uploading technologies may find the risk of death or the loss of 
their conscious minds from failed mind-uploading acceptable if counterbalanced by very considerable 
benefits from successful mind-uploading. If a mind can be uploaded in the near future, the value of 
protecting one’s brain from injury or damage becomes much higher than for other organs, which will 
lose relative value with the advent of uploading. 
John Pavius has provided 6 reasons why he feels will be impossible to upload the human mind into a 
computer. 
1. Overload of the platform onto which the uploading is done is likely. This is a common problem that 
the most advanced computer scientists are struggling with. In principle, backups of uploaded minds 
can be made. But is the "backup" really you, or is it just a clone of you that takes your place now that 
the "real" you is lost? 
2. The Storage Media Won't Last Five Years, Much Less Forever. Digital storage media may collapse 
alarmingly fast when used continuously by millions of people "living" on them. Without frequent 
physical backups, refreshes, and format updates, precious data will quickly be rendered unreadable or 
inaccessible.  
3. Insane Energy Demand. The human brain only needs 20 watts to run the application called “You”, 
but with almost 7 billion humans, the earth's ability to host all humans will be straining. This requires 
the invention of a new energy technology, such as fusion reactors or a Dyson sphere,  
4. Lack of Processing Power. Adding up the brain's billions of neurons and trillions of synapses gives 
a "total processing power" of about 10 quadrillion calculations per second, or 10 petaflops. However, 
neuroscientists are still uncovering all the ways that the little wires in our heads encode information 
and this requires an enormous amount extra computational energy exceeding that 10-quadrillion 
figure by several orders of magnitude.  
5. Minds Do Not Work Without Bodies. What makes you “You” is not just the information content of 
your memories and conscious mind — it's the whole dynamic physical makeup and history of your 
body. In fact, barely anything is known about what specific jobs all of the brain's structures actually 
evolved for, but an emerging consensus is that the brain's main job is simply to keep track of what 
various parts of your body are doing (or should be doing). Meanwhile, the special human conscious 
self is an evolutionary latecomer that became a feature under the delusion that it is in charge but really 
just along for the ride. 
This means that, because the human mind is merely a component of the body, it is not possible to 
separate the two — at least, not without losing everything you know and experience as "yourself". 
Experiments have shown that people's personalities can change if they are embodied just slightly 
differently via virtual reality. Studies on amputees have shown that removing body parts affects visual 
perception. Even simple abstract notions (like "past" and "future", "like" and "dislike," even "you" 
and "I") boil down to physical sensations of the body in space.  
6. Who Gets Uploaded? Unless there is a way to upload all of humanity simultaneously, there will be 





The brain might be physically duplicated with brain-scanning, but to upload a particular person’s 
personality, neural processes must be simulated at the level of individual neurons.  Virtual worlds 
seem to provide an ideal environment for the creation and maturation of powerful AGI systems. 
Creating virtual neurons, synapses and activations is another way to let the brain guide AGI. Humans 
would be uploaded into virtual bodies, and live in virtual worlds with a high level of integration 
between AGIs and human society. Social interaction in virtual worlds is a domain that requires 
general intelligence on the human level, and is not amenable to narrow AI techniques. By the time of 
the Singularity, humans may essentially be inseparable from the AGI-incorporating technological 
substrate they have created. Right now many people already consider themselves inseparable from 
their cell-phones and the Internet. AGIs involved in the metaverse, i.e. the universe of virtual worlds, 
become progressively more and more intelligent due to their integration in the social network of 
human beings interacting with them.  
Eventually, AGI’s will have many significant advantages over biological intelligences. The ability to 
modify their own underlying structures and dynamics, will give AGI anability for self-improvement 
that vastly exceeds that possessed by humans. AGI designs based too closely on the human brain may 
not be able to exploit the unique advantages available to digital intelligences. Approaches that provide 
greater efficiency on available computer hardware seem sensible at the present time. 
5.7 Creating Artificial Live: ALife 
If simulating the brain molecule by molecule is not ambitious enough, there is another possible 
approach to AGI that is even more ambitious: simulation of the sort of evolutionary processes that 
gave rise to the human brain in the first place. Although a super- computer cannot yet simulate the 
origin of life on Earth molecule by molecule, it is possible to emulate the type of process wherebylife 
emerges: cells from organic molecules, multi-cellular organisms from unicellular ones. This kind of 
research falls into the domain of artificial life (Alife) rather than AI proper. The fields of AI and 
artificial life overlap, as living and flourishing in a changing and uncertain environment seem to 
require at least a rudimentary form of intelligence. 
Artificial life attempts to understand the essential general properties of living systems by synthesizing 
life-like behavior in software, hardware and biochemicals. The rules governing the elements of 
complex systems, which have to be reshaped over time by some process of adaptation or learning, are 
the main focus of artificial life. 
The phrase ‘artificial life’ was coined by Christopher Langton (1995), who envisioned a study of life 
as it could be in any possible setting. Artificial life owes its deepest intellectual roots to John von 
Neumann and Norbert Wiener. Von Neumann tried to understand the fundamental properties of living 
systems, especially self-reproduction and the evolution of complex adaptive structures, by 
constructing simple formal systems that exhibited those properties. Wiener started applying 
information theory and the analysis of self-regulatory processes to the study of living systems. The 
constructive and abstract methodology of cellular automata still typifies much of artificial life, as does 
the abstract and material-independent methodology of information theory. 
There is an important difference between the modeling strategies of traditional AI and artificial life. 
Most traditional AI models are top-down-specified serial systems involving a centralized controller 
who makes decisions, which have the potential to affect directly any aspect of the whole system. 
ALife’s models are bottom-up-specified, parallel systems of simple agents, interacting locally. They 
are repeatedly iterated and the resulting global behavior is observed. Such lower-level models are 
sometimes said to be ‘agent-based’ or ‘individual-based.’ The whole system’s behavior is represented 
only indirectly, and arises out of the interactions of constituent parts, both with each other and with 
their physical and social environment.  
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Artificial life (also known as ‘ALife’) is an interdisciplinary study of life and life-like processes that 
involves synthesizing that behavior in artificial systems. Our technological capabilities have brought 
us to the point where we are on the verge of creating "living" artifacts. Artificial life is an alternative 
life-form: life made by Man rather than by Nature, using artificial rather than living cells.  Artificial 
Life expands our sense of what is possible, and it provides a constructive way to explore it. Although 
artificial life is fundamentally directed towards both the origins of biology and its future, the scope 
and complexity of its subject require interdisciplinary cooperation and collaboration. 
Artificial Life aims to investigate the possibility of discovering lifelike behavior in unfamiliar 
settings, to create new and unfamiliar forms of life, and to develop a coherent theory of life in all its 
manifestations. It may help individuals to use new technologies for extending life and creating new 
forms of life, using drugs, prosthetics, the Internet, evolvable hardware, and proliferating robots. 
Artificial life is foremost a scientific, rather than an engineering, endeavor. Given how ignorant we 
still are about the emergence and evolution of living systems, artificial life should emphasize 
understanding first and applications second.  
Artificial Life highlights the question of whether artificial constructions, especially the purely digital 
systems existing in computers, could ever literally be alive. The answer to this question requires 
agreement about the nature of life. However such agreement should not be expected until we have 
experienced a much broader range of possibilities. Artificial life’s self-conscious aim to discern the 
essence of life encourages a liberal experimentation with novel life-like organisms and processes. 
Thus, artificial life fosters a broad perspective on life. 
While biology research is essentially analytic, attempting to break down complex phenomena into 
their basic components, Alife is synthetic, trying to construct phenomena from their elemental units 
putting together systems that behave like living organisms. Biology studies phenomena associated 
with life on earth, that is, life-as-we-know-it, while Alife studies the large domain of biological 
possible life, that is, life-as-it-could-be. 
Artificial life amounts to the practice of "synthetic biology," and the attempt to recreate biological 
phenomena in alternative media would result in not only better theoretical understanding of the 
phenomena under study, but also in practical applications of biological principles in industry and 
technology. 
In the long run, artificial life can contribute to the development of practical adaptive systems in many 
fields of application, such as software development and management, design and manufacture of 
robots, including distributed swarms of autonomous agents, automated trading in financial markets, 
pharmaceutical design, ecological sustainability, and extraterrestrial exploration. 
Because intelligence is a property of living systems, AI might be seen as a subfield of A-Life. 
Artificial life is interested in understanding the properties of living organisms, so that they can build 
artificial systems that exhibit these properties for useful purposes. While AI researchers are interested 
mostly in perception, cognition and generation of action, Alife focuses on evolution, reproduction, 
morphogenesis and metabolism.  AI attempts to replicate human intelligence, whereas Alife attempts 
to emulate the behavior of organic life systems. Alife may or may not be intelligent.  
Evolution is central to Alife and it offers the possibility of adaptation to a dynamic environment. 
When an unforeseen event occurs, the system can evolve, analogously to nature. An evolutionary 
method is advantageous not only in solving problems, but also in offering better adaptability. The 
evolution of life has shown a remarkable growth in complexity. Simple prokaryotic one-celled life has 
led to more complex eukaryotic single-celled life,
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 which then led to multicellular life, then to large-
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accessible within the cell so that the DNA is not collected together in the area the membrane encloses. 




bodied vertebrate creatures with sophisticated sensory processing capacities, and ultimately to highly 
intelligent creatures that use language and develop sophisticated technology. This illustration of 
evolution’s creative potential leads to a deep question. Does evolution have an inherent tendency to 
create greater and greater adaptive complexity, or is the complexity of life as we know it just a 
contingent and accidental by-product of evolution? 
Much effort in artificial life is directed towards creating a system that shows how this kind of open-
ended evolutionary progress is possible, even in principle. Although some forms of life remain 
evolutionary stable for millions of years (e.g., sharks), the apparently open-ended growth in 
complexity of the most complex organisms is intriguing and puzzling. Open-ended adaptablity is a 
hallmark of life, at least when considered on an evolutionary time scale. The ability to cope with a 
complex, dynamic, unpredictable environment is a defining feature of cognitive and intelligent 
systems. This implies that there is a fundamental similarity in the key mechanisms behind both living 
and cognitive systems, and the future of both AI and artificial life hinges on bridging the gap between 
non-living and living matter. Artificial and natural evolving systems are qualitatively different classes 
of evolutionary dynamics, and no known artificial system generates the kind of evolutionary 
dynamics exhibited by the biosphere. Stome key insights are still missing about the mechanisms 
whereby evolution continually creates new kinds of environments that elicit new kinds of adaptations. 
Evolvability, the capacity of evolution to create new adaptations, depends on a system’s ability to 
produce adaptive phenotypic variation, and this hinges on both the extent to which phenotype space 
contains adaptive variation and the ability of evolutionary search to find it. For evolutionary search to 
explore a suitable variety of viable evolutionary pathways, genetic operators must generate enough 
evolutionary novelty. At the same time, evolutionary memory is needed to retain incremental 
improvements discovered over time. Evolvability requires successfully and flexibly balancing these 
competing demands for novelty and memory; this is known as the ‘explore–exploit’ trade-off in the 
machine learning literature. 
Genetic algorithms are currently the most prominent and widely-used computational models of 
evolution in artificial life systems. A genetic algorithm is a machine-learning technique loosely 
modeled on biological evolution; it views learning as a matter of competition among candidate 
problem solutions. Potential solutions are encoded in an artificial chromosome, and an initial 
population of candidate solutions is created randomly. The quality or ‘fitness’ of each solution is 
calculated by application of a ‘fitness function’. For example, if the problem is to find the shortest 
route between two cities and a candidate solution is a specific itinerary, then the fitness function might 
be the reciprocal of the sum of the distances of each segment in the itinerary, so that shorter-distance 
routes have higher fitness. In effect, the fitness function is the ‘environment’ to which the population 
adapts. A candidate solution’s ‘genotype’ is its chromosome, and its ‘phenotype’ is its fitness. By 
analogy with natural selection, lower fitness candidates are then replaced in the population with new 
solutions modeled on higher fitness candidates. New candidates are generated by modifying earlier 
candidates with ‘mutations’ that randomly change chromosomal elements and ‘crossover’ events that 
combine pieces of two chromosomes. After reproducing variants of the fittest candidates for many 
generations, the population contains better and better solutions. 
Swarm Intelligence                                                                                                                                    
Many organisms live in social groups, and artificial life uses bottom-up models to explore how the 
structure and behavior of social groups arises and is controlled. The simplest examples concern the 
social organization of insects. Distributed networks of relatively simple insects give rise to complex 
collective behaviors, involving foraging, nest building, transporting resources, and the like. These 
collective behaviors are remarkably flexible, robust and autonomous. The attempt to design 
algorithms or distributed problem-solving methods inspired by the collective behavior of insect 
societies has come to be called swarm intelligence. 
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Individual ants are not smart, but ant colonies are. A colony can solve problems unthinkable for 
individual ants, such as finding the shortest path to the best food source, allocating workers to 
different tasks, or defending a territory from neighbors. As individuals, ants might be tiny dummies, 
but as colonies they respond quickly and effectively to their environment. Their swarm intelligence 
relies upon countless interactions between individual ants, each of which is following simple rules of 
thumb. Scientists describe such a system as self-organizing. When looking for a role model in a world 
of complexity, imitating a colony of ants or bees is not the worst option. 
Recent advances in swarm intelligence include a theory of how groups of robots work together to 
solve group goals involving robot swarms. In robotics swarm-bots are a collection of mobile robots 
able to self-assemble and to self-organize in order to solve problems that cannot be solved by a single 
robot. These robots combine the power of swarm intelligence with the flexibility of self-
reconfiguration because aggregate swarm-bots can dynamically change their structure to match 
environmental variations. SWARM-BOTS, a project funded by the Future and Emerging 
Technologies program of the European Union, focuses on the design and the implementation of self-
organizing and self-assembling biologically-inspired robots. 
Drawing heavily on the chemical biology, researchers from Humboldt University in Germany have 
devised a way for electronic agents to efficiently assemble a network without having to rely on a 
central plan. The researchers modeled their idea on the methods of insects and other life-forms whose 
communications lack central planning, but who manage to form networks when individuals secrete 
and respond to chemical trails. The researchers found that what works for ants and bacteria also works 
for autonomous pieces of computer code. Rather than determining the structure of a network in a top-
down approach of hierarchical planning, agents found nodes and created connections in a bottom-up 
process of self-organization.  
Craig Venter Creates Synthetic Life Form                                                             
In May 2010, Craig Venter and his crack team of scientists successfully created a synthetic life form 
for the first time ever using a custom-made string of DNA. This is one of the milestones in the history 
of science. Venter and his team used the bioinformatics tool to design the chromosome, synthesized it 
using the four building blocks of life written into its DNA (the bases Adenine, Guanine, Cytosine and 
Thymine) and then assembled it in yeast before transplanting it into a recipient bacterial cell. This 
bacterial cell was then transformed into a new bacterial species. The new species they created has 
some extraordinary elements in its genome including a website!! It is a living species now, part of our 
planet's inventory of life. It is the first synthetic cell with a computer as its parent. This is certainly a 
defining moment in the history of biology and biotechnology. Craig Venter was not merely copying 
life artificially or modifying it radically by genetic engineering. He played the role of a god: creating 
artificial life that could never have existed naturally. The new organism is based on an existing 
bacterium that causes mastitis in goats, but at its core is an entirely synthetic genome that was 
constructed from chemicals in the laboratory. 
The research has occupied 20 scientists for more than 10 years at an estimated cost of $40m.The 
achievement may herald the dawn of a new era, in which new life is made to benefit humanity. Early 
applications might be bacteria that churn out biofuels, soak up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
and even manufacture vaccines. 
The team now plans to use the synthetic organism to work out the minimum number of genes needed 
for life to exist. From this, new microorganisms could be made by bolting on additional genes to 
produce useful chemicals, break down pollutants, or produce proteins for use in vaccines. 
According to Venter, “Over the next 20 years, synthetic genomics may become the standard for 
making anything”. “The chemical industry will depend on it. Hopefully, a large part of the energy 
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industry will depend on it. We really need to find an alternative to taking carbon out of the ground, 
burning it, and putting it into the atmosphere. That is the single biggest contribution I could make."  
Practical applications of artificial life 
One measure for the success of a scientific field is its usefulness for solving practical problems. By 
this criterion, artificial life is a success today, mainly because of applications that exploit genetic 
algorithms and offshoots like genetic programming. Biologically-inspired methods are increasingly 
applied to technological problems, such as using immune-system principles and mechanisms to 
protect computer systems against attacks by computer viruses and worms, and designing novel 
strategies for navigation of autonomous flight systems. The increased understanding of real biological 
systems has allowed us to control them better. For example, artificial life is helping to illuminate why 
normal cells evolve into cancerous cells. Finally, artificial life is used for a variety of aesthetic 
purposes. There are artificial-life approaches to music composition, and the techno-artists’ journal 
Leonardo regularly publishes papers concerning ALife. 
Conclusions 
Artificial life is an interdisciplinary investigation into one of the most fundamental aspect of the 
natural world – life itself. Its synthetic methodology is making incremental progress on a wide range 
of issues, from dynamical hierarchies and artificial cells to the evolution of complexity. Its ambitious 
agenda for the future involves explaining how life arises from non-living substrates, determining the 
potentials and limits of living systems. This agenda means that artificial life is likely to change the 
future face of cognitive science in significant ways. 
5.8 Artificial Consciousness and Emotions  
Since the appearance of computer technology, computer scientists have dreamed about building a 
conscious robot. The big issue is whether this is feasible even in principle. Is consciousness a 
prerogative of human beings, which depends on the material the brain is made of or can be replicated 
using different hardware? Given the results of artificial intelligence and neural computing, in the near 
future machines may exceed human intelligence and develop a mind. If human consciousness is 
attributable to complex neural electro-chemical interactions in the brain, it could become just a matter 
of time until a machine can achieve self-awareness. 
A crucial question is whether consciousness can be linked to the biological portion of our intelligence. 
Will future machines be capable of having emotional and spiritual experience? It may be expected 
that nonbiological entities will claim to have emotional and spiritual experiences. However, there does 
not yet exist an objective test that can conclusively determine the presence of consciousness.  The 
core of consciousness, subjective experience, cannot thus far be penetrated through objective 
measurement. Only behavioral correlates of consciousness have been identified.  The presence of 
behavior resulting from consciousness does not necessarily imply a thing being alive. Conversely, the 
absence of behavioral indications of consciousness does not necessarily point to something not being 
alive.   
Because issues of consciousness cannot be resolved at the moment through objective measurement a 
critical role exists for philosophy. The nature of subjective experience is also fundamental to our 
concepts of ethics, morality and law. 
There is no consensus among humans about the consciousness of non-human entities. But our future 
nonbiological replicas will be vastly more intelligent and therefore will exhibit the finer qualities of 
human thought to a far greater degree.  These nonbiological entities will be extremely intelligent so 
that they can likely convince other humans that they are conscious using all of the emotional cues that 
humans employ.  
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Forms of consciousness                                                                        
A number of distinct forms of consciousness are observable in humans. 
Anesthesia: When a patient is subjected to general anesthesia e.g., for open heart surgery, all 
behavioral indications of consciousness stop during the procedure. Sometimes patients can remember 
things that occurred during the surgery, suggesting there may be some level of consciousness. But we 
cannot ascertain whether the patient is conscious or not.  
Sleep: During deep sleep, breathing becomes regular, brain activity is reduced and the person 
(generally) stops interacting with the environment. But persons can respond in this state. They can be 
awakened by being shaken them, from hearing a loud noise, someone speaking their name, the lights 
being turned on, a sharp pain, etc… Persons often recall having dreams, and can be awakened by 
events that occur in a dream. The person is alive, but we cannot always make behavioral 
measurements that would suggest an alive state.  
REM sleep is the fifth of the five stages of sleep most people go through each night. REM is 
characterized by rapid eyes movements during sleep, which is what gave this stage its name. During 
REM sleep, the large voluntary muscles of the body are paralyzed, but brain activity is quite intense. 
REM sleep is the stage of sleep when people have intense dreams. During REM sleep, breathing and 
heart rate are faster than normal. The sleeper's legs, face, and fingers are trembling and there is rapid 
movement of the eyes. The stages of sleep proceed in cycles throughout the night. The cycles may 
repeat as many as five times per night. The length and intensity of REM sleep increase with each 
succeeding cycle. During the first cycle, REM sleep might be only 10 minutes long, while during the 
last cycle it might stretch to 90 minutes. 
Cryonics is the freezing of the human body and brain. A person walks into Cryonics Inc. and asks to 
be frozen, perhaps because he can no longer be sustained by contemporary medicine and has the hope 
that healing and reanimation may be possible in the future. Cryonics Inc. administers a lethal cocktail, 
and then proceeds to quickly drain her fluids and pack her in ice. Many years later, they repair crystal 
damage, and revive her. From the person's perspective, she got a lethal injection and died. The 
freezing of the body/brain is irrelevant.   
When the person is revived, that individual is alive and it may be considered to be the same 
individual. From the revived person's point of view, she will have been handed all the previous 
person's memories, body, and substrates to generate an identical copy of her previous consciousness. 
She must be considered as a replica, because the original died many years ago. In fact, the new 
version will remember the lethal injection. It will not sense the passage of time, because there was 
nothing alive all those previous years. There is no observable behavior, indicating an alive state in the 
original person, once frozen. The new version represented electronically is, hopefully, a good 
approximation of the original, and may behave almost identically. The future repair technologies 
expected by cryonics are still hypothetical. As of 2010, only around 200 people have undergone the 
procedure. In the USA, cryonics can only be legally preformed on humans after they have been 
declared legally dead, as otherwise it would count as murder or assisted suicide.  
Split Brain. In some severe cases of epilepsy, doctors sometimes performed surgery to cut the corpus 
collosum (connective neurons between left and right hemispheres). Split brain patients appear to 
function and behave normally after this dramatic surgery. However, anecdotal reports and careful 
testing reveal that there are two conscious entities inside the body after this procedure. Each 
hemisphere controls the opposite half of the body, and only senses that half. Presenting things to one 
hemisphere, through its half of the visual field, is only perceived by that hemisphere. In this case, 
there are two people, taken from parts of the original person prior to the surgery. No death has 
occurred. Rather, the personal identity of the original person has changed from one singular person to 
two similar persons. 
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Hypnosis. Hypnosis is considered mostly a distinctly altered state of consciousness. 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) studies indicate that during hypnosis subjects are not in a sleeplike 
state but are awake, though sometimes a bit drowsy. They can freely resist the hypnotist’s suggestions 
and are far from mindless automatons. If hypnosis differs in kind rather than in degree from ordinary 
consciousness, it could imply that hypnotized people can take actions that would be impossible to 
perform in the waking state. It could also lend credibility to claims that hypnosis is a unique means of 
reducing pain or of effecting psychological and medical cures. 
Problem of Consciousness                                                                
Consciousness is a term that refers to the relationship between the mind and the world with which it 
interacts. It has been defined as: subjectivity, awareness, the ability to experience or to feel, 
wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind. We have seen 
that there are several states of consciousness that a human experiences. Despite the difficulty in 
definition, many philosophers believe that there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what 
consciousness is. Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, 
making conscious experience a familiar but mysterious aspect of our lives. 
The problem of consciousness is the central issue in current theorizing about the mind. The mind 
requires a complex dynamic system in the background, like a brain, to operate within the reach of a 
physical environment. Mind is the stream of consciousness. Despite the lack of any agreed upon 
theory of consciousness, there is a widespread consensus that an adequate account of mind requires a 
clear understanding of consciousness and its place in nature and reality. 
Questions about the nature of conscious awareness have been asked for as long as there have been 
humans. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, consciousness had become central in thinking 
about the mind. Philosophers like John Locke (1688) regarded consciousness as essential to thought 
as well as to personal identity. For most of the next two centuries the domains of thought and 
consciousness were regarded as more or less the same. 
In the 1980s and 90s there was a major resurgence of scientific and philosophical research into the 
nature and basis of consciousness. The words “conscious” and “consciousness” are umbrella terms 
that cover a wide variety of mental phenomena. An animal, person or other cognitive system may be 
regarded as conscious in a number of different ways. 
Sentience: Consciousness may lie in the ability to feel, perceive or have subjective experiences. Being 
conscious in this sense may admit of different degrees, and just what sort of sensory capacities are 
sufficient may not be sharply defined. Are fish conscious in this respect? What about shrimp or bees? 
Wakefulness: One might count an organism as conscious only if it were awake and normally alert. 
Hence, organisms would not count as conscious when asleep or in any of the deeper levels of coma. 
Again boundaries may be blurry, and intermediate cases may exist.  
Self-consciousness: A more demanding standard might define conscious creatures as those that are not 
only aware, but also aware that they are aware, so that consciousness is a form of self-consciousness. 
The self-awareness requirement might be interpreted in a variety of ways, and which creatures would 
qualify as conscious in the relevant sense will vary accordingly.  
What it is like: According to Thomas Nagel (1974), a being is conscious just if there is “something 
that it is like” to be that creature, i.e., some subjective way the world seems or appears from the 
creature's mental or experiential point of view. He states that "an organism has conscious mental 




Transitive Consciousness: Creatures may be described as conscious as being conscious of various 
things involving some object at which consciousness is directed.  
There are thus many concepts of consciousness, and both “conscious” and “consciousness” are used 
in a wide range of ways with no privileged meaning. Consciousness is a complex feature of the world, 
and understanding it will require a diversity of conceptual tools for dealing with its many differing 
aspects. 
Understanding consciousness involves a multiplicity not only of explanations but also of questions 
that they pose and the sorts of answers they require. The relevant questions can be gathered under 
three crude rubrics as the What, How, and Why questions.                                          
The Descriptive Question: What is consciousness? What are its principal features? And by what 
means can they best be discovered, described and modeled?                                                                                                     
The Explanatory Question: How does consciousness of the relevant sort come to exist? Is it a 
primitive aspect of reality, and if not how does (or could) consciousness arise from or be caused by 
non-conscious entities or processes? 
The Functional Question: Why does consciousness exist? Does it have a function, and if so what it is 
it? Does it act causally and if so with what sorts of effects? Does it make a difference to the operation 
of systems in which it is present, and if so why and how? 
Chalmers (1995) makes a distinction between the hard and easy problems of consciousness. The hard 
problem is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain 
processes, and experience. It is the problem of explaining how and why people have qualitative 
phenomenal experiences. Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? Why is there 
a subjective component to experience? Why does awareness of sensory information exist? These are 
formulations of the hard problem. Providing an answer to these questions could lie in understanding 
the roles that physical processes play in creating consciousness, and the extent to which these 
processes create subjective qualities of experience.  
The hard problem contrasts with so-called easy problems. The easy problems of consciousness try to 
explain the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli; the integration of 
information by a cognitive system, the reportability of mental states, the ability of a system to access 
its own internal states, the focus of attention, the deliberate control of behavior, and the difference 
between wakefulness and sleep. 
All of these phenomena are vulnerable to functional explanation in terms of computational or neural 
mechanisms, although there is not yet anything close to a complete explanation of any of these 
phenomena. But the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. For example, 
when we see there is the experience of visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of 
dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with, for example the 
sound of a clarinet, or the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms, 
mental images that are conjured up internally, the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a 
stream of conscious thought. All of these states are united in that there is something it is like to be in 
them. All of them are states of experience. 
What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond the performance of 
functions. Once the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions relating to experience 
has been explained, there may still remain the further unanswered question: Why is the performance 
of these functions accompanied by experience?  
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A widely-held opinion is that experiences cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms. This is 
sometimes expressed as the claim that there is an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) between the 
physical and the phenomenal world of experiences. 
There is no consensus about the status of the explanatory gap. Some deny that the gap exists and hold 
that consciousness is an entirely physical phenomenon. They argue that once the easy problems are 
solved, there will be nothing left to be explained about consciousness (Dennett, 2005). In contrast, 
Chalmers argues that the problem of experience will persist even when the performance of all the 
relevant functions is explained, and a new approach is needed to cross the explanatory gap. 
Perhaps the most popular extra ingredient that has been proposed is quantum mechanics. Many 
physicists contend that quantum mechanics could be enough for building up a consistent theory of 
consciousness (Georgiev, 2004). The attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness may stem 
from a Law of Minimization of Mystery: consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is 
mysterious, so maybe the two mysteries have a common source.  
However, according to Chalmers, quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same difficulties 
as neural or computational theories. Quantum phenomena have some remarkable functional 
properties, such as non-determinism and non-locality. These properties may play some role in the 
explanation of cognitive functions, such as random choice and the integration of information, and this 
hypothesis cannot be ruled out a priori. But when it comes to the explanation of experience, quantum 
processes are in the same boat as any other. The question of why these processes should give rise to 
experience is entirely unanswered and they offer no hope of explaining consciousness in terms of 
quantum processes. Rather, these theories assume the existence of consciousness, and use it in the 
explanation of quantum processes. At best, these theories tell something about a physical role that 
consciousness may play. They say nothing about how it arises. At the end of the day, the same 
criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. 
Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness should take experience as a fundamental property of 
the universe, like mass, electromagnetic change, and spacetime.  A new psycho-physical theory would 
relate to psycho-physical processes and experience. These psychophysical principles, connecting the 
properties of physical processes to the properties of experience, can not interfere with physical laws, 
but rather would be a supplement to a physical theory.  
The Irrelevance of Quantum Computing for Consciousness 
 
Many researchers have conjectured that quantum effects in the brain are crucial for explaining 
psychological phenomena, including consciousness. However, recent research has indicated that 
computation via quantum mechanical processes is not necessary to explain consciousness. Due to the 
enormous computing power of neurons, consciousness can still be explained within a purely 
neurobiological framework, without requiring the assumption of quantum computation. Thus, it may 
be argued that neuro-computational rather than quantum mechanisms provide the most credible 
explanations of mental phenomena. In short, while quantum effects exist in any physical process, an 
appeal to quantum effects does not seem to contribute to understanding how consciousness arises. 
 
An analogy would be the use of quantum effects to understand how it is that birds can fly. It is 
unnecessary to refer to atomic bonding properties of birds to explain the wing function in their flight 
(Litt et al., 2006). Although most wing feathers are made of keratin, which has specific bonding 
properties, the wing function can be explained independently of this atomic structure. For bird-flight, 
aerodynamic mechanisms, such as geometry, stiffness, and strength are much more relevant to explain 
the flight of birds, even though atomic bonding properties may give rise to specific geometric and 
tensile properties. Clarifying how birds fly does not require specification of how atoms bond in 
feathers. Explaining brain function by appeal to quantum mechanics is akin to explaining bird flight 




Furthermore, there are three principal arguments for the implausibility of quantum mechanical 
processes in brain operation. The first argument is computational. Quantum effects do not have the 
temporal properties required for neural information processing. Certainly, phenomena which require 
quantum mechanical explanation do exist throughout the brain, and are fundamental to any complete 
understanding of its structure and physical mechanics. Every molecular bond and chemical interaction 
has non-negligible quantum effects. However, quantum effects do not contribute essentially to 
explaining the overall functionality of the brain. Information processing in the brain can be 
appropriately described without reference to quantum theory. Specifically, quantum-level events, in 
particular the superpositional coherences necessary for quantum computation, do not have the 
temporal endurance to control neural-based information processing. The fastest firing neurons work 
on millisecond timescales, while polarization excitations in even the shortest microtubules in quantum 
computation are on the order of 10
–7
 sec. Therefore, a functional explanation of the brain need not 
resort to quantum mechanisms. For the general operations of the brain, quantum effects are at a 
sufficiently low level so that any associated fluctuations can be categorized and handled as noise.  
 
The second argument against quantum consciousness is biological: there are substantial physical 
obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Although significant progress has been 
made in the design and production of large-scale quantum computers, the required working conditions 
contrast vividly with the immediate environment of the brain (Vandersypen et al., 2001). 
 
The advantage of a quantum computer is its ability to maintain superposed qubit (a qubit, or quantum 
bit, is the unit of quantum information allowing two values of 0 and 1 at the same time) states long 
enough to facilitate superparallel computation. However, a vital prerequisite for preventing 
decoherence (loss of coherence between the components of a system) is the maintenance of a very 
high degree of isolation from even minute environmental interactions. Exceedingly low operational 
temperatures are also a necessity for most physical implementations of quantum computers, although 
simpler machines based on nuclear magnetic resonance have managed room-temperature coherence 
over useful timescales (Cory et al.,1997). The conditions that exist in and around brains do not 
conform to these physical requirements and would likely instantaneously cause disruption and end 
quantum coherence.  
 
Another important physical obstacle to quantum computation in the brain is the matter of error 
correction, which pertains to noise tolerance in the transmission and processing of information. 
Although redundant networks (with some extra capacity if certain components fail) may also play a 
role, the most common brain implementations of error correction and recovery seem to involve either 
tuned attractor boundaries or high-precision spike codes (relationship between stimuli in the form of 
electrical pulses and neuronal responses) which are well-understood engineering concepts (Stiber and 
Holderman, 2004).  
 
Although nature is capable of evolving ingenious solutions to difficult problems, the burden of proof 
is on those who would invoke quantum mechanics to not only provide the details of such a biological 
mechanism for quantum error correction, but to do so in the face of physical evidence for simpler, 
classically based alternatives.Even if quantum computation in the brain were technically feasible, 
there is still a question about the need for such massive computational efficiency in explaining the 
mind. No evidence has been generated that brains need the power of quantum parallelism to support 
the basic biological needs of survival and reproduction.  
 
The third argument against a quantum basis for consciousness is psychological. It has been proposed 
that there may be psychological phenomena such as conscious experience, which are not amenable to 
a neurocomputational explanation but that may be explicable by appeal to quantum theory (Penrose, 
1994,1997; Hamerhoff 1998a, 1998b). The effect of anesthesia has been invoked as evidence for a 
quantum mechanical theory of consciousness (Hamerhoff, 1998a). However, in recent years, 
explanations of anesthetics based on molecular biology have received substantial empirical support. 
None of these explanatory mechanisms involve quantum computation (Litta et al. 2006). Hence, 




All of the evidence points to the conclusion that understanding consciousness is unlikely to require 
quantum computation. The scientific exploration of consciousness is still in its infancy, but there is no 
evidence to suggest any superiority of quantum mechanical over neurocomputational explanations. 
Therefore, the onus is on the proponents of quantum theory to show that aspects of the brain cannot be 
explained by neurocomputational theories, and that they need explanation by quantum computation. 
 
Relationship between Intelligence and Consciousness 
 
Humans are both conscious and intelligent. However, it is possible to imagine one attribute without 
the other. An intelligent but unconscious being is known as a “zombie” in both science fiction and 
philosophy. It is also possible to imagine a conscious non-intelligent being. It would experience its 
environment as a flow of unidentified, meaningless sensations engendering no mental activity beyond 
mere passive awareness. Digital computers will almost certainly be intelligent at some time in the 
future. We may then live in a world full of zombies, with all of the resulting moral and philosophical 
issues.  
The majority opinion in biology and neuroscience is that consciousness results from the chemical and 
physical structure of humans, just as photosynthesis results from the chemistry of plants. A computer 
is made of the wrong material for consciousness to arise. In this view, digital computers will never be 
conscious, even if they are intelligent.  
However, some researchers do believe that, once computers and software grow powerful and 
sophisticated enough, they will be conscious as well as intelligent. They point to a similarity between 
neurons, the brain’s basic component, and transistors, the basic component of computers. Both 
neurons and transistors transform incoming electrical signals to outgoing signals. While a single 
neuron is not conscious and not intelligent, the brain of a conscious and intelligent human is. A single 
transistor is similarly not conscious. But gather many together, connect them and you will get 
consciousness, just as with neurons. Furthermore, if a type of consciousness exists that is different 
from our own, we may fail to recognize it because human consciousness is the only kind we know. 
The possibility of machine consciousness raises a number of important issues. 
"Why build a self-aware machine?"                                                                               
A strong motivation would certainly come from the innate human desire to discover new horizons and 
to extend the frontiers of science. Also, developing an artificial brain based on the same principles as 
used in the biological brain would provide a way for transferring the human mind into a faster and 
more robust door to immortality.  
If the hypothesis of consciousness as a physical property of the brain is supported and human 
consciousness is an electrical neural state spontaneously developed by complex brains, then the 
possibility of realizing artificial self-aware beings remains open 
Will machines ever become human?  
One day, computer programs may become so complex and processing speeds become so great that for 
all intents and purposes it will appear that computers are actually 'thinking'. Could this process of 
'thinking' develop to the point where a computer becomes self-aware? A discussion of this issue 
requires distinguishing between three distinct concepts: 'thinking', 'intelligence', and 'self-awareness'.  
Each of these represents a different threshold for machines to attain. 
Thinking refers to making decisions, selecting from a set of options, examining consequences, 
determining what is true and what is false, deciding on a course of action, problem solving, etc. 
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Computers, no matter how complex, do not plan ahead and make decisions. They may be 
programmed to select the best option from an array of possibilities, but are unable to consider any 
options other than those that are programmed in. A computer must run through every possibility 
before coming up with an answer, and it is unable to ignore certain moves as being poor until it 
actually works through them. In contrast, a human can think; he is able to make leaps of judgment 
without the need to slavishly run through all the calculations.  
A distinction must be made between knowledge and intelligence. Knowledge is the knowing of 
things, having a collection of data. Although computers possess a great deal of knowledge in their 
data banks, computers do not 'know' they have knowledge, as a person does. This is where 
intelligence comes in, that is the knowing of things, not just having the knowledge of things. Some 
computers do contain a great deal of knowledge, but do not 'know' anything and they cannot be 
described as being intelligent. 
Humans are self-aware because we know that we exist and are aware of our surroundings and what is 
happening around us. Computers obviously cannot know that they exist, so they cannot possess self-
awareness. Some would argue that when computers reach a certain level of complexity they will 
become self-aware. If it is simply a matter of complexity, then the day will surely come when 
computers will be self-aware. However, there is more to achieving self-awareness than just increasing 
the degree of complexity of computation that is feasible. The main difference is how we solve 
problems. While the human has understanding, the computer just has programs and rules. 
One approach for identifying the ingredients for self-awareness is to examine biological life. This 
would include viruses, which possess the ability to self-replicate. DNA and RNA are macromolecules 
and constitute the foundation of all life on this planet, and thus would seem to form a precondition for 
all minds on this planet. But DNA and RNA do not have minds, they are not even alive, and are 
essentially just robots, with no intentionality behind their actions.   
Nevertheless, these mindless little molecular robots form the basis for human consciousness; humans 
are the direct descendants of these self-replicating robots. We are mammals and have descended from 
reptiles, which descended from fish, whose ancestors were marine worm-like creatures, who 
descended from simpler multi-celled creatures who descended from single celled creatures who 
descended from self-replicating macromolecules, about three billion years ago. To put it more starkly, 
our great, great, great....grandmother was a robot! We are not only descended from macromolecules 
but are composed of them. .  Each of our cells - a tiny agent that can perform only a limited number of 
tasks - is about as mindless as a virus. Enough of these dumb little machines have been combined to 
result in a real, conscious person, with a genuine mind. We are made of a collection of trillions of 
macromolecular machines, which in turn are ultimately descended from the original self-replicating 
macromolecules. So something made of dumb, mindless robots can exhibit genuine consciousness, 
we are living proof of that. 
The only difference between mindless machines, or macromolecules, and a 'mind', is intentionality - 
the ability to act by conscious decision. To gain an understanding of how we make conscious 
decisions it may be useful to look at the way in which computers work. A thermostat performs the 
same function as a computer, it will take in data, check if certain conditions are met, and then proceed 
to the next stage. The device registers whether the temperature is greater or smaller than the setting, 
and then arranges for the circuit to be disconnected in the former case and connected in the latter. It is 
carrying out an algorithm, a calculational procedure. A computer is a machine that is designed to 
carry out algorithms, it computes! Any procedure that can be converted into an algorithm, can be 
executed by a computer. In the case of the thermostat the algorithm is very simple, computers execute 
far more complex algorithms, and the human brain performs even vastly more complex algorithms. 
According to some of the enthustiats of artificial intelligence, the human brain only differs from a 
thermostat in that it is much more complicated. All mental qualities, such as intelligence, thinking, 
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understanding, consciousness, are merely features of the algorithm carried out by the brain. If an 
algorithm exists that matches what takes place in a human brain, then it could in principle be run on a 
computer with sufficient storage space and speed of operation. If such an algorithm was installed into 
a computer it would, presumably, pass the Turing test and respond in every way comparable to how a 
human being would respond. Whenever the algorithm were run it would, some supporters of artificial 
intelligence argue, experience feelings, have consciousness and be a mind. 
However, some skeptics about artificial intelligence argue that mere complexity of operation is not in 
itself enough to generate consciousness and does not allow for the computation of complex algorithms 
with any understanding. They argue, quite rightly, that a thermostat has no understanding or 
knowledge of what it does, nor does a car, an airplane or a space shuttle, the latter being many, many 
times more complex than a thermostat!  
With the advances being made in computer technology, computers will reach the same level of 
complexity as the human brain by around the year 2029. Once that level of complexity has been 
reached, the issue is to determine if the computer really is self-aware. It will not be possible to 
establish self-awareness on the basis of the Turing test approach, because it will not be known if the 
answers the computer gives are due to it being intelligent, or simply due to good programming. One 
way to establish computer awareness, which would not provide definitive proof, but at least it would 
be a very strong indicator, might be the following. By simply switching the computer on and not 
running any specific program, would it come up with any new ideas of its own accord? If after an 
unspecified period of doing nothing, the computer announced that it had been studying quantum 
theory and made a suggestion for a new line of experimental enquiry that should produce such and 
such results, then that would be a strong candidate for self-awareness. However, this would not be 
completely convincing, because such a line of enquiry could have been pre-programmed. Perhaps it 
would be more interesting if the computer started writing its own programs and that might be 
considered to be the equivalent of exercising free will. 
If a computer does at some point become self-aware, how would it manage to convince us that it is? 
One possibility is that it could go on strike until we grant it recognition, but then that could just be 
part of the program designed to it. This also raises the interesting question, are all of us just running a 
program? 
There is no test that we can apply to a computer to determine beyond all doubt that it is self-aware. In 
using the Turing test a computer may respond in a manner that a person is expected to respond, and 
the computer acts as if it were self-aware.  
Conclusion 
If human consciousness is the result of complex neural-chemical interactions, the possibility that 
machines will develop a mind is becoming more realistic. Given the current pace of computer 
evolution and the progress in artificial neural networks, scientists predict that computing systems will 
reach the complexity of the human brain around 2029. On the one hand, it is still unclear whether 
there is any true possibility of reproducing consciousness in a machine. On the other hand there is no 
known law of nature that forbids the existence of subjective feelings in artefacts designed by humans. 
The implication of developing an artificial brain is that it would provide a way for transferring our 
mind into a faster and more robust support mechanism, opening a door toward immortality. Freed 
from a fragile and degradable body, human beings with synthetic organs could represent the next 
evolutionary step of the human race. Such a new species could start the exploration of the universe, 
search for alien civilizations, survive to the death of the solar system and perhaps escape from it, 
control the energy of black holes and move at the speed of light in search for the human survival on 
other planets. All of this depends on the ability keep technology under control and making sure that it 
is used to the benefit of human civilization. 
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Artificial Emotions                                                          
Since it is believed that emotions play a significant role in problem solving and decision making 
(Damasio, 1995), research in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life is directing some attention on 
emotions. The concept of artificial emotion is increasingly used in designing autonomous robotic 
agents, mostly by making robots respond emotionally to situations experienced in the world or to 
interactions with humans. According to Michaud et al (2000) emotions can serve three important roles 
in designing autonomous robots. 
Emotions to Adapt to Limitations: Emotions play a role in determining control in different forms of 
behavior, in particular in coordinating plans and multiple goals to adapt to the contingencies of the 
world. In the adaptation process of humans in the world, emotions help to find an equilibrium 
between the subject’s concerns and the environment. Uncertainty prevents a complete dependence on 
predictive models in human planning, and argues in favor of the design of artificial emotions.  
Emotions for Managing Social Behavior: In social behavior, emotions are associated with four 
universal problems of adaptation: hierarchy (Anger/Fear), territoriality (Exploration/Surprise), 
identity (Acceptance/ Rejection) and temporality (Joy / Sadness).  Emotions may be viewed as 
functional adaptations in establishing a balance of opposing forces in social transactions. These 
balances are always temporary and frequently change when moving from one conflict to another.  
Emotions for Interpersonal Communication: In order to regulate behavior in social interaction, 
emotions also have a communicative role. They act to release the coordination of social behavior in 
order to promote group cohesion, to communicate about the external environment, and about threat 
signals. It is advantageous to communicate intentions to others, and to be sensitive to messages from 
others. Emotional expression may promote individual or group isolation (as it may be necessary in 
defending something) or promote group formation (as different social circumstances might require). 
Emotion then serves a dual purpose: it is a both an act of communication and a sensory state. 
From an engineering point of view, autonomous robots would surely benefit from having emotional 
mechanisms that play a similar role in humans. The long term research goal is to propose a model of 
artificial emotion that is suitable for robots to behave autonomously in their environment. In addition, 
different mechanisms for implementing artificial emotions can surely be designed according to 
properties associated with the decision making approach used to control a robot.  
AI research in emotions with HCI tries to optimize the relationship between the human user and 
machines, by developing engineering tools to measure, model, and provide responses to human 
emotions through sensors, algorithms, and hardware devices. Moreover, research into Intelligent 
Agents bases its internal architectures on emotions (emotion-based systems) as biologically inspired 
processes. Its main objective is to emulate emotion processes in agents’ behavior.  
Both of these branches of research aim to improve system performance in decision making, action 
selection, behavior control, trustworthiness, and autonomy. However, since these branches of research 
are new and very complex, it is not surprising that their projects are confronted with basic problems.  
5.9 Artificial Stupidity  
Artificial Stupidity is the term commonly used as a humorous contrast to Artificial Intelligence. The 
term is often used to refer derogatorily to the inability of an AI program to adequately perform basic 
tasks. But artificial stupidity also refers to decreasing the intellectual content of computer programs by 
deliberately introducing errors in their responses when they attempt to pass the Turing test. In 1991, 
when the first Loebner prize competition was run, The Economist reported that the winning entry 
incorporated deliberate errors to fool the judges into believing that it was human. This technique has 
remained a part of the subsequent Loebner prize competitions. A sufficiently developed Artificial 
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Stupidity program would enable computer programmers to find flaws immediately, while minimizing 
errors in the development and debugging stages of computer software. 
6.  Artificial Intelligence in Economics  
Artificial, or Computational, Economics is a research discipline at the interface between computer 
science and economics.  Within the area of computational economics the field of Agent-based 
Computational Economics (ACE) belongs to the discipline of complex adaptive dynamic systems that 
studies economic processes, including whole economies, as dynamic systems of autonomous 
interacting agents. Large numbers of individual agents engage repeatedly in local interactions, giving 
rise to global regularities such as employment and growth rates, income distributions, market 
institutions, and social conventions. These global regularities in turn feed back into the determination 
of local interactions. The result is an intricate system of interdependent feedback loops connecting 
microeconomic behaviors, interaction patterns, and global regularities. Recent advances in analytical 
and computational tools, taking into account these kinds of aspects, allowed the emergence of the 
ACE approach. 
Agent-based modeling offers some advantages relative to other methodologies for economic research. 
More complex phenomena and larger economies can be considered than with behavioral laboratory 
experiments. Some underlying structural parameters of an economy, such as demand, production, and 
cost functions, and therefore equilibrium prices and quantities, can be directly observed, rather than 
estimated, as would be required if real-world data were used. Point predictions of theoretical models 
can be computed. Moreover, in addition to observing the underlying structure of the economy, the 
researcher can specify and control it. The researcher can evaluate a change in one parameter while 
keeping all else constant and look at its effect in isolation. In the real world, in contrast, such changes 
often occur concurrently with changes in other variables. The ability to vary one parameter 
exogenously allows the direction of causality to be established in the relationship between two 
variables. 
ACE is well-suited to studying complex systems. A system is defined to be complex if it is composed 
of interacting units and the system exhibits emergent properties, that is, properties arising from the 
interactions of the units that are not properties of the individual units themselves.  
The complexity that is embraced by ACE research makes it difficult, if not impossible, to use 
conventional methods for introduction of new theories, such as stating and proving theorems. Instead, 
much ACE research uses computer simulations to analyze complex dynamic models.  There has been, 
and will almost surely continue to be, tremendous progress in improving computer hardware. There 
has also been significant progress in software engineering, which is particularly valuable for ACE 
modeling. 
A complex adaptive system typically includes the following features: 
 It includes reactive units which are capable of demonstrating systematically different 
attributes due to changed environmental conditions. 
 It includes goal-directed units which direct some of their reactions towards the achievement 
of built-in (or evolved) goals. 
 It includes planner units that attempt to exert some degree of control over their environment 
to facilitate achievement of these goals. 
 
The agents in an ACE model can be economic entities as well as social, biological, and physical 
entities. In ACE, the term agent refers broadly to an encapsulated piece of software that includes data 
together with behavioral methods that act on these data. Some of these data are publicly accessible to 
all other agents. Others are designated as private, and hence are not accessible by any other agents, or 
only accessible to a specified subset of other agents. Agents can communicate with each other through 
public and/or private channels, depending on the economy that is considered. 
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Examples of agents include individuals (e.g., consumers, workers), social groupings (e.g., families, 
firms, government agencies), institutions (e.g., markets, regulatory systems), biological entities (e.g., 
crops, livestock, forests), and physical entities (e.g., infrastructure, weather, and geographical 
regions). Thus, agents can range from active data gathering decision-makers with sophisticated 
learning capabilities, to passive structures with no cognitive functioning. Moreover, hierarchical 
constructions are permitted, so that, e.g, a firm might be composed of workers and managers. 
ACE consists of two branches. One branch is descriptive, focusing on the explanation of emergent 
global behavior. Why have particular global regularities evolved and persisted in real-world 
decentralized market economies, despite the absence of top-down planning and control? How and 
why have these global regularities been generated, through the repeated local interactions of 
autonomous interacting agents? The second branch is normative, with a focus on the discovery of 
alternative economic designs that might increase consumer surplus, seller profit, or overall welfare. 
For a particular economic entity, what are the implications of that entity for the performance of the 
economy as a whole? For example, how might a particular market protocol or government regulation 
affect economic efficiency? 
The ACE focus on self-organizing systems is not new. Traditional economics has studied the specific 
processes whereby social order can emerge from self-interested micro-level behavior, with theoretical, 
empirical, and experimental methods. What is new about ACE is its use of powerful new 
computational tools in four key ways (Tesfatsion, 2001, 2002, 2003).                                                                                    
1) Computational systems are constructed. They are populated with heterogeneous agents, who 
determine their interactions with other agents and with their environment on the basis of 
social norms, behavioral rules, and data acquired through experience. 
2) Agents continually adapt their behavior in order to satisfy their preferences. In this way the 
economic world exhibits self-organization. 
3) The evolutionary process is considered as a process of natural selection which directly acts on 
agent behavior, and invites agents to open-ended experimentation with new behavioral rules. 
This allows agents co-evolve in the economy. 
4) The economic worlds modeled can grow in real time, and new events, driven by agent-agent 
and agent-environment interactions without further outside intervention, can be included. 
In ACE, the traditional mathematical optimization by agents is replaced by the less restrictive and 
more behaviorally plausible postulate of boundedly rational agents adapting to market forces. ACE 
models apply numerical methods of analysis to computer-based simulations of complex dynamic 
problems for which more conventional methods may not be adequate.  
Starting from initial conditions, which include type characteristics, internalized behavioral norms and 
modes of behavior (including modes of communication and learning), and internally stored 
information about itself and other agents, the computational economy evolves over time as its 
constituent agents repeatedly interact with each other, without further intervention from the modeler. 
Agents learn and modify behavior in response to the activity they observe. These local interactions 
give rise to macroeconomic regularities such as shared market protocols and behavioral norms which 
in turn feed back into the determination of local interactions. All events that subsequently occur must 
arise from the historical time-line of agent-agent interactions. The result is a complicated dynamic 
system of recurrent causal chains, connecting individual behaviors, interaction networks, and social 
welfare outcomes. Therefore, ACE has been characterized as a bottom-up approach to the study of 
economic systems.  
This intricate two-way feedback between microstructure and macrostructure has been recognized 
within economics for a very long time, but economists have mostly lacked the means to model this 
feedback quantitatively in its full dynamic complexity. Traditional quantitative economic models have 
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relied heavily on extraneous coordination devices such as fixed decision rules, common knowledge 
assumptions, representative agents, and imposed market equilibrium constraints.  
However, researchers now have a new approach to quantitatively model a wide variety of complex 
phenomena associated with decentralized market economies, such as inductive learning, imperfect 
competition, endogenous trade network formation, and the open-ended co-evolution of individual 
behaviors and economic institutions, to complement existing methods.  
6.1 ACE Research Areas                                                                                            
Leigh Tesfatsion (2001) classifies the topics recently addressed in ACE research into eight research 
areas: (i) learning and the embodied mind; (ii) evolution of behavioral norms; (iii) bottom-up 
modeling of market processes; (iv) formation of economic networks; (v) modeling of organizations; 
(vi) design of computational agents for automated markets; (vii) parallel experiments with real and 
computational agents; and (viii) building ACE computational laboratories. 
(i) Learning and the Embodied Mind 
ACE researchers use a broad range of algorithms to represent the learning processes of computational 
agents. These algorithms were mainly originally developed with optimality objectives in mind, so that 
they must be used cautiously for social processes. For automated economic processes, it is appropriate 
to use learning algorithms based on optimality criteria in which the current strategies of the 
computational agents jointly co-evolve on the basis of some type of exogenous fitness criterion (e.g., 
market efficiency). However, in ACE for real-world economic processes with human participants the 
learning algorithms have to incorporate actual human objectives and decision-making behavior. So, 
for example, different “neighborhoods" of agents (e.g., firms within different industries), separately 
co-evolve their strategies on the basis of some type of endogenous fitness criterion (e.g., relative firm 
profitability). 
Due to the numerous differences discovered in laboratory experiments, between actual human-subject 
behavior and the behavior predicted by traditional rational-agent theories, there is a need for a better 
modeling of agent behavior. In this respect an embodied-mind approach has been recommended. This 
approach views games as strategic interaction problems, embedded in natural and social processes. 
ACE researchers are increasingly moving away from standard off-the-shelf learning algorithms and 
towards a more systematic investigation of the performance of learning algorithms in various 
economic decision contexts, in which genetic algorithms are used to implement the evolution of 
individual strategies. 
(ii) Evolution of Behavioral Norms                                                                                   
A norm exists in a given social setting if individuals act in a certain way and are punished when they 
deviate from the norm. The existence of norms may be a matter of degree, and permits one to study 
the growth and decay of norms as an evolutionary process. Using agent-based computational 
experiments, mutual cooperation can evolve among self-interested, unrelated agents through 
reciprocity with little or no explicit forward-looking behavior on the part of the agents. This idea has 
encouraged the consideration of bounded rationality and evolutionary dynamics. Using agent-based, 
computational experiments research has shown that various collective behaviors might arise from the 
interactions of agents following simple rules of behavior.  
(iii) Bottom-Up Modeling of Market Processes                          
 One of the most active areas of ACE research is the study of the self-organizing capabilities of 
market processes. Specifically, in an ACE model of oligopolistic markets, globally optimal joint profit 
maximization pricing across firms results without any explicit price collusion. This type of bottom-up 
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evolution-of-cooperation outcome was new to many economists. Firms were co-evolving their 
strategies in an intricate structure of path-dependent interactions. Chance and particular interaction 
histories for a firm mattered for the determination of the final outcomes.  
Several specific types of market have been investigated with ACE: financial; electricity; labor; retail; 
business-to-business; natural resource; entertainment; and automated Internet exchange systems.   
Conventional models of financial markets, based on assumptions of rational choice and market 
efficiency, have not been capable of explaining common empirical patterns such as fat-tailed asset 
return distributions, high trading volumes, price bubbles, persistence and clustering in asset return 
volatility, and cross correlations between asset returns, trading volume, and volatility. Due to these 
difficulties, financial markets have become one of the most active research areas for ACE modelers. 
ACE financial market models that allow agents to form expectations inductively, using a genetic-
fuzzy classifier system, have been able to provide possible explanations for a variety of observed 
regularities in financial data. 
Conventional models of foreign exchange markets have performed poorly in explaning exchange rate 
dynamics. ACE modeling of foreign exchange markets has provided a possible explanation for three 
empirical stylized facts: peaked and fat-tailed rate change distributions; a negative correlation 
between trading volume and exchange rate volatility; and a ”contrary opinions" phenomenon in which 
convergence of opinion causes a predicted event to fail to materialize.  
Social learning in the form of imitation of strategies is an important factor in stock markets, along 
with individual learning. However, standard stock market models do not include the mechanisms by 
which such social learning actually takes place. One key finding from ACE research is that market 
behavior never settles down; initially successful forecasting models quickly become obsolete as soon 
as they are adopted by increasing numbers of agents. Another key finding is that individual traders do 
not act as if they believe in the efficient market hypothesis, even though aggregate market statistics 
suggest that the stock market is efficient. 
An ACE framework for energy markets has studied how prices for bulk electricity would be affected 
by a government-proposed change from a uniform-price auction to a discriminatory-price auction. 
Under a uniform-price auction, all trades occur at the same price, while a discriminatory auction 
allows different prices for different units,as a function of bid and ask prices submitted. The market is 
modeled as a sequential game among electricity generators (sellers) with market share and profit 
objectives. In each trading period each generator submits a supply function expressing its quantity 
offered at various prices. A key finding is that, when supply function offers are not publicly available, 
the proposed change from a uniform-price to a discriminatory-price auction  permits larger generators 
to increase their profits relative to smaller generators. Under the discriminatory auction larger 
generators have a significant informational advantage over smaller generators because they submit 
more offers and therefore can learn more precisely about the current state of the market. The uniform-
price auction mitigates this advantage by letting smaller generators share in the industry's collective 
learning, by receiving the same market price for their electricity as any other generator.  
(iv) Formation of Economic Networks                                                                                
In imperfectly competitive markets with strategically interacting agents it is important to know the 
manner in which agents determine their transaction partners, because this affects the form of the 
transaction networks that emerge. Transaction networks are now frequently analyzed by means of 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1972), but without emphasizing the dynamics of learning, 
adaptation, and innovation, nor the development of trust. At the moment, small-world transaction 
networks, characterized by a relatively well-connected set of neighbor nodes and by short-cut 
connections with a small average minimum path length between nodes, are attracting increased 
attention. Such networks have both local connectivity and global reach. An ACE model of a bilateral 
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exchange economy has explored the consequences of restricting trade to small-world trade networks. 
A key finding is that small-world trade networks provide most of the market-efficiency advantages of 
the completely connected trade networks, while retaining almost all of the transaction cost economies 
of the locally connected trade networks.  
More recent ACE research on the endogenous formation of trade networks has tended to focus on 
labor markets. An ACE labor market framework studies the relationship between market structure, 
worker-employer interaction networks, worksite behaviors, and welfare outcomes. A key finding is 
that holding job capacity (total potential job openings to total potential work offers) fixed, changes in 
job concentration (number of workers to number of employers) have only small and unsystematic 
effects on the market power levels attained. 
(v) Modeling of Organizations                                                                                            
A group of people constitutes an organization if the group has an objective or performance criterion 
that transcends the objectives of the individuals within the group. Organizations are viewed as 
complex adaptive systems themselves.  Studies of firms in organization theory have tended to stress 
the effects of a firm's organizational structure on its own resulting behavior. In contrast, ACE market 
studies stress the effects of particular types of firm behavioral rules on price dynamics, growth, and 
market structure. An interesting new direction is combining these two perspectives. A stylized ACE 
market model may explore how the structure of the market and the internal organization of each 
participant firm affect the form of the optimal behavioral rules for the participant firms. 
More concretely, a firm may choose whether to produce an existing product variety or to introduce a 
new product variety. The demand for each product variety dies out after a stochastically determined 
amount of time, so that each firm must engage to some degree in innovation in order to sustain its 
profitability. Firms differ in their ability to imitate existing product varieties and in their ability to 
design new product varieties. The differences are due to learning-by-doing effects, as well as to 
random factors, which alter the organizational structure of each firm. Each firm has an innovation rule 
determining its choice to innovate or not, and the firms co-evolve these rules over time on the basis of 
anticipated profitability. Experiments explore how the innovation rule of a firm should adapt both to 
the structure of the industry as a whole and to the organizational structure of the individual firms to 
maximize profit. 
(vi) Design of Computational Agents for Automated Markets                                            
In certain applications, automated contracting through computational agents can increase search 
efficiency. That is, computational agents are often more effective at finding beneficial contractual 
arrangements in market contexts with strategically complex multi-agent settings, and with large 
strategy domains. Therefore, many researchers are now involved in the design of computational 
agents for automated markets. To date, much of this work has focused on implementation, 
enforcement, and security issues. In general, the contracts used in automated markets have been 
binding and these contracts limit the ability of the computational agents to react to unforeseen events.  
The recently developed ”leveled commitment contract" permits agents to renounce contracts by 
paying a monetary penalty to the contracting partner, but the efficiency of the resulting contracts 
depends heavily on the structure of the penalties. Four types of penalties have been considered: (i) 
fixed; (ii) percentage of contract price; (iii) increasing penalty based on contract start date; and (iv), 
increasing penalty based on contract breach date. The main finding is that choosing relatively low but 
positive penalties of breach of contract work best. Surprisingly, however, it has also been found that 
self-interested myopic agents achieve a higher social welfare level, and more rapidly, than cooperative 
myopic agents when decommitment penalties are low.  
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The use of computational agents in automated auction markets on the Internet is growing. The greater 
search efficiency of computational agents in automated markets may mean that they will displace 
humans in such tasks. It appears that human bidders in auction experiments who bid against 
computational bidding agents are consistently outperformed. Hence, the information economy may 
become the largest multi-agent economic system ever envisioned, comprising billions of adaptive 
strategically-interacting computational agents. 
(vii) Parallel Experiments with Real and Computational Agents                                
Experimentation with human subjects has become an important economic research methodology, but 
one problem it has, is that it is not possible to know exactly why a human subject is making a 
particular choice. Rather, the human subject's beliefs and preferences must be inferred from his 
choices. These may include errors in actions, so that choices might differ from those that the human 
subject intended to make. In contrast, in ACE experiments with computational agents, the modeler 
sets the initial conditions of the experiment. As the computational agents then co-evolve their 
behavioral rules over time, the modeler can attempt to trace this evolution back to its root causes. 
There is a potential synergetic role for parallel human subject and computational agent experiments. 
Human-subject behavior can be used to guide the specification of the behavioral rules that 
computational agents use. Conversely, computational-agent behavior can be used to formulate 
hypotheses about the root causes of observed human-subject behaviors.  
(viii) Building ACE Computational Laboratories                                                          
Taking advantage of the recent advent of powerful computational tools, the use of agent- based 
computational models has been advocated for the testing of economic theories. For example, Nobel 
laureate Robert Lucas (1987) writes: ”(A theory) is not a collection of assertions about the behavior of 
the actual economy but rather an explicit set of instructions for building a parallel or analog system - a 
mechanical, imitation economy”.  However, many economists lack the strong programming skills 
required for ACE research. Easily learned languages are not powerful enough for many economic 
applications. General programming languages such as C++ and Java and authoring tools such as 
AgentSheets, Ascape, RePast, and Swarm provide useful repositories of software for constructing 
agent-based model economies, but their main appeal is to experienced programmers. 
A computational laboratory (CL) provides a potentially useful middle way to avoid these difficulties. 
ACL is a computational framework that permits the study of systems of multiple interacting agents 
with controlled and replicable experiments. In particular, a CL with a clear and easily manipulated 
graphical user interface can be used to test the sensitivity of a system to changes in a wide variety of 
key parameters without the need to do any original programming. For example,  a CL has been 
designed specifically for the study of trade network formation in a variety of market contexts. This 
Trade Network Game (TNG) Lab comprises buyers, sellers, and dealers who repeatedly search for 
preferred trade partners, engage in risky trades modeled as non-cooperative games, and evolve their 
trade strategies over time. The evolution of trade networks is visualized dynamically by means of 
real-time animations and real-time performance chart displays.  This example may encourage the 
routine construction and use of CLs for social sciences. 
6.2 Criticism against ACE 
Although many economists are dissatisfied with conventional economic models, they have also 
serious doubts about ACE. This is natural since any novel methodology a paradigm will be challenged 
and scrutinized before it is accepted.  
First, critics point out that computational methods produce only examples, whereas conventional 
economic theory aims to produce theorems, which apply in any economy satisfying the assumptions 
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of the theorems. Some theorems in economics, such as existence theorems in general equilibrium or 
game theory, will cover an infinite number of possible cases. However, the substantive gap between 
“examples” and “theorem” is less clear.  
Theories usually characterize a class of examples but, in order to attain analytical tractability, many 
interesting phenomena may be missed. Computations examine a finite set of examples, but these are 
taken from a much more robust set of possible specifications. This allows more flexible functional 
form specifications as well as more complex and realistic assumptions. The relevance and robustness 
of examples is more important than the number of examples, and computational methods allow one to 
examine cases that theory cannot touch. Furthermore, computation can often give us insights when 
there are no general theorems.  
Second, critics point out that numerical results in computational work have errors. However, careful 
numerical work can reduce numerical errors. Theoretical models may not have errors when they solve 
particular cases, but they often commit specification errors by focusing on tractable cases. In this 
respect, computational work has an advantage because numerical errors can be reduced through 
computation. The issue is not whether there are errors, but where those errors are, and how crucial 
they are. The key fact is that economists face a trade-off between the numerical errors in 
computational work and oversimplifying assumptions in analytically tractable models. As Tukey 
(1962) put it, “Far better an approximate answer to the right question ... than an exact answer to the 
wrong question...”  
Third, critics argue that computational models are black boxes that offer few if any insights. A single 
example with many factors contributing to the result may show what is possible, but one example 
cannot sort out the relative importance of a model’s various components. It is unclear how much can 
be inferred from a few examples. A few examples may not demonstrate much, but a few thousand 
well chosen examples can be more convincing, and a few million examples may be as compelling as 
any theorem.  
6.3 Open Issues for ACE Research                                                                                      
A key open issue for ACE research area (i) - learning and the embodied mind - is how to model the 
minds of the computational agents. Should these minds be viewed according to traditional artificial 
intelligence terms, as logical machines with added data filing cabinets? Or should they instead be 
viewed as observers of embodied activity.  For the design of a fully automated market, the minds of 
computational agents should not have to imitate those of real people. This could be detrimental to 
good market performance. On the other hand, if the focus is on the modeling of some real-world 
economic processes with human participants, then similarity might be essential to ensure predictive 
power. 
Another issue is with what degree of flexibility should agent learning in ACE frameworks be 
specified? ACE studies tend to rely on learning algorithms in the form of relatively simple updating 
equations with fixed parameterizations. However, the evidence on these algorithms strongly suggests 
that no one algorithm performs best in all situations. Nor does any one algorithm match best to 
observed human decision-making behavior under all conditions. A better way to proceed is to permit 
the ACE agents to learn to learn. For example, each agent could be permitted to evolve a repertoire of 
behavioral rules or modes which the agent selectively activates depending on the situation at hand.  
An important issue for ACE research area (ii) - the evolution of behavioral norms - is how mutual 
cooperation evolves among economic agents even when cheating reaps immediate gains and binding 
commitments are not possible. What roles do reputation, trust, reciprocity, retaliation, spitefulness, 
and punishment play? More generally, how do exchange customs and other behavioral norms for 
economic processes come to be established, and how stable are these norms over time? Are these 
behavioral norms diffusing across traditional political and cultural boundaries, resulting in an 
increasingly homogeneous global economy? 
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The evolution of behavioral norms has also been studied in classical game theory, which explains this 
evolution on the basis of strategic considerations, such as instrumental cooperation in anticipation of 
future reciprocity. In contrast, ACE research places equal or greater stress on peer emulation, parental 
imitation, and other socialization forces which underlie the transmission of culture. 
A fruitful area for future ACE research is the evolution of behavioral norms in collective action 
situations, such as the collective usage of common-pool resources. The factors that can make these 
problems so challenging for standard economic modeling - e.g., face-to-face communication, trust, 
and peer pressure - can be modeled within an ACE framework.  
A challenge for ACE research area (iii) - the bottom-up modeling of markets – is how to explain the 
evolution of markets and other market-related economic institutions. Much ACE research focuses on 
the evolution of “horizontal" institutional structures, e.g., trade networks and monetary exchange 
systems. However, real-world economies are strongly hierarchical and hierarchies are essential to help 
individuals sort information in a complex world.  
The question driving ACE research area (iv) - the formation of economic networks – is the manner in 
which economic interaction networks are determined through the deliberate choice of partners as well 
as by chance. An interaction might consist of some kind of game situation in which partners choose 
actions strategically, so that the payoff that results from any given choice of partner might not be 
knowable in advance. This leads to a complicated feedback process in which current partner choices 
are influenced by past action choices and current action choices are influenced by past partner 
choices.  
The main questions in research area (v) - the modeling of organizations – have largely been 
normative. What is the optimal organizational structure for achieving an organization's goals? More 
generally, what is the relationship between environmental properties, organizational structure, and 
organizational performance? The increased use of ACE modeling in this research area may permit a 
quantitative study of organizations within broader economic settings, e.g., the study of intra-firm 
organization for multiple firms participating within a market. 
One focus of research area (vi), the design of computational agents for automated markets, is the 
extent to which interaction networks are important for predicting market outcomes. If interaction 
effects are weak, as in some types of auction markets, then the structural aspects of the market (e.g., 
numbers of buyers and sellers, costs, capacities) will be the primary determinants of market outcomes. 
In this case, each different market structure should map into a relatively simple central-tendency 
output distribution in response to varying structural conditions. If interaction effects are strong, as in 
labor markets, then each different market structure might map into a spectral distribution of possible 
market outcomes, which may be clustered around two or more distinct “attractors" corresponding to 
distinct possible interaction networks. Moreover, strong interaction effects might also increase the 
speed of convergence to these attractors in highly connected networks and impede or inhibit 
convergence, if networks are sparsely connected or disconnected. 
A few challenging issues exist for ACE research area (vii) - parallel experiments with real and 
computational agents, such as the need to make the parallel experiments truly parallel, so that 
comparisons are meaningful and lead to robust insights. One major hurdle is the need to capture the 
crucial aspects of an experimental design as perceived by human participants in the initial conditions 
of the ACE. However, this can be hard to achieve, because the perceptions of human participants in 
an experiment can differ systematically from the perceptions of the investigator. Asking expiremental 
subjects what they were trying to do in an experiment tends not to yield reliable data, since 
participants may try to rationalize their previous actions with post hoc explanations, or try to give 
responses that they believe would please the experimenter. Futhermore, experiments with human 
participants generally have to be kept short and simple to prevent boredom or fatigue among the 
participants and to keep them within the budgetary constraints of the investigators, since human 
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subjects in economic experiments must be paid. In contrast, computational agents face no such 
limitations. 
A prime issue for ACE area (viii) - building ACE computational laboratories - is methodological. 
This is the need to construct computational laboratories (CLs) that permit the rigorous study of 
complex distributed multi-agent systems through controlled experimentation. Should a separate CL be 
constructed for each application, or should researchers strive for general multi-purpose platforms? 
How can experimental findings be effectively communicated to other researchers by means of 
descriptive statistics and graphical visualizations without information overload? How might these 
findings be validated by comparisons with data obtained from other sources? 
A particularly important unresolved issue for area (viii) is the need to ensure that findings from ACE 
experiments are robust in that they reflect fundamental aspects of an economic application and not 
simply the peculiarities of the particular hardware or software used to implement the experiments. A 
particular language should ensure independence of the hardware platform, but not independence of 
specific software implementation features. In this respect a possible approach is model docking, the 
alignment of different computational models to enable them to model the same application problem. 
Regardless of the approach taken, however, an essential prerequisite is that the source code must be 
openly disseminated to other researchers for replication purposes. 
Parameter choice is important in ACE modeling. The scale and the time horizons assumed in ACE 
modeling are crucial. The ACE studies illustrated above might be classified as intermediate-run 
studies, in that they focus on evolutionary processes taking place over many, but not infinitely many, 
time periods. Some research is focused on the probability with which different kinds of behavioral 
norms and institutions emerge in the very long run. ACE models cannot be used directly to confirm or 
reject the long-run distributional predictions of these studies. However, ACE models could be used 
for testing for speeds of convergence in some cases. 
Finally, does ACE have anything to say about the direction of causality between individuals and 
social groupings? ACE does permit causality to be established in many cases, because parameters of 
the economy can be varied exogenously and their effects measured. This has allowed researchers to 
conclude that the answer to the question “which must come first, individuals or social groupings," is 
“neither." Rather, it depends on details of how the economy is specified. As in the real world, 
individuals and social groupings co-evolve together in an intricate dance through time, and the 
dymanics of the dance depends on many details. ACE research is only just beginning to model this 
complex two-way feedback process. 
6.4 Potential Costs and Benefits 
ACE model economies are grounded in the interactions of autonomous adaptive agents, broadly 
defined to include economic, social, and environmental entities. ACE agents are necessarily 
constrained by the initial conditions set by the modeler. However, the dynamics of the ensuing 
economic process are microfounded in that they are governed by agent-agent interactions. The state of 
the economy at each point in time is given by the internal attributes of the individual agents that 
currently populate the economy. This type of dynamical description should have direct attractiveness 
for economists and other social scientists and increase the transparency and clarity of the modeling 
process. 
A growing body of computational evidence suggests that simple individual behaviors can generate 
complex macro regularities. If this evidence receives empirical support, further improvements in 
explanatory clarity can be expected from ACE modeling. 
The use of ACE model economies could also facilitate the development and testing of integrated 
theories in many different fields of social science. In particular, ACE frameworks could encourage 
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economists to address growth, distribution, and welfare issues in a more comprehensive manner 
embracing a variety of economic, social, political, and psychological factors. 
Moreover, ACE model economies can be used to test economic theories developed using more 
standard modeling approaches. By testing, we mean that we study whether the theory makes accurate 
predictions in an economy in which a model can be applied. This typically is an economy in which 
not all assumptions of the model are satisfied (if all assumptions of a model are satisfied, than by pure 
logic, a formally derived theory must be true). ACE models can also be used to test the robustness of 
these theories to relaxations of their standard assumptions, such as common knowledge of rationality, 
selfish preferences, rational expectations, and perfect capital markets. Finally, ACE model economies 
can be used to test for the possibility that multiple distinct microstructures are capable of supporting a 
given macro regularity. 
7 The Economics of Artificial Intelligence 
7.1 Implications of AI for economic theory: back to the future 
In many respects, the advent of artificial intelligence promises to be a bonanza for classical economic 
theory. In classical models, agents are assumed to be fully rational in the sense that, given theor 
objectives, they have no computational limits in making the best decisions to achieve them. This 
ability will be the defining characteristic of intelligent artificial agents.  
Economic theory is intended to provide an account of how humans behave. Experimental evidence 
has exposed the limits of humans’ computational abilities, and shown that these limits are binding in 
many common types of economic decisions. Thus, among some economists, classical models are 
thought to describe only highly sophisticated actors such as central banks or large firms, or 
alternatively to represent normative models of how an economic agent should act. Behavioral 
economic models, which allow individuals to make boundedly rational decisions, have become 
fashionable as descriptive models of how humans make decisions. 
However, for artificially intelligent agents, with essentially no limits of computational power, 
classical theory becomes relevant as a description of behavior. In the domain of individual choice, 
artificial agents can use objective probabilities rather than distorting them. They can discount the 
future exponentially rather than hyperbolically or time-inconsistently. They can have expectations of 
the future that are the unbiased given the information they have available, rather than extrapolating 
from previous trends. 
Furthermore, in interactive settings, classical game theory would be relevant. Game theory requires 
very strong assumption both on the objectives and reasoning ability of an individual and on his beliefs 
about the objectives and reasoning ability of those with whom she interacts. Suppose a hyper-rational 
AI knew that she is interacting with similar agents. Furthermore, suppose that the rationality of agents 
is common knowledge. This means that classical game theory should apply and that Nash equilibrium 
is an appropriate model to describe the outcome of their interaction. 
In classical dynamic models of savings and economic growth, agents were assumed to be infinitely 
lived. For example, in the well-known Ramsey (1928) savings model, which served as the basis for 
the subsequent literature on optimal economic growth, an infinitely lived agent chooses a time-path of 
consumption and savings to maximize his utility over an infinite time horizon. The infinite horizon 
assumption was viewed as a convenient analytical device that made the appropriate optimization 
problem solvable. However, the advent of Methuselarity promises to make infinite horizon models 
descriptive.  
Established models of endogenous growth, such as those of Lucas (1986) and Romer (1990) can 
describe how a singularity might be achieved. In Lucas’ model, there is a production process in the 
economy, which uses labor, capital and human capital, as inputs. Human capital represents 
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productivity-enhancing human experience and skills that result from prior investment in education 
and learning on the job. In his model, labor and capital display diminishing returns, but human capital 
yields increasing returns. That is, more investment in human capital increases production at an 
increasing rate, and the economy can asymptotically approach singularity. An implication is that, if 
human capital is interpreted as the knowledge base possessed by artificially intelligent agents, then the 
model captures how artificial intelligence can lead to a singularity.  
In Romer’s model, productivity is a function of the number of people in the economy. The greater the 
number of people, the more productive is the economy. The intuition is that the greater the number of 
agents, the more productivity-enhancing ideas that they can generate. However, each idea benefits all 
members of the economy. Thus, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes arbitrarily 
large, the economy’s growth rate approaches infinity. The model can be interpreted as describing an 
economy populated with artificially intelligent agents, each of whom are potentially capable of 
inventing technologies that enhance productivity. If an arbitrarily large number of artificially 
intelligent agents can be produced, each of whom might come up with useful ideas, the economy 
would accelerate to approach an infinite growth rate. 
Economic theory also provides a framework to consider the implications of friendly and unfriendly 
Artificial Intelligence. Individuals are assumed to maximize a utility function. This is a function that 
represents their preferences, in the sense that it takes on greater values for more preferred outcomes. 
The classical economic approach assumes that an individual’s utility consists of only her own payoffs, 
which correspond to the objectives of the indifferent AI agents described earlier. However, any 
number of social preference elements can be added to the utility function. Humans have been shown 
in experimental studies to exhibit altruism, a preference to increase the payoffs of others if they feel 
these others have too little. They also often have social welfare preferences, a willingness to sacrifice 
their own interests for the sake of the group, in some cases. They are also willing to repay kind actions 
of others, which is referred to as positive reciprocity. Economic theory can incorporate these elements 
into the utility function and predict the behavior of Friendly AI in different types of interaction. It can 
similarly model unfriendly AI, and thus can potentially model how constraints can be designed to 
keep unfriendly agents in check. This analysis can use the tools of mechanism design (Hurwicz, 
1973), a branch of game theory.   
7.2 Economic History and the Singularity 
Historical growth rates, rather than following a smooth accelerating trend over time have tended to be 
roughly piecewise linear. In other words, growth is more of less constant over a long period of time 
but punctuated with abrupt, seemingly unheralded transitions from one economic era to another. Each 
of these transitions is marked by a sudden and drastic increase in the rate of economic growth. 
With each economic era the question of whether growth speeds up or slows down depends on two 
competing factors. Deceleration typically results as innovators exhaust the easy ideas ─ the low-
hanging fruit. But acceleration also follows as the economy, by getting larger, enables its members to 
explore an ever-increasing number of innovations.  
The economic historian Angus Maddison argues that that between 1950 to 2003, world GDP growth 
was relatively steady. During that time, despite enormous technical change, no particular technology 
left much of a fingerprint on the data, and no short-term accelerations in growth could be attributed to 
a particular technological development. Therefore, Maddison's data offer little support for the idea 
that innovation and growth have accelerated recently. 
However, the data give a different conclusion if taken over a longer time horizon. Bradford DeLong 
considers world output over the last 7000 years. For most of that time, growth proceeded at a 
relatively steady exponential rate, with a doubling of output about every 900 years. But within the 
past few centuries, something dramatic happened: output began doubling faster and faster, 
approaching a new steady doubling time of about 15 years. That's about 60 times as fast as it had been 
in the previous seven millennia.  
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In the roughly 2 million years that our ancestors lived as hunters and gatherers, the population rose 
from about 10000 proto-humans (primitive ancestors of modern humans who began to walk upright) 
to about 4 million modern humans. This implies that if the growth pattern during this era was fairly 
steady, then on average the population must have doubled about every quarter million years. 
Beginning about 10 000 years ago, when humans began to settle down and live as farmers, the 
farming population doubled about every 900 years--some 250 times as fast as before. 
Robin Hanson (2008) suggests that there are perhaps five eras during which growth has exhibited a 
sharp positive increase: the universe after the Big Bang, the emergence of the human brain, the 
appearance of the hunting economy, the advent of the farming economy, and later of the industrial 
economy. Each new era was characterized by a growth rate that was between 60 and 250 times as fast 
as that of the previous era. Each switch was completed in much less time than the previous one. These 
switches can be viewed as Singularities.  
He presents a long term summary of life, the universe and everything which goes as follows. The 
universe started fourteen billion years ago, life appeared by four billion years ago, and on Earth 
animals started growing larger and smarter about half a billion years ago. Humans appeared a few 
million years ago, farming started about ten thousand years ago, industry started about two hundred 
years ago, and computers started a few decades ago.  
According to Hanson’s calculations, history is a sequence of faster and faster exponential growth 
modes. First the largest animal brains grew slowly, and then the wealth of human hunters grew faster. 
Next farmer wealth grew much faster, and finally industry wealth grew faster still. Perhaps each new 
growth mode could not start until the previous mode had reached a certain enabling scale. Humans 
could not grow via culture until animal brains were large enough, farming was not feasible until 
hunters were dense enough, and industry was not possible until there are enough farmers near each 
other.  
While growth rates have varied widely, growth rate changes have been surprisingly consistent -- each 
mode exhibited growth between one hundred and fifty to three hundred times faster than its 
predecessor. Also, the recent modes have made a similar number of doublings before giving rise to a 
new mode.  
The singularities are the result of critical innovations. Most innovations happen within a given growth 
era and do not change its basic growth rate. A few exceedingly rare innovations, however, do 
suddenly change everything. Agriculture was one such innovation; industry was another. 
According to Hanson, another Singularity could lie just ahead. Data on the previous singularities 
might form a guide to what such a transition might look like if previous dynamics continue to apply. 
If a new transition were to show the same pattern as the the effect of agriculture and industrialization, 
then growth would quickly speed up by between 60 and 250-fold. If we extrapolate from previous 
historical patterns, the world economy, which now doubles in size every 15 years or so, would soon 
double in somewhere between a week or a month after the next critical transition.  
What innovation could induce sudden acceleration in economic growth? No improvement within just 
one small sector of the economy could do the trick. In advanced countries today, farming, mining, 
energy, communications, transportation, and construction each account for only a small percentage of 
economic activity. Innovations with specific application in only one of these areas, even if it greatly 
enhanced productivity in that sector, would provide at best a small increase in overall output. Even 
drastic advances in nanotechnology would do no more than merely lower the cost of capital for 
manufacturing, which now makes up less than 10 percent of U.S. GDP. 
However, the next radical jump in economic growth may come from something that has a profound 
effect on everything, because it addresses the one permanent shortage in our entire economy: human 
time. About two thirds of all income in the rich countries is paid directly as wages and any innovation 
that could replace or dramatically improve the efficiency of human labor would be a very big deal. 
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Greatly lowering this cost could have a huge impact. And a robotics or artificial intelligence 
technology which may substitute on a large scale for most human labor may greatly lower labor costs. 
One of the pillars of the modern Singularity hypothesis is that very intelligent machines will produce 
the next Singularity.  
7.3 Economics of Human-Machine Interaction 
David Friedman (2011) has investigated the economics of the introduction of new technologies on 
product and on labor markets. In general, recent and influential new technologies, such as computer 
software and nanotechnology, are characterized by a distinctive cost structure. They have very high 
fixed costs of research and development, and of launching initial production. However, the marginal 
cost of producing additional units is very low. The production of new AI systems, including 
autonomous robots, can be expected to generally have this type of cost structure.  
For the first in a new class of products, a natural monopoly may briefly exist. Depending on how well 
a patent regime can be enforced, and experience suggests that this will be very difficult at the global 
level, new firms will be able to enter after some time. If these firms make products which are close 
but not perfect substitutes, a situation of monopolistic competition would prevail. Because of the cost 
structure, two firms making an identical product would not be able to co-exist, so an entrant with a 
cheaper or better version of the same product can rapidly completely wipe out an incumbent.   
The arrival of AI will greatly influence the labor market. Augmentations of humans that increase their 
productivity will also increase their wages. Inequality between those humans who are augmented and 
those who are not can be expected to increase. 
The introduction of autonomous AI workers on the labor market will have profound effects. This will 
cause a much larger upheaval on the market than that caused by the introduction of China and India 
into the world economy over the last two decades. However, history has witnessed even more drastic 
technological shocks to the labor market and emerged more prosperous. In Western countries, until 
250 years ago, farming was the dominant occupation, employing perhaps 95% of the labor force. This 
share has declined to roughly 2%. This enormous upheaval was wrought by the industrial revolution. 
Humanity survived and prospered. 
Indeed, many kinds of labor have already been replaced by machines. At first, machines replaced 
humans at tasks needing physical strength, but more recently machines have replaced humans at 
mental tasks. If a huge number of important tasks formerly in the human realm were now achievable 
with machines, the economy could start growing much faster, for three reasons. First, capable 
machines could be created in much less time than it takes to breed, rear, and educate new human 
workers. Second, the cost of computing has long been falling much faster than the growth of the 
economy. When the workforce is largely composed of computers, the cost of making computer 
workers will therefore fall at that faster rate, with all that this entails for economic growth. Third, as 
the economy begins growing faster, computer usage and the resources devoted to developing 
computers will also grow faster. And because innovation is faster when more people use and study 
something, computer performance may be expected to improve even faster than in the past. 
However, this should not make human workers as a whole worse off, though workers in some 
occupations will suffer. First of all, all humans can be expected to benefit enormously from the lower 
prices that the expected gains in efficiency will create. Economic theory predicts that the mix of 
human and machine would follow the Law of Comparative Advantage. This is a principle, usually 
applied at the level of countries engaged in international trade. Countries export, and may under some 
conditions fully specialize, in those products which they produce relatively efficiently compared to 
other products. This has the implication that every country exports some products. This is true even 
for those countries that are less efficient producing every product than another country.  
The same would apply to the labor of man and machines. Even if machines eventually become more 
efficient at every economically valuable task than humans, humans would still be employed in those 
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sectors, in which their disadvantage in smallest. The resource that is human labor would not go 
undemanded. For example, suppose that machines are 50 times more efficient than humans at 
preparing food but only 5 times as efficient at dentistry; then humans willing to work will continue to 
find employment as dentists.  
Human wages will depend on the particular sector and tasks they perform. When humans and 
machines are substitutes, and machines can be produced at very low cost, human wages in that sector 
can be expected to fall as demand for them decreases. On the other hand, for tasks where humans and 
machines are complements, demand for human labor would rise, which would tend to increase wages. 
However, the wage changes would be mitigated by workers moving away from sectors in which 
humans and machines are substitutes into sectors in which they are complements.  Furthermore, there 
might still be some human tasks left where machines are not demanded despite their efficiency. For 
example, some rich people, for reasons of taste or status, might still want to be served and entertained 
by real human beings and for such jobs, human wages could rise.    
What about machine wages? Eventually it will become very cheap to produce new AI workers as well 
as to take them out of the labor force. Whether AI workers are the property of their creators, or are 
working for their own benefit, a principle termed the Iron Law of Wages, originally proposed by 
Ferdinand Lasalle, would seem to apply. The Iron Law of Wages states that the price of labor seeks a 
level that is near its subsistence level. For robot workers, this would be at the marginal cost of their 
operation, which would primarily consist of the costs of power, replacement parts, and maintenance. 
If wages were greater than this level, it would mean that new machines could be profitably introduced 
into the market, bidding down wages. If wages were lower than marginal cost, it would mean that 
machines would be withdrawn from the labor force until the break-even point is reached. 
7.4 Methuselarity and Economic Behavior 
Methuslarity will change many current patterns of economic behavior. The current human lifecycle 
can be thought of as consisting of three stages. During the first stage, childhood and adolescence, 
individuals invest in skills to be used in the future. During the second stage, working life, they supply 
labor and earn income. Some of this income is used for consumption, some used to pay back debt 
incurred early in life, and some used to save for retirement. The third stage is retirement, in which the 
individual consumes part or all of her savings, leaving the remainder to heirs.  
The advent of very long healthy lives with low morbidity will likely more or less eliminate the third 
stage. Without age-related illnesses, most deaths will be caused by accidents or catastrophic events, 
and not be preceded by a period of infirmity. Instead of retirement, taking long breaks between spells 
of work may become more common, and some savings will be accumulated for these periods, and for 
bequests should sudden death occur. However, individuals would typically no longer save for 
retirement, a permanent period of leisure when one expects never to return to work. The first phase 
would become longer, as people will invest more in themselves because they have longer to reap the 
rewards. Multiple careers would become more common. 
Kotlikoff (1979) analyses the implications of large life-extension. It would have the effect of shifting 
an individual’s budget constraint outward, since there would be more scope for intertemporal 
substitution of consumption. Life extension would increase the ratio of productive to unproductive 
persons, and increase the intensity of capital of the economy. All of these changes should make the 
world richer, and would mean acceleration in the economic gains that previous increases of life 
expectancy have yielded. Murphy and Topel (2006) estimate that from 1970 to 2000, gains in life 
expectancy added about $3.2 trillion per year to national wealth in the US alone. A number of studies 
find that a five year increase in life expectancy adds between 0.1 and 0.6 per cent to a nation’s annual 
growth rate (see Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, 2008).  
Methuselarity would also affect politics greatly, and intergenerational relations would be affected. 
Politically difficult decisions would have to be made to increase the pensionable age and change 
health care benefits for the elderly. The problem would be exacerbated by the likelihood that there 
78 
 
would be, at least initially, great inequality in lifespans. Wealthy individuals would be the most likely 
to receive life-extending treatments first, and therefore current pension systems may become severely 
regressive. This would likely provoke demands for reform.  
8 State of the Art and Challenges for AGI 
The earlier discussion of different approaches to AGI suggests that the integration of several of the 
approaches into a single AGI research agenda might be desirable.By far the most intensely integrative 
AGI approach is the Novamente AI approach (Goerzel, 2007). The Novamente AI Engine is in part an 
original system and in part an integration of ideas from prior work on narrow AI and AGI. The 
Novamente design is unique in its overall architecture and incorporates aspects of many previous AI 
paradigms such as genetic programming, neural networks, agent systems, evolutionary programming, 
reinforcement learning, and probabilistic reasoning.  
The principles underlying the Novamente design have been derived from a novel complex-systems-
based theory of mind called the psynet model. The psynet model lays out a series of properties that 
must be fulfilled by any software system if it is going to be an autonomous, self-organizing, self-
evolving system, with its own understanding of the world, and the ability to relate to humans on a 
mind-to-mind rather than a software-program-to-mind level. At the moment, a complete Novamente 
design has been laid out in detail, but implementation is not yet complete. The end result will be an 
autonomous AGI system, oriented toward assisting humans in collectively solving pragmatic 
problems. 
Eventually, AGI’s will have many significant advantages over biological intelligences. The ability to 
modify their own underlying structures and dynamics, will give AGI the capacity for self-
improvement vastly exceeding that possessed by humans. AGI designs based too closely on the 
human brain may not be able to exploit the unique advantages available to digital intelligences. 
Increases in computational power and the emergence of technologies like Grid computing also 
contribute to a positive outlook for AGI. While it is possible that, in the not too distant future, regular 
desktop machines will be able to run AGI software comfortably, today’s AGI prototypes are 
extremely resource intensive, and the growing availability of world-wide computing farms would 
greatly benefit AGI research.  
Traditional, narrow AI is very valuable, but AGI research is a very present and viable option. The 
complementary and related fields are mature enough, the computing power is becoming increasingly 
easier and cheaper to obtain, and AGI itself is ready for popularization.  
Optimistic observers expect the following achievements in the realm of AI in upcoming years:  
 The tipping point of human life expectancy will be reached, with every year of research 
guaranteeing at least one more year of life expectancy. In contrast, in 2007, 3-4 months of life 
expectancy were added due to the development of new medicines and treatments. 
 The world energy crisis will be resolved once cheap, high-efficiency solar panels can be 
synthesized by nano-machines and produced for mass use. 
 In 2019, a $1000 PC will have as much power as the human brain and in 2029 it will be 1,000 
times more powerful than the human brain. 
 Reverse engineering of the human brain will be completed in 2029. 
The next grand challenges for future research appear to be: theoretical understanding of behavior; 
achieving higher level intelligence; automated design methods (artificial evolution and 





Theoretical understanding of behavior 
The question is how particular behaviors in the real world can be achieved with artificial agents. This 
has to do with the “here and now” time scale of the mechanisms behind behavior. There are not yet 
general purpose perceptual systems and there is still an insufficient understanding of how we can 
achieve rapid legged locomotion. Although there has been a lot of progress in research on humanoid 
walking robots, especially in Japan, most of these robots still walk more slowly than humans, and 
their walking style looks somewhat unnatural. There should be a match in the complexity of the 
sensory, motor and neural control systems. In this sense many robotic systems are unbalanced. To 
date, most robots are specialized, either for walking, other types of locomotion, or sensory-motor 
manipulation. However, rarely are these robots skilled at performing a wide spectrum of tasks. This is 
due to conceptual and engineering limitations. Huge transdisciplinary efforts between engineering, 
biomechanics, and material science will be required to make progress here. 
Behavior in general requires sensory-motor coordination that in natural systems is achieved by a 
subtle interplay of morphology (of the sensory and motor systems), materials, control, and interaction 
with the environment. Little research has been done on quantifying morphology and materials in 
computational terms. Better materials would almost certainly entail a quantum leap in artificial 
intelligence. Moreover, there are challenges concerning the various sensory modalities such as in 
haptics, that is, communication via touching.  
Achieving higher level intelligence 
Higher level intelligence is not purely sensory-motor. It also refers also to thinking, natural language, 
emotion, and consciousness. In natural systems, brains are intrinsically intertwined with enacted 
embodiment, and cannot be clearly separated from it. The question is how organisms can acquire 
meaning, how they can learn about the real world, and how they can combine what they have learned 
to generate symbolic behavior, a problem known as the “symbol grounding problem.” There is 
general agreement that learning will make substantial contributions towards a solution. Through the 
physical interaction with the environment, the agent induces or generates sensory stimulation, which 
in fact is the enabler of learning as the basis for higher level intelligence.  
Machine learning addresses two interrelated problems: the development of software that improves 
automatically through experience and the extraction of expert rules from a large volume of specific 
data. Systems capable of exhibiting such characteristics are important because they have the potential 
to reach higher levels of performance than systems that must be modified manually to deal with 
situations their designers did not anticipate. Hence, software must be automatically adapted to new or 
changing users and runtime environments, and to accommodate for the rapidly increasing quantities 
of diverse data available today. 
Automated design methods (artificial evolution and morphogenesis) 
The question is what are the basic design considerations for creating a synthetic model of the 
evolution of living systems (i.e. an `artificial life' system)? Automated methods must be employed 
because humans will no longer be able to manually design all aspects of such systems. The grand 
challenge is to develop truly complex creatures capable of communication, language, high-level 
cognition, and – perhaps – consciousness. The extent to which physically realistic simulations are 
sufficient for this purpose, and whether evolution actually must happen in the real world with its 
infinite richness, are deep and currently unanswered issues. 
Moving into the real world 
The last grand challenge concerns, very generally speaking, the “move into the real world.” Enacted 
embodied artificial intelligence is based on the idea that true intelligence always requires interaction 
with the real world. Building intelligent robots that are capable of performing a wide range of tasks 
remains a grand challenge. Cyborgs could be viewed as a way to “move into the real world”. 
80 
 
Combining biological neural tissue and a real-world artifact opens up entirely new avenues in man-
machine interaction. On the one hand, we may learn something about neural functioning, and on the 
other we might be able to better understand how to control robots by observing the natural neurons. 
Medical applications in prosthetics, such as an artificial device replacing a missing body part, are 
obvious candidates for practical applications. 
Finally, a big challenge, conceptually and from an engineering perspective, is the development of 
systems in the real world of self-repair, self-assembly, and self-reconfiguration.  
The Future of Artificial Intelligence 
Well before the end of the 21st century, thinking on non-biological substrates will dominate and 
biological thinking will be stuck at 1026 calculations per second. Nanobot technology (nano robots 
with the size of human blood cells, which can communicate with each other wireless) will expand our 
minds in many ways. Nanobots will be introduced without surgery, likely injecting or swallowing 
them. They can also be directed to leave the body, so that the process is easily reversible. They can 
take up trillions of positions throughout the brain.  
 
The electronic circuits in a computer are already more than ten million times faster than a human 
neuron’s electro-mechanical processes. The combination of human level intelligence with a 
computer’s inherent superiority in the speed, accuracy, and sharing ability of its memory will be 
formidable.  
Supercomputers should have achieved one human brain capacity by 2010 and PCs may do so around 
2020. By the second decade of the 21st century, computers will be able to read on their own, 
understanding and modeling what they have read. Machines will gather knowledge on their own 
initiative. 
By 2030, it will take a village of human brains (around a thousand) to match $1000 of computing. By 
2030 nanobot technology will be viable and brain scanning will be a prominent application. By 2050, 
$100 of computing will equal the processing power of all the human brains on Earth that would still 
be using carbon-based neurons. 
However, achieving the computational capacity of the human brain with a machine will not 
automatically produce human levels of capability in some areas. These may include musical and 
artistic aptitude, creativity, physically moving through the world and understanding and responding 
appropriately to emotion. The requisite hardware capacity is a necessary, but not a sufficient, 
condition. The software of intelligence is also critical. Mastering the software of intelligence will take 
place through reverse engineering the human brain and copying its design. The basic technologies to 
scan a brain exist today, just not with the requisite speed, cost and size. However, these are improving 
at a double exponential pace. Nanobot-based scanning will be more practical than scanning the brain 
from outside.  
Objectively, after scanning and re-instating all of the neural details of a specific person into a human-
like intelligent entity, the newly emergent “person” will appear to other observers to have very much 
the same personality, history and memory as the person originally scanned. This new person will have 
a body enhanced through biotechnology and nanotechnology. The future machines will claim to have 
spiritual experiences, but ultimately, consciousness cannot objectively be measured. There is no 
consensus yet about whether nonhuman entities could become conscious. 
Subjectively, consciousness of the new entity is critically important: to feel pain, and discomfort, to 
have own intentions, own free will, to have subjective experiences. If he says: “I am lonely, please 
keep me company”, does that settle the issue?  If I am scanned, is this really me? Alas, “the old Me” 
has to sit back and watch the new “Me” succeed in endeavors that the old Me could only dream about. 
While this new “Me” is recognizably similar to “the old Me”, I still would conclude that “he” is not 
“Me”, because I still exist independently. However, the replacement of my brain with a non-biological 
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equivalent leads into a new Me and may lead to termination the old Me. What appears the continuing 
existence of just one Me is really the creation of a new Me and the termination of the old Me. 
The future of AGI is a big, difficult, complicated issue. No one can sensibly claim to know what is 
going to happen. However, a few plausible categories of general scenarios are listed here: 
1) Steady Progress scenario: incremental progress gradually and slowly becoming less and less 
narrow in the direction of AGI. 
2) Dead-End scenario: narrow AI research continues and leads to various domain specific successes 
but does not succeed progressively moving toward AGI. 
3) AGI-Based Singularity scenario: scientific and technological progress occurs so fast that the rate of 
advancement is effectively infinite. The knowledge-advancement curve becomes vertical. There is 
still a dramatic, irreducible uncertainty attached to the development of any future technology as 
radical as AGI, so that the character of the human condition following such a major change is 
substantially unknown. 
4) Kurzweil scenario: AGI is achieved via scanning human brains, figuring out the nature of human 
thought from these scans, and then replicating the human brain function on massively powerful 
computer hardware. 
5) The Path to Posthumanity scenario: the most likely future is one in which human–level AGI is 
achieved via integrative methods synthesizing insights from computer science, cognitive science and 
other disciplines inspired by neuroscience rather than via emulation of the human brain. Kurzweil 
does not provide any proof that an AI-driven Singularity is upon us. In any extrapolation of the future 
of a complex real-world system there can be no such thing as proof, only at best “probably 
approximately correct predictions”. Kurzweil may be underestimating the uncertainty involved in 
predicting the future of complex, open systems like human societies. Kurzweil seems to have 
succumbed to a certain extent to overconfidence. How certain could a date like 2045 for human-level 
AI possibly be? What is the variance of this estimate? There is a lot more uncertainty in the future 
than Kurzweil wants to recognize. A big problem is how to model consciousness and experience. 
Kurzweil may be too confident in his predictions about the intrinsically unpredictable. Kurzweil 
extrapolates not from contemporary progress in the AI field, but rather from contemporary progress in 
computer hardware and brain scanning.  
Brain-scanning and computer-hardware will allow effective human brain emulation sometime in the 
next few decades. A crucial metaphysical question may be how far should devices be developed to 
promote direct brain-machine interactions, or apply external or internal controls of the body or the 
brain? Beyond a certain point, what matters most to humans may not be functional things or physical 
limitations, but relational, moral, spiritual, aesthetic, and creative aspects.   
It is not yet clear what sorts of interactions between design and evolution will prove to be most 
helpful to integrate evolution with AI.AI may be converting more and more of the Earth’s matter into 
engineered, computational substrate capable of supporting more AI’s until the whole Earth is one 
gigantic computer. AI would radiate out into space in all directions from the Earth, breaking down 
whole planets, moons and meteorites and reassembling them into giant computers.  Space technology 
might become advanced enough to provide the Earth permanent protection from the threat of asteroid 
impacts. The universe will be wakened up as all the inanimate dumb matter (rocks, dust, gases, etc.) is 
converted into structured matter capable of supporting life, albeit synthetic life. This process could be 
complete by 2200 or so, or it might take billions of years, depending on whether or not machines 
could figure out how to circumvent the speed of light for the purpose of space travel. AI human 
hybrids, which will become so integrated that they will constitute a new category of life, would have 
both supreme intelligence and may achieve physical control over the universe. 
When computer scientists succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do everything better 
than humans can, then either of two possibilities might occur.  
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First, the machines might be permitted to make their own decisions without human oversight.  The 
human race might easily permit itself to become dependent on the machines. As society and the 
problems that face it become more and more complex and machines become more and more 
intelligent, people will let machines make more of their decisions for them, because machine-made 
decisions will bring better results than man-made ones. Then the machines will be in effective control.  
Second, human control over the machines might be retained. Then the average man may have control 
over certain private machines of his own, but control over large systems of machines will be in the 
hands of an elite which will have greater control over the masses.  
Since human work may no longer be necessary, the human masses may become superfluous and 
exterminated if the elite is ruthless. If the elite is humane, it may use propaganda or other 
psychological or biological techniques to reduce the birth rate until the mass of humanity becomes 
extinct.  
If the elite consist of more compassionate individuals, they may be good shepherds to the rest of the 
human race. They will check that everyone's physical needs are satisfied, that all children are raised 
under hygienic conditions, that everyone has a wholesome hobby to keep him busy, and that anyone 
who is dissatisfied undergoes treatment to cure his "problem."  In such a society, engineered humans 
may be physically healthy, even happy, but they will certainly not be free. Governments may 
intervene by passing laws protecting human rights from robots and requiring robots to be benevolent. 
The most compelling 21st-century technologies - genetic engineering, nanotechnology and robotics 
(GNR) - pose a different threat than the technologies that have come before. Robots, engineered 
organisms, and nanobots, can self-replicate and quickly get out of control with the risk of substantial 
damage in the physical world. Self-replication is the modus operandi of genetic engineering, which 
uses the machinery of the cell to replicate its designs, and it forms the prime danger underlying the 
“gray goo” in nanotechnology, which may destroy life.  
Genetics, nanotechnology, and robotics will become so powerful that they may spawn whole new 
classes of catastrophies and abuses, some of which would be feasible for individuals or small groups 
of troublemakers to initiate. They would not require large facilities or rare raw materials as was the 
case with nuclear weapons. Knowledge alone will enable the use of them.  Hence, there is the danger 
of Knowledge-enabled Mass Destruction (KMD), amplified by the power of self-replication. 
However, each of these technologies offers untold promise too. The vision of near immortality drives 
us forward. Genetic engineering may soon provide treatments, if not outright cures, for most diseases. 
Nanotechnology and nanomedicine can address yet more ills. Together they could significantly extend 
our average life span and improve the quality of our lives.  
If we could agree what we wanted, where we were headed, and why, then by understanding what we 
can and should relinquish, we would make our future much less dangerous. Otherwise, we can easily 
imagine an arms race developing over GNR technologies, as it did with the Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) technologies in the 20th century.  
The new Pandora's boxes of GNR are almost open, yet it is hardly noticed. Ideas cannot be put back 
in a box. Unlike uranium or plutonium, they do not need to be mined and refined, and they can be 
freely copied. Once they are out, they remain out.  
How high are the extinction risks? 
The philosopher John Leslie (2010) has studied this question and concluded that the risk of human 
extinction is at least 30 percent. Kurzweil believes we have "a better than even chance of making it 
through", with the caveat that he has always been accused of being an optimist.  
Some serious people are suggesting that we simply have to move beyond Earth as quickly as possible. 
We should colonize the galaxy using von Neumann probes, which hop from star system to star 
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system, replicating as they go. This step will almost certainly be necessary 5 billion years from now or 
sooner if our solar system is disastrously impacted by the impending collision of our galaxy with the 
Andromeda galaxy within the next 3 billion years.  
Will we survive our technologies? 
We are being propelled into this new era with no plan, no control, and no brakes. The breakthrough to 
wild self-replication in GNR could come suddenly. Building on the relinquishments initiated by the 
Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, successful abolition of 
nuclear weapons could help us build a habit of relinquishing dangerous technologies. Verifying 
relinquishment may be a difficult problem, but not an unsolvable one. 
The major task will be to apply this to technologies that are naturally much more commercial than 
military. There is a vital need for transparency. Verifying compliance will also require adoption of a 
strong code of ethical conduct resembling the Hippocratic oath, and having the courage to 
whistleblow as necessary, even at high personal cost.This requires vigilance and personal 
responsibility by those who work on both NBC and GNR technologies to avoid enabling weapons of 
mass destruction and knowledge-enabled mass destruction. 
It would seem worthwhile to question whether to take such a high risk of total destruction to gain yet 
more knowledge and yet more things.There is a limit to our material needs and that certain knowledge 
is too dangerous and is best forgone. We must find alternative outlets for our creative forces, beyond 
the culture of perpetual economic growth; this growth has largely been a blessing for several hundred 
years, but it has not brought happiness, and we must choose whether to continue the pursuit of 
unrestricted and undirected growth through science and technology with all of the risks that 
accompany it . Philosopher Thoreau (1817-1862) said that we will be "rich in proportion to the 
number of things which we can afford to let alone."  
The Disappearing Computer 
The-computer-as-we-know-it' will have no role in our future everyday lives. It will be replaced by a 
new generation of technologies. Computing will move off the desktop and ultimately integrate with 
other objects and everyday environments. Computing will become an inseparable part of our everyday 
activities, while simultaneously disappearing into the background. It would become a ubiquitous 
utility, taking on a role similar to electricity, an enabling but invisible and pervasive medium 
revealing its functionality on request in an unobtrusive way and supporting people’s everyday 
activities. 
Reality and Hype 
It is the area of strong AI that features more prominently in the public imagination (Arnall, 2003). As 
discussed earlier, the achievement of machine intelligence reaching, or even surpassing our own is 
deemed as inevitable, perhaps within 30 years. But, in fact, the future of strong AI is highly uncertain, 
with considerable controversy within the literature concerning whether it is even possible. 
Furthermore, the economic and social issues raised by the possibility of strong AI are so fundamental 
that they cross many academic boundaries, including philosophy, sociology and psychology. 
Barriers to strong AI 
The standard test against which the possibility of strong AI is often judged is the Turing Test which 
discusses the conditions for considering a machine to be intelligent. One famous sceptic of AI is 
Hubert Dreyfus, who says that a computer will never be intelligent unless it can display a good 
command of common-sense. This will never be fully grasped because much of our commonsense can 
only be learned through experience. Thus, since current computers can only really ‘represent’ things, 
the possibility of taking a skill, emotion, or something else equally abstract, and changing it into a 
series of zeros and ones is, according to Dreyfus, close to impossible.A second famous doubter is 
John Searle, who, with his Chinese Room analogy, has responded directly to Turing. Although a 
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rulebook tells an English–speaking man inside a room how to deal with Chinese sentences which may 
be perfect Chinese, it does not follow that the man actually understands the language as a native 
speaker would, rather than merely processing it. 
These kinds of convincing rebuttals demonstrate that there are intellectually powerful barriers to the 
ultimate goal of AI research. Many researchers consider strong AI as neither particularly likely nor 
even desirable. Although computers are certainly becoming faster, this does not necessarily imply that 
computers are becoming more intelligent. 
Moore’s law in hardware development must be contrasted with the fact that computer engineers do 
not seem to be able to write software much better as computers get more advanced.Even if the ability 
to program software advances rapidly within the next few decades, it seems likely that the AI 
laboratories will be incapable of providing the kind of environment necessary for generating well-
rounded intelligence.  It cannot be expected to build a single, isolated AI alone in a laboratory with 
much intelligence. This is unless AIs are provided with space in which a rich culture will be evolved 
with repeated social interaction. 
And with things that are like them, you cannot really expect to get beyond a certain stage. Robots lack 
the dexterity of the human hand, essential for the types of manufacturing that have moved to low-cost 
locations. Low-cost dexterous manipulation is essential if progress is to be made. At present, however, 
creating dexterous manipulation is beyond researchers. This and similar challenges are unlikely to be 
met in the next few years. It may be 30–40 years before such technologies are perfected. 
A future for strong AI? 
In spite of the many fundamental barriers the fields of AI and robotics are replete with many 
wonderfully inventive predictions, a domain where reality and science fiction often meet. Indeed, it is 
likely that in the next two decades more and better capabilities will be observed that may be attributed 
as awareness. However, it is unlikely that machines will ever have human awareness in the 
philosophical sense of the term, although they may come close in the long term. Rather, we can 
expect to see classical AI going on to produce more and more sophisticated applications in restricted 
domains, such as expert systems, chess programs and Internet agents.  
Therefore, in conclusion, full AI will not be expected for at least several decades. The reason is that 
there is no obvious direct path for getting from the simple robots and brittle software programs 
currently in existence to human-level intelligence. A long series of conceptual breakthroughs are 
needed, and for this kind of thinking, it is very difficult to anticipate a timetable. 
Predictive intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence has a predictive aspect which concerns the ability to use software running on 
powerful computers to analyze information about human behavior. In the private sector, companies 
are already using predictive intelligence to analyze data profiles and solve more mundane business 
problems, like marketing to help customers market more effectively and to identify which customers 
are more likely to spend the most money. 
Another example of this is provided by the US Department of Defense which is mining data sources 
all over the world to detect, classify and identify foreign terrorists, decipher their plans, and take 
timely action to pre-empt and defeat their acts. The tools rely to a large extent on new AI 
technologies. These include “entity extraction” from biologically inspired algorithms for agent 
control, for face, iris and gait recognition, and for avoiding surprise and predicting future events. 
Concerns have emerged in relation to their implications for infringing individual and group privacy, 





Strong AI asks fundamental questions because it necessarily deals with the nature of human-machine 
relationships. So great are the implications, that the kinds of tools that might be necessary to begin 
debate over strong AI are not yet available. It is likely that this technology will not occur in the next 
few decades, although such potentially revolutionary developments should not be downplayed as 
mere science fiction.  
The prospects of these emerging technologies to affect quality of life in the coming decades should be 
realistically assessed. There can be no decisive conclusions; the industries involved are too dynamic 
and uncertain to generate any real sense of resolution. Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight a 
number of important differences and similarities between nanotechnology and AI which go some way 
to shedding more light on their character. 
Perhaps the greatest contrast between the two industries concerns public interest. Nanotechnology is 
widely regarded as a new and exciting branch of science and technology. This belief has contributed 
to a massive period of growth in research. AI, on the other hand, is viewed by many as a highly 
specialized and unproven discipline.  The AI community has experienced difficulty in publicizing its 
own achievements, without provoking general anxiety over machine superiority. This has resulted in a 
struggle to attract funding in the past, and it is likely that this trend will continue for sometime into the 
foreseeable future. 
Visible similarities also exist between nanotechnology and AI. There has been much talk about the 
convergence of traditionally separate scientific fields. For example, a confluence of nanoscience, 
biotechnology, IT, and cognitive science (NBIC) could lead to a tremendous improvement in human 
abilities, societal outcomes, the nation’s productivity and the quality of life. Convergence largely 
arises from the wide availability of techniques and tools on offer today bringing individuals from 
traditionally separate disciplines together. 
It is possible that developments in nanotechnology could lead to advances in AI through 
improvements in computer miniaturization, performance, or architecture or through the sensor 
interface. It may be assumed that any futuristic nanobots would have to be imbued with a reasonable 
degree of AI.  
Any pervasive diffusion of nano- and AI-based technologies in the coming decades will change the 
structure of the economy greatly.These economic changes will affect politics, the environment, the 
distribution of income, and our own biology. With the AI revolution, society will undergo perhaps the 
most radical changes in its history. 
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